REPRESENTATION AND ITS BOUNDARIES IN POST-CONFLICT AREAS: CAN REPRESENTATION AND PERFORMANCE INCREASE PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF LEGITIMACY?

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REPRESENTATION AND ITS BOUNDARIES IN POST-CONFLICT AREAS: CAN REPRESENTATION AND PERFORMANCE INCREASE PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF LEGITIMACY?

This dissertation explores how increasing women and ethnic minorities on police forces impacts public perceptions of police legitimacy. It also looks at how performance influences these perceptions and examines how the effects of representation may be limited by perceptions of corruption. Citizen perceptions of legitimacy are increasingly important for countries that have undergone shifts in governance, borders, and ethnic conflict. In areas where conflicts have occurred along ethnic and religious lines, these characteristics become particularly salient in future interactions with the state. The theory of representative bureaucracy suggests that bureaucracies will be more responsive to the public and may garner additional legitimacy when they reflect the demographics of those they serve (Mosher 1968).

This research is situated in Kosovo, a country that has experienced ethnic conflict and gender violence and employs an experimental survey to understand how women and minorities rate police officers in the areas of trust, seriousness in carrying out investigations, and fairness. In gendered scenarios where a respondent had little information about the policies of a force and could only see the demographic makeup of police, representation was an important influence for how women rated legitimacy of police in all areas. In a similar scenario for ethnicity, representation was important to some minority communities but not others. In the scenario where a policy was enacted that would benefit victims of domestic violence, performance mattered to both men and women for all three dimensions of legitimacy, whereas respondents did not react significantly to whether a man or woman enacted the policy. Findings for ethnicity in a similar
scenario where a member of the majority versus minority community enacted a policy show representation was not important, but performance was significant for all groups in all areas of legitimacy. These findings imply that representation is most important when little information is known about policies of the bureaucracy. They also point to the importance of bureaucratic performance and establishing effective policies to gain greater legitimacy in the eyes of the public in terms of evaluations of seriousness, fairness, and trustworthiness of the bureaucracy.

Moving to evaluations of legitimacy based on actual makeup of local police, findings are mixed. However, perceptions of increased corruption are consistently associated with negative perceptions of police legitimacy.
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Introduction

Citizen perceptions of legitimacy are increasingly important for countries that have undergone shifts in governance, borders, and ethnic conflict. Trust and confidence necessary to build community are broken down in societies that have been consumed by violence where neighbors prey on neighbors (Brinkerhoff, 2007). In areas where conflicts have occurred along ethnic and religious lines, these characteristics become particularly salient in future interactions with the state. This dissertation seeks to examine the role that representation in the bureaucracy can play in perceptions of legitimacy in post-conflict areas.

The overall question this dissertation considers is: how do passive and active representation affect citizen perceptions of legitimacy and where are the limits of representation? In answering this question, I make theoretical and substantive contributions to the theory of representative bureaucracy. Representative bureaucracy is concerned with the proportional representation of populations in bureaucratic agencies, as well as with the impacts that representation has on policy making and implementation (Meier and Nicholson-Crotty 2006). The theory suggests that bureaucracies will be more responsive to publics and more accountable when they reflect the demographics of those they serve (Denhardt and deLeon 1995; Krislov 1974; Krislov and Rosenbloom 1981; Meier 1975; Nachmias and Rosenbloom 1973; Saltzstein 1979; Selden 1997; Stein 1986; Meier and Stewart 1992; Theobald and Haider-Markel 2008; Sowa and Selden 2003).

While scholars have studied bureaucratic representation extensively in public organizations in the US, some things remain unclear: how representation is related to citizen perceptions of legitimacy; how the theory of representative bureaucracy travels to other geographical areas and political contexts; and whether corruption may be a limiting factor to the representation-legitimacy link. This paper considers each of these questions. To answer how the theory of
representative bureaucracy applies to contexts outside of the US, this research is situated in a post-conflict setting using Kosovo as a case study.

**Theoretical Framework**

The theoretical framework of this dissertation draws heavily from the representative bureaucracy literature. I also address questions of what constitutes legitimacy and how ethnic and gender representation in the bureaucracy impact perceptions of legitimacy. Kosovo is a country that has experienced ethnic conflict and gender-based violence, and ethnic and gender representation are instilled in the constitution and civil service laws.

**Legitimacy**

Research has identified four core elements to legitimacy: procedural justice (defined as fairness and appropriateness of procedures), performance, public trust, and confidence in police (Boateng, 2018; Hough et al, 2010; Hough, 2012). Legitimacy based on the actions of the bureaucracy can be divided into two types: performance legitimacy and procedural legitimacy. From the perspective of performance legitimacy, legitimacy is derived from government performance and effectiveness. Thus, states possess performance legitimacy in the eyes of citizens when they improve living standards in addition to filling state functions (Francois and Sud, 2006). It is related to collective gains, distributive justice, favorable outcomes, and fairness (Scholte and Tallberg, 2018; Hurd, 2007). Procedural legitimacy, on the other hand, embodies efficiency, expertise, impartiality, participation, accountability, problem solving, and correct procedure (Tallberg and Zurn, 2017; Scholte and Tallberg, 2018; Hurd, 2007).

Legitimacy as a concept capturing beliefs of citizens that bolster obedience/compliance with law includes perceptions by segments of society that government power is exercised fairly in the interest of the whole nation (Levi and Sacks, 2009; USAID, 2005; Cromartie, 2018). Relatedly, legitimacy is described as the foundation of democratic and political authority derived
from citizen perceptions that leaders are elected fairly and laws are enforced through just procedures; consequently, perceptions that these conditions are not met leads to an inability of governments to compel citizens obedience and as well as a loss of authority (Koppell, 2008).¹

Legitimacy is also discussed as important to the continuity, stability, and credibility of an organization and leads to a steady supply of resources from citizens and perceptions that actions undertaken are “more meaningful, more predictable, and more trustworthy” (see Parsons, 1960; Suchman, 1995, pg. 575, emphasis in the original). These definitions emphasize the importance of citizen obedience to laws, which stems from the perceptions of citizens that government fairly exercises power. Legitimacy refers not only to elected officials, but also to bureaucracy, as citizens see laws being enforced through those bodies. The actions of agencies that make up the bureaucracy are then central to gaining or losing legitimacy.

Citizen perceptions of legitimacy will be informed by personal values that have been formed within and shared across their social groups. This has been described as depending on the self-conception of the individual, as obedience comes only when a person sees consistency with the subjection asked of them and the way the self is imagined (Cromartie, 2018). Early building of social identity theory posits that when ‘us and them’ distinctions are salient, people enhance similarities within their group, as well as differences between them and other groups, leading to distinctions to favor their own group (Tajfel and Wilkes, 1963). Relatedly, self-categorization theory says that ingroups inform appropriate ways to think, feel, and act, and says that those who embody these prototypical behaviors become influential leaders in the group; they gain legitimacy as they are seen embodying these characteristics and use rhetoric to locate themselves

¹ Note that Koppel is not arguing in favor of this definition, but rather sees legitimacy and support for political authority as potentially irreconcilable demands.

Within group values are seen in the concept of pragmatic legitimacy. This refers to evaluations of legitimacy based on calculated self-interests of constituents of whether the organization’s activities will benefit their group (Suchman, 1995). This benefit can be through exchange, where support for a policy is based on expected value of the policy outcomes to that group; influence, where the organization is seen as responsive to larger interests and either “incorporates constituents into its policy-making structures or adopts constituents' standards of performance as its own;” and dispositional legitimacy, where constituents respond to organizations as if they were individuals with goals, styles, and personalities (constituents will see organizations as legitimate that "have our best interests at heart," that "share our values," or that are "honest," "trustworthy," "decent," and "wise") (Suchman, 1995, pg. 578).

Because the reflections of one’s own values are inherent to legitimacy, a potential mechanism for building legitimacy is representation, particularly within bureaucracies, as citizens interact most closely with bureaucracies when interfacing with the government. Passive representation in bureaucracy, that is how closely bureaucracies reflect the demographics of those they serve, can fill the first need of feeling represented in the bureaucracy, whereas active representation, where representatives press for the interests of those they represent (Mosher, 1968), can move us toward a legitimacy where bureaucrats share and act on values held by those they represent. Both are important to understanding legitimacy because they lead to different ends: passive may see demographic or symbolic representation as an end whereas active
Some researchers of legitimacy have suggested a move away from whether public officials look like those they serve to considering whether they think like those they serve (Murdoch, Connolly, and Kassim, 2018). While this could suggest moving away from representation altogether, I argue that this could be a call for moving toward examining legitimacy in terms of active representation, rather than only passive. As supported by social identity literature, bureaucrat’s thought process could be due to sharing norms and values with a community in a way that influences how the bureaucrat conceives of a problem and approaches procedure. Rather than taking away from the idea of representation then, this calls for a focus on actions taken by bureaucrats and not only whether a citizen sees themselves represented passively.

Representative Bureaucracy

Several researchers in representative bureaucracy have written about the importance of values and beliefs accounting for positive effects of representation. As early as 1958, Van Riper asserted that background experiences and personal attitudes of civil servants are the determinant for decision making. Lim (2006) asserts that partiality, shared values, beliefs, and empathic understanding are connected with representativeness and that these shared values and beliefs lead to substantive results because minority bureaucrats are able to articulate interests of their group during decision-making processes, as well as when undertaking their own decisions. Meier and Nicholson-Crotty (2006) highlight that representative bureaucracy “assumes that shared experiences or values, which may not be shared across gender or race divisions, fundamentally affect the decisions made by and the actions taken by the bureaucrat” (pg. 850). Active
representation then could affect perceptions of legitimacy based on citizen perceptions that the bureaucracy is acting on their behalf and pressing for their interests.

**Representation and Legitimacy**

Some representative bureaucracy literature has examined the role of representation in relation to legitimacy (see Riccucci, Van Ryzin, and Lavena, 2014; Peters, Maravic, and Schroter, 2015; Gravier, 2013; Theobald and Haider-Markel, 2009). Researchers have found evidence that passive representation influences citizen perceptions of performance, trustworthiness, fairness, and legitimacy of police (Riccucci, Van Ryzin, and Lavena, 2014; Theobald and Haider-Markel, 2009). What remains unclear in the literature is how active representation affects perceptions of legitimacy. I argue that in addition to passive representation, active representation is important to legitimacy, as evidenced by the reference to actions and performance of the bureaucracy in the definitions of legitimacy seen above. While passive representation may be important in affecting perceptions of values held by the bureaucracy, active representation could build legitimacy when a member of an ethnic group actually changes performance to benefit their ethnic group.

Representation and legitimacy may be even more intimately tied in areas that have experienced conflict. Esman (1999) emphasizes that the legitimacy of government in post-conflict areas is conditioned on seeing fellow ethnics wielding power at political levels and in state bureaucracies, being able to compete and attain to those positions, and providing “sympathetic hearing” and protection of allocation of services and provision of benefits (pg. 365). The literature on representative bureaucracy indicates that passive representation is linked to active representation when the issue is salient, when a bureaucrat has discretion, and when policy decisions are relevant to the represented group (Meier 1993). In areas marked by ethnic
conflict, ethnicity in the bureaucracy becomes increasingly salient. This makes ethnicity an important area to observe whether passive and active representation lead to an increase in citizen perceptions of legitimacy. 

The discussion on legitimacy above supports a role for both passive and active representation and places an emphasis on measuring perceptions of legitimacy and performance outcomes. I draw from these definitions to underline the importance of studying both the performance of the bureaucracy and citizen perceptions in building legitimacy.

**Kosovo as a Case Study**

The research for this study was conducted in the context of Kosovo. Kosovo has a population of approximately 1.8 million, with 93% counting themselves as Albanians (these numbers exclude the northern Serbian-majority regions) (Peterson, 2012). Ethnicity is particularly salient in Kosovo due to ethnic conflict and differences in language and religion that generally fall along ethnic lines. With Slobodan Milosevic’s rise to power in Yugoslavia came a Serbian Nationalist agenda, which led to the revocation of Kosovo’s autonomy in 1989 and apartheid-like conditions in the region. After being excluded from the Dayton negotiations to settle ethnic conflict in the Bosnian War, Kosovar Albanians resorted to acts of violence. By 1996, sporadic acts of violence against Serb police and civilians occurred (Rogel, 2003). By 1998, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and Serbian police (and army) confrontations turned into full-scale war (Mertus, 1999). Armed conflict between the KLA and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s army lasted from 1998-1999 and has been characterized as ethnic cleansing (The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000). The International Criminal Tribunal

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2 Research on representative bureaucracy in the US-context finds that representation based on ethnicity has measurable impacts in a variety of policy areas (see Hindera, 1993a; Selden, 1997; and Pitts, 2007).
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) prosecuted crimes committed during the Kosovo War and indicted nine senior Yugoslav officials, including Milosevic, for crimes against humanity and war crimes committed between January and June 1999. Six KLA members were charged with crimes against humanity and war crimes, but only one was convicted (International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 2014). The violence was carried out along ethnic lines, making ethnicity particularly salient in the region.

Much of this violence occurred as police officers joined military groups in carrying out actions against citizens. Both Serbian and Albanian groups experienced oppression at the hands of police from the other group when each was in power. Milosevic took up the nationalist cause after seeing mostly Albanian regional Kosovar police conflicts with Serbs in 1987; this was televised widely in Serbia, contributing to beliefs that Serbs were being persecuted in areas where they were minorities (Percy et al., 1995). Ethnic Albanian Kosovars also met force at the hands of Serbian police. During the late 1980s, Kosovo came under Serbian police rule, which was marked by the arrest, interrogation, or interment of 584,373 Kosovo Albanians (Rogel, 2003). A US Department Report (1997) says that police oppression continued against ethnic minorities, with “police commit[ing] the most wide-spread and worst abuses against Kosovo’s 90-percent ethnic Albanian population.” This included not following legal procedures when extracting “confessions” as well as the arbitrary arrest and detention of citizens. Human Rights Watch found that sexual violence was used as a weapon of war to systematically cleanse ethnic populations (Human Rights Watch, 2000).

The NATO intervention in 1999 was a response to this increased violence from police; in June 1999, Kosovo was placed under transitional UN administration through UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (UN Resolution, 1999). This resolution allowed for an international
presence in Kosovo and provided more autonomy for Kosovo, though UNMIK had authority over the territory, people, and all legislative, executive, and judicial administration. This provisional administration was meant to ensure peaceful conditions for all inhabitants of Kosovo (UNMIK, 2019; Haxhiaj, 2018). Research on failures of UNMIK administration in Kosovo notes that while almost all legislation provided for minority rights, these were often not carried out due to lack of minority representation and bureaucratic control (Eckhard, 2014).

In 2008, Kosovo declared independence, which meant taking governance and administration on themselves (Haxhiaj, 2018). With the change of administration came an opportunity for setting new norms with heavy involvement from the international community in drafting laws over governance in Kosovo. The 2008 constitution and subsequent civil service laws recognize the need for minority protection and minority opportunities. Part of the declaration for independence reads: “We declare Kosovo to be a democratic, secular and multiethnic republic, guided by the principles of non-discrimination and equal protection under the law. We shall protect and promote the rights of all communities in Kosovo and create the conditions necessary for their effective participation in political and decision-making processes” (Full Text: Kosovo Declaration, 2008, emphasis added).

From its inception as a nation, Kosovo has identified representation as a value as well as a tool for a more effective government. Political representation in Kosovo is enshrined in the constitution, which requires that 20 of the 120 deputies of the Assembly of Kosovo must come from minority populations, with no less than 10 of those 20 being held by Serbs (Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, 2008). Article 7 of the Constitution “ensures gender equality as a fundamental value for the democratic development of the society, providing equal opportunities for both female and male participation in the political, economic, social, cultural and other areas
of societal life,” and Article 101 states that “the civil service shall reflect the diversity of the people of Kosovo and take into account internationally recognized principles of gender equality” (Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, 2008).

In addition to constitutional guarantees for political representation, and as evidence of the commitment to participation of all communities in the decision-making process, Kosovo provides a structure for minority and gender representation in the bureaucracy through the 2010 Civil Service Law. The law states that all communities have a right to fair and proportional representation in all levels of the civil service, with ten per cent of central positions reserved for members of non-Albanian communities and proportional representation required at the municipal level (OSCE, 2013). There are 91,000 employees in the public sector in Kosovo (Gap Institute, 2015), and as of 2012, 7.85% of civil servants at the central level were from minority groups, with Bosniaks, Turks, and Serbs being over-represented (OSCE, 2013). This law was extended to specify that 10% of senior posts must be held by non-Albanian communities (ibid.). Likewise, the 2010 civil service law is meant to ensure principles of “legality, non-discrimination, effectiveness and efficiency, accountability, impartiality and professionalism, transparency, and the principle of equal opportunities for women and ethnic minorities” (Law on Civil Service, 2010). Article Three Item 1 states that “The Civil Service is composed of impartial, professional, accountable Civil Servants and reflects multiethnicity and gender equality” (ibid.).

Targets for ethnic diversity of KP are considered met with 10% of officers being Serb, and 3% other ethnicity; however, women remain underrepresented (Green et al., 2012). In 2017 women remained underrepresented and made up only 14% of the 8,820 Kosovo Police, including

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3 The OSCE references the Law on Civil Service, Articles 5(1)(1.2), 5(1)(1.9), 11(1) and 11(2).
4 Note that they have not reached 100% compliance: There are 91,000 employees in the public sector in Kosovo (Gap Institute, 2015), and as of 2012, 7.85% of civil servants at the central level were from minority groups, with Bosniaks, Turks, and Serbs being over-represented (OSCE, 2013).
constituting 11% of uniformed officers (Farnsworth et al., 2018). A 2018 campaign focused on encouraging women to join the KP resulted in nearly double the number of female applicants from the previous 2014 campaign (6.26% of 19,736 applicants in 2014 were women compared to 13.43% of 17,620 applicants in 2018) (Staples, 2019). Police enjoy high levels of trust from Albanian Kosovar citizens with 62.6% saying they trust the KP (Marku, 2019). Serb Kosovars give the lowest confidence ratings with only 17% saying they trust police, while other minorities fall in between with 46.7% responding they trust KP, and women report slightly higher levels of trust in KP compared to men (61.1% vs. 56.2%) (ibid.). This is similar to other contexts addressed in literature on representative bureaucracy, where majority communities are more trusting of the police than minority communities.

The presence of laws protecting minority and gender representation, coupled with the salience of ethnicity and gender in a post-conflict setting, makes Kosovo an interesting area to study how passive and active representation are linked to perceptions of legitimacy by looking at citizen perceptions of ethnic and gender makeup of the police and performance, actual makeup of the police, and how corruption may be a moderating factor that breaks or diminishes the link between representation and legitimacy.

**Chapter Overviews**

Chapter one explores how increasing female representation in the bureaucracy impacts citizen perceptions of legitimacy through use of hypothetical scenarios from an experimental survey. Chapter two examines citizen perceptions of legitimacy in relation to ethnic representation using hypothetical scenarios in an experimental survey. Chapter three considers how representation in the bureaucracy impacts perceptions of legitimacy in real-world settings.
and explores whether there are limits to the impacts of representation when the public perceives that the bureaucracy is corrupt.

Data were collected through an experimental survey that draws from research by Riccucci, Van Ryzin, and Lavena (2014) who look at the effects of passive representation on citizen perceptions of police legitimacy. A nationally representative group of respondents in Kosovo were presented with a series of scenarios in either Albanian and Serbian and asked to imagine they are citizens of the town in the scenarios. They then rated the legitimacy of the police actions taken in terms of how seriously they pursued investigations, how much they trust police to do the right thing, and how fair they were in handling investigations. Scenarios varied the gender and ethnic makeup of police forces and their performance and presented scenarios where a bureaucrat was acting on behalf of their gender or ethnic group. Respondents were also asked to rate Kosovo Police in their area.

The first empirical chapter explores female representation in Kosovo and employs an experimental survey to understand how women rate police officers responding to domestic violence in the areas of trust, seriousness in carrying out investigations, and fairness. It also addresses whether information about bureaucratic performance impacts evaluations of legitimacy in terms of seriousness, trust, and fairness.

When respondents were given information on the demographic makeup of police, but not on policies they had in place, representation became an important influence for women on how they rated legitimacy of police in all areas. Increased female representation was only significant for men in ratings of fairness. When respondents were given information about a policy that was enacted that would benefit victims of domestic violence, respondents did not seem to care whether a man or woman enacted the policy; women’s ratings of trusting police to do the right
thing were significant (p<0.10), but no other area was significant. In contrast, in both the scenarios where only demographic makeup was known and where a policy was enacted, men and women had significant positive ratings for the effect of performance on legitimacy in all three areas. The only exception was that both men and women’s ratings of the impact of performance on fairness were not significant in the scenario where only gender makeup was known, but performance was significant for a policy being put in place to help victims of domestic violence. These findings indicate where representation may be more important: when citizens know little about the policies of their police forces, representation is meaningful to those traditionally under-represented. Effective policies and performance, on the other hand, have positive effects on legitimacy for both men and women, even when forces are less representative of gender.

The second empirical chapter contributes insights into how citizens perceive legitimacy and performance when there is ethnic representation. I assess how representation affects public perceptions of legitimacy through an experimental survey that varies ethnic representation and performance through a series of scenarios and measures legitimacy along seriousness, fairness, and trust.

In the passive representation scenario, only Albanians and non-Serb minorities rated units with more minority representation as more fair, while representation was not significant for any ethnicity in rating police in the areas of seriously pursuing investigations and trust. Higher performance was significant for all minority communities when rating seriousness and trust, but only for Serbs when ratings fairness. In the active representation scenario, having a minority in charge of a policy change was not correlated with higher ratings of police legitimacy among any group. While sharing an ethnicity did not have an impact on ratings of legitimacy, higher performance was significant in all areas of legitimacy for both majority and minority
communities. A better understanding of the sociopolitical context leads to a possible explanation of corruption as a moderating variable that overrides potential gains of increased minority ethnic representation on police forces and points to a potential limitation of the theory of representative bureaucracy.

The third empirical chapter moves away from hypothetical and experimental scenarios to measure citizen perceptions of policing in Kosovo. It asks whether public perceptions of corruption moderate the representation – legitimacy linkage. Using data on police in Kosovo, I examine whether ethnic makeup of police forces is correlated with improved evaluations of legitimacy for minority groups and women.

Findings are mixed for representation leading to more legitimacy but show that increased corruption is consistently associated with negative perceptions of police legitimacy for seriousness, fairness, and trust. Findings for representation show that there are differences across minority groups, with Serbs not having significant ratings for factors of legitimacy when Serb representation increases, while Other Minorities rate bureaucrats more positively in terms of seriousness and fairness when their ethnic groups are represented. Representation has different effects for different groups. This may be due to how each group is treated, their perception of the legitimacy of the government in general, and whose values are being represented. Political and local contexts can moderate expected effects of representation and point to a need for contextualizing studies. These findings underscore other research that considers limitations to representation, especially where past maltreatment by the bureaucracy has occurred, which is common in post-conflict settings.
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Chapter One: Domestic Violence in Post-Conflict Areas: Can Performance and Representation Improve Public Perceptions of Police Legitimacy in Pursuing Domestic Violence Cases?

This paper explores how including women on police forces may improve outcomes for women and increase public perception of police legitimacy when addressing domestic violence. The theory of representative bureaucracy suggests that bureaucracies will be more responsive to the public and may garner additional legitimacy when they reflect the demographics of those they serve (Mosher 1968). This paper examines female representation in Kosovo, a country that has experienced ethnic conflict and gender violence, and employs an experimental survey to understand how women rate police officers responding to domestic violence in the areas of trust, seriousness in carrying out investigations, and fairness. In the scenario where a respondent had little information about the policies of a force and could only see the demographic makeup of police, representation became an important influence for women on how they rated legitimacy of police in all areas. In the scenario where a policy was enacted that would benefit victims of domestic violence, performance mattered to both men and women for all three dimensions of legitimacy, whereas information on whether a man or woman enacted the policy had little impact. Implications of these findings are that if citizens know little about their police forces, representation becomes increasingly important. But even a less representative force can gain legitimacy by enacting effective policies that benefit less represented groups.

Keywords: gender, domestic violence, post-conflict, representation, policing

Gender equality is the fifth UN Sustainable Development Goal and includes ending all forms of discrimination and violence against women and girls in public and private settings (UN Women, 2022). Global research on 39 countries shows that having female police officers on a force is positively correlated with reports of sexual violence, and male and female victims report a preference for reporting to female officers (UN Women 2011). Reporting may lead to better outcomes for women: studies have found that women who received a one-year protection order had an 80% decrease in rates of physical abuse and that two years after obtaining a protection order, there was a 45% decrease in abuse as compared to before receiving a protection order (Carlson, Harris, and Holden 1999; Holt et al. 2002). However, reporting can also lead to worse outcomes for victims when it leads to retribution from their abuser, especially when there is no
guarantee that there will be an effective response from law enforcement (Futures Without Violence, n.d.). Positive actions from law enforcement, such as follow-up home visits and repeated contact with victims, can encourage reporting of domestic violence, while other actions, such as victims who had prior reports of domestic violence feeling the criminal justice response was insufficient or even endangered the victim, discourage reporting (U.S. Department of Justice 2009). Survivors of domestic violence may not report for personal reasons such as embarrassment, fear of retaliation, economic dependency, or societal reasons including, “imbalanced power relations for men and women in society, privacy of the family, [or] victim blaming attitudes” (Gracia 2004). Studies suggest that female officers improve the quality of policing, increase rates of reporting and arrest for domestic violence, support affected citizens, help prevent escalation of domestic violence, and lead to declines in intimate partner homicide and rates of repeated abuse (Miller and Segal 2014; Meier and Nicholson-Crotty 2006; Andrews and Miller 2013; Jordan 2001; Sun 2007).

These findings point to a role for looking at domestic violence from a representative bureaucracy lens; representative bureaucracy suggests that bureaucracies will be more responsive to publics and may garner additional legitimacy when they reflect the demographics of those they serve (Mosher 1968 and Krislov 1974). Passive representation, where the bureaucracy looks more like those they serve, can extend legitimacy to a public organization through a more symbolic role (Selden 1997) and may help communities feel enfranchised when they see a bureaucrat who looks like them (Ricucci and Saidel 1997; Selden 1997; Thielemann and Stewart 1996, as referenced in Meier and Nicholson-Crotty 2006). Active representation, where representatives press for the interests of those they serve (Mosher, 1968), may increase public perceptions of legitimacy where bureaucrats share and act on values held by those they represent.
Both passive and active representation are important to understanding legitimacy because while passive representation is a necessary but insufficient condition for active representation, each on its own may lead to different ends: passive representation may achieve demographic or symbolic representation as an end goal whereas active representation focuses on policy outcomes and implementation undertaken by those doing the representing (Meier and Nicholson-Crotty, 2006). A meta-analysis (Bishu and Kennedy, 2020) of 96 articles on representative bureaucracy identified gaps in the current understanding of the theory, including an absence of studies that focus on different geographic and policy contexts. This study addresses the need to examine representation in varied contexts by examining the role of passive and active gender representation in Kosovo, a country in the Balkans that has experienced gender-based violence during conflict. Its political context is interesting theoretically in that Kosovo is a young country established on ideals of gender representation in political, bureaucratic, societal, and cultural contexts (Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, 2008; Law on the Civil Service of the Republic of Kosovo, 2010). Additionally, this context allows for a better understanding of how more equitable gender representation affects perceptions of legitimacy in post-conflict areas.

This chapter employs an experimental survey based on the work of Riccucci, Van Ryzin, and Lavena (2014) to understand how women and men living in post-conflict areas rate legitimacy of police officers in the areas of trust, seriousness in carrying out investigations, and fairness when there is passive and active representation. Respondents were asked to rate each of these dimensions of legitimacy for police forces with varying levels of gender representation and performance. In passive scenarios, female respondents rated units with higher female representation as more legitimate along each of the dimensions of legitimacy; for men, ratings only increased for how fair police are in carrying out investigations. Both men and women rated
police units as more legitimate in the areas of how fairly they pursued investigations, while only women rated police more positively for seriousness in pursuing investigations and trustworthiness when the number of women on the force was more balanced. Performance was correlated with seriousness and trust—but not fairness—for both men and women when only the demographic makeup of police was known. In the active representation scenario, having a female in charge of a policy change was not correlated with higher ratings of police legitimacy among men, and was only significant for women on ratings of trust. Conversely, higher performance was significant in all areas of legitimacy for both men and women.

This study first establishes a theoretical framework to explore how representation, values, and performance are related. Next, potential contributions and hypotheses are presented. After the context specific to Kosovo is laid out, data and measures are described. Finally, findings and implications are discussed.

**Theoretical Framework**

Representative bureaucracy is concerned with the proportional representation of populations in bureaucratic agencies, as well as with the impacts that representation has on policy making and implementation (Meier and Nicholson-Crotty 2006). Mosher (1968, 12) defines passive representation as “concern[ing] the source of origin of individuals and the degree to which, collectively, they mirror the society” and active representation as cases in which the bureaucrat presses for the interests of those individuals they represent. The theory suggests that bureaucracies will be more responsive to publics and more accountable when they reflect the demographics of those they serve (Denhardt and deLeon 1995; Mosher 1968; Krislov 1974; Krislov and Rosenbloom 1981; Meier 1975; Nachmias and Rosenbloom 1973; Saltzstein 1979; Selden 1997; Stein 1986; Meier and Stewart 1992; Theobald and Haider-Markel 2008; Sowa and
Selden (2003). Krislov (1974) suggested that the notion of representation implies additional legitimacy as the smaller stands for and encapsulates the larger body represented. As mentioned above, passive representation may help communities feel enfranchised when they see a bureaucrat from their own group while active representation may increase perceptions of legitimacy where bureaucrats share and act on values held by those they represent (Ricucci and Saidel 1997; Selden 1997; Thielemann and Stewart 1996, as referenced in Meier and Nicholson-Crotty 2006).

Social identity and self-categorization theory inform why individuals from groups may hold and act on these same values. They point to the salience of distinctions between groups that lead individuals to favor their own group over others as they build norms around appropriate and acceptable ways of acting, thinking, and feeling; influence emerges as leaders embody positive prototypical behaviors and gain legitimacy as they are seen embodying these characteristics and using rhetoric to signal group membership (Tajfel and Wilkes, 1963; Reicher & Hopkins, 1996; Hogg, 2001; Hogg, Hains, & Mason, 1998; Hornsey, 2008). Embodying prototypical behaviors, values, and attitudes of the group then is what maximizes influence and power (Hornsey, 2008).

Legitimacy and Values

One aspect of representative bureaucracy discussed in the literature is the linkage between representation and legitimacy (see Ricucci, Van Ryzin, and Lavena, 2014; Peters, Maravic, and Schroter, 2015; Gravier, 2013; Theobald and Haider-Markel, 2009). Researchers have found evidence that passive representation influences citizen perceptions of performance, trustworthiness, fairness, and legitimacy of police (Ricucci, Van Ryzin, and Lavena, 2014; Theobald and Haider-Markel, 2009; Ricucci, Van Ryzin, and Jackson 2018). Additionally,
decisions that benefit the public can serve to legitimize the actions of government bureaucracies (Selden, 1997).

Citizen perceptions of legitimacy are increasingly important for countries that have undergone shifts in governance, borders, and ethnic conflict. The trust and confidence necessary to build community are broken down in societies that have been consumed by violence where neighbors prey on neighbors (Brinkerhoff, 2007). Civilian confidence in institutions that have had third-party peacekeepers is of particular importance in post-conflict countries as they seek to establish stability and consolidate state power; one avenue to enhancing confidence in the security sector is through inclusion of affected groups, namely increasing female representation in the security sector (Karim, 2019). Research shows that an increase in female representation in national legislatures prolongs peace and reduces conflict reoccurrence through prioritizing social welfare and improving public perceptions of good governance and credibility of elites (Shair-Rosenfield and Wood, 2017). Recruitment of more female peacekeepers in the UN is driven by the idea that women deploy distinctive skills that make units more effective; research has found that an increase in female peacekeepers is associated with greater implementation of rights for women and a greater willingness to report rape in areas where sexual violence was prevalent during conflict (Narang and Liu, 2022).

Literature in the social sciences on legitimacy includes several conceptualizations of legitimacy: legitimacy as capturing beliefs that government power is exercised fairly in the interest of the whole nation (Levi and Sacks, 2009; Cromartie, 2018); as carrying out procedures correctly and fairly (Levi, Sacks, and Taylor 2009; Koppell, 2008; Scholte and Tallberg, 2018; Hurd, 2007; Tallberg and Zurn, 2019; Riccucci, Van Ryzin, and Lavena 2014); as justness measured through evaluations of appropriateness (Knox, 2016); as actions undertaken by
government being seen as trustworthy (Parsons, 1960; Levi, Sacks, and Talyor 2009; Suchman 1995; Riccucci, Van Ryzin, and Lavena 2014); and as based on calculated self-interests of constituents of whether the organization’s activities will benefit their group (Suchman, 1995). These underlying components of legitimacy can serve as proxies to understand legitimacy as a whole. Each concept highlights the importance of individual perceptions in evaluating legitimacy of the bureaucracy and indicates that public perceptions of legitimacy are informed by personal values that have been formed within and shared across social groups. If bureaucrats mirror the demographic characteristics of those they serve, they are more likely to encompass their values and make decisions to benefit those they serve (Meier et al. 1976). When these values are espoused and applied to decision making, they may influence public perceptions of how procedures are carried out, how appropriate resulting actions are, and how fair and trustworthy bureaucrats are.

Legitimacy can be viewed through the lens of performance, trust, and confidence in government actors as well as through procedural justice, which looks at fairness and appropriateness of procedures (Boateng, 2018; Hough et al, 2010; Hough, 2012). From a performance perspective, legitimacy of the bureaucracy can be thought of as being derived from improving living standards for citizens (Francois and Sud, 2006). This improved standard of living is related to favorable outcomes and fair treatment (Scholte and Tallberg, 2018; Hurd, 2007). Procedural legitimacy, on the other hand, stems from correct procedure, expertise, accountability, and problem solving (Tallberg and Zurn, 2017; Scholte and Tallberg, 2018; Hurd, 2007).

The foundation of legitimacy is based on justness and evaluations of appropriateness (Knox, 2016). These evaluations that lead to legitimacy have been described as “a generalized
perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995, pg. 574). Citizen perceptions of legitimacy then will be informed by personal values that have been formed within and shared across their social groups and will serve as important criteria for determining legitimacy.

Values and beliefs are advanced in research as key determinants for decision making, which may account for the positive effects of representation. Personal attitudes of civil servants, partiality, and empathetic understanding are all tied to representation (Lim, 2006; Van Riper, 1958). Bureaucrats hold values and beliefs that are then articulated in decision-making processes, which lead to substantive results for the represented (Lim, 2006). When values are more likely to be shared within as opposed to across gender and ethnic lines, representation affects how bureaucrats behave (Meier and Nicholson-Crotty, 2006). Because the reflections of one’s own values is inherent to legitimacy, a potential mechanism for building legitimacy is likely through representation. Bureaucracies are particularly important areas for representation where residents interact face-to-face when interfacing with the government.

**Representation, Gender, and the Context of Policing**

Representative bureaucracy literature has considered a variety of demographic and policy areas, including both gender and policing (Meier and Nicholson-Crotty, 2006; Keiser et al. 2002; Riccucci, Van Ryzin, and Lavena, 2014; Andrews and Miller, 2013). Keiser et al. (2002) discussed three types of issues where gender representation is likely to occur: (1) policies that benefit women as a class; (2) policies that through the political process have been defined as gendered and may therefore be more salient to women; and (3) instances where gender fundamentally changes the relationship with the client. In the area of policing, the importance of
female representation has been shown in the US and England. Riccucci, Van Ryzin, and Lavena (2014) found that gender representation on police forces influenced perceived job performance, trustworthiness, and fairness. Andrews and Miller (2013) found that female police chief constables are associated with higher arrest rates for domestic violence but that an increase in female police officers is only significant when they are able to carry out front-line police work. Schuck (2018) found a relationship between greater numbers of women on police forces and higher rates of reporting rape and processing rape cases. Meier and Nicholson-Crotty (2006) found that more female police officers increase the likelihood that female victims will report sexual assaults, and Nicholson-Crotty et al. (2018) demonstrate similar findings within sexual assault reporting networks.

Meier and Nicholson-Crotty (2006, pg. 852) posit that a theoretical link can be formed between passive and active representation by looking at how policy improves “even if the representative does not specifically act for the represented” and examine the importance of female representation for access to political and social power. They suggest both passive and active representation may be at play regarding sexual assault: the gender of an officer may change how the client perceives officers, and the officer may be in a position to change how sexual assault is handled within the department. The authors suggest four theoretical reasons a police force with more female officers may lead to better outcomes in issues affecting women: (1) a woman who sees more women on a force could assume sexual assault is taken more seriously; (2) a woman will be more likely to have a female officer as first point of contact; (3) female officers may sensitize their male colleagues; and (4) a female officer could share a set of values with female residents because of common gender-related experiences. Only the final reason directly depends on the actions of an officer representing her group; the rest involve
others’ perceptions (either the perception of those reporting or of male officers after interacting with female officers). As such, the authors note that in two of these mechanisms, there does not need to be contact between a citizen and a female officer for representation to occur: (1) female clients may observe more women patrolling in their city, and (2) female officers may share and act on a set of values with other women.

These proposed mechanisms suggest the importance of looking at both passive and active representation in conjunction with citizen perceptions of legitimacy, especially as it pertains to gender makeup of police in marked situations, such as sexual assault or domestic violence. These issues will be particularly salient in a post-conflict area where sexual assault was used as a weapon in conflict and where domestic violence persists.

Because the gender of police officers should be more salient to those who are usually underrepresented, women may care more about female representation on police forces than their male counterparts, which would lead them to rate officers as being more legitimate along the three dimensions discussed above. This leads to the following hypotheses:

H1: Women will rate units with higher levels of gender representation as more legitimate

H2: Women’s ratings of bureaucratic legitimacy will increase when a female bureaucrat is seen actively pursuing the interests of their group

However, representation may not be the only factor in citizen’s evaluations of bureaucratic legitimacy. The idea that policies will benefit a class points to a potential role for bureaucratic performance in influencing evaluations of legitimacy. Literature on representative bureaucracy implies that representation improves performance, whether directly or indirectly, through impact on bureaucrat’s decisions or citizen perceptions (Andrews et al., 2016). However, representation is likely not the only factor influencing good performance. Research on police performance indicates that factors like psychological and physiological stress responses and
training in a variety of methods impact police performance positively or negatively (Andersen and Gustafsberg, 2016; Arnetz, Arble, Backman, Lynch, & Lublin, 2013; Arnetz, Nevedal, Lumley, Backman, & Lublin, 2009). A use of force decision-making method of training is correlated with better physiological control, situational awareness, and overall performance; image-based psychological and technical techniques led to improvements in problem-based coping, sleep, and lessened exhaustion, all of which are correlated with enhanced performance; and police trauma resilience training lead to less negative moods, heart reactivity, and police performance (ibid.). As such, performance itself can influence perceptions of legitimacy outside of performance gains that are driven by representation. This leads to the following hypothesis:

H3: Women will rate units with higher levels of performance as more legitimate when controlling for levels of representation

Research has also explored whether there is an interaction effect between representation and performance. Riccucci, Van Ryzin, and Lavena (2014) ask whether citizens more positively evaluate an agency when there is both high representation and high performance and find that while both matter separately, there does not seem to be an interaction between representation and performance in their context. Riccucci, Van Ryzin, and Jackson (2018) find mixed results for performance and representation. For white respondents, they found that higher representation had little influence when performance increased (measured by number of complaints) yet also found that whites reacted negatively to higher representation of African Americans when performance decreased. Conversely, they found that black respondents generally rated police higher when there was more representation, and even higher when there was good performance. On the issue of trust, whites rated police lower regardless of job performance when the number of black officers increased while black respondents rated police as more trustworthy regardless of performance when the number of black officers increased. Consistent with findings from
Ricucci, Van Ryzin, and Lavena (2014), they find that the interaction between representation and performance is not significant for black respondents, though it is for white respondents. These studies indicate that performance and representation are shape perceptions separately, but that the interaction of the two is not consistent across groups. Performance on its own seems to matter outside of gains driven by representation. It is worth noting that research has found that representation and performance are not always zero-sum gains, meaning that a minority group can make gains without a corresponding loss to the majority (Meier, Wrinkle, and Pollinard, 1999).

**Kosovo Context: Domestic Violence**

From its inception as a nation, leaders of Kosovo have identified gender representation as a value and tool for more effective government. Both the 2008 constitution and subsequent civil service laws recognize the need for equal opportunities for men and women (Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, 2008; Law on Civil Service, 2010). The legal and regulatory framework guaranteeing equal representation for women is less extensive than that guaranteeing representation for ethnic communities, and equal representation is considered achieved when it reaches 40% (*ibid.*). Municipal structures are broadly in compliance with female representation at 41%, though central institutions had representation of women at 36%. These numbers are not broken down by seniority or by ethnic community, so it is difficult to tell whether women face discrimination by both ethnicity and gender (*ibid.*).

Gender representation on police forces lags behind other institutions and is a prominent area of focus for improving the civil service in Kosovo. Increased female representation in policing has been an aim of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which has supported the Association of Women in the Kosovo Police since 2004 (OSCE, 2019). In 2017
women remained underrepresented and made up only 14% of the 8,820 Kosovo Police, including constituting 11% of uniformed officers (Farnsworth et al., 2018). There have been recent gains, however. A 2018 campaign featured female KP officers, retired American Chief of Police, and the U.S. Embassy’s Department of Justice police support program (ICITAP) to encourage women to join the police force (U.S. Embassy Pristina, 2018). ICITAP reported that the number of women who applied doubled after this campaign (L. Berkani and R. Staples, Personal Communication, March 28, 2019). A 2019 mandate required 30% of participants at trainings to be female; out of the 430 KP officers hired to go to basic training in 2019, 30.9% were female (Jones 2020).

Responding to domestic violence in particular has been a focus of the Kosovo Police. Progress in the legal framework for addressing domestic violence was made in 2018, when the Criminal Code was revised to define and treat domestic violence separate from other offenses; in 2019, 650 more cases were reported than in 2017 (UN Women 2019). Failing to comply with a civil court judgment on domestic violence is considered a criminal and prosecutable offense, though prosecution is rare (US Department of State, 2019).

Police data in Kosovo indicate 94% of gender-based violence is perpetrated by men, and 62% of Kosovars have experienced domestic violence (68% of women and 56% of men) (ibid.). In 2017, of the 1,125 cases of reported domestic violence, 76% of the victims were women (ibid.). Police are often the first to respond to domestic violence calls, but, while 73.6% of Kosovars say they would turn to the police to assist with domestic violence, many do not trust officers to follow through with investigations (UN Women 2017). Female police are actively working to change the culture of normalizing and dismissing domestic violence cases (ibid.). A training for KP by Jane Townsley, founder of Force International, retired UK senior police
officer, and experienced gender specialist in the field of policing and security, emphasized the importance of domestic violence units, trust and confidence in police, gender-responsive policing, and effective policies. She noted that “effective police response is a major contributing factor to the reputation of Kosovo Police” (UN Women 2018).

Despite institutionalized values of representation, sexual violence is still a concerning issue in Kosovo. Recent statistics reported by the Kosovo Women’s Network indicate that more than two-thirds of women have been victims of domestic violence, and women’s rights groups in Kosovo report that workplace sexual harassment and abuse often go unreported for fear of dismissal or retaliation (US Department of State, 2019). A high-profile domestic violence case in 2018 that resulted in the murder of the perpetrator’s wife and nine-year-old daughter sparked public protests, as the victims’ relatives claimed they contacted Kosovo Police (KP) multiple times to request assistance, including reporting a death threat four hours before the murder. The murderer was later found guilty and sentenced to 24 years in prison (US Department of State, 2019). In February 2019, Kosovo women protested outside Kosovo Police Headquarters in Pristina after a teenager reported to police that she had been raped by a teacher; she was then assaulted by the Kosovo Police Officer to whom she reported and was forced to have an abortion (Surk, 2019). The Kosovo Police Inspectorate reported that 19 total police officers were accused of domestic violence between 2019 and 2020 (Ahmeti 2021).

Kosovo Police have increased efforts to address domestic violence since these occurred. In June 2021, Kosovo Police organized a meeting on increasing capacity to handle domestic violence cases, and, in July of that year, ICITAP led a series of round-table discussions with Kosovo Police Domestic Violence investigators and officers to address areas for improvement in responding to and serving children and families in domestic violence situations; findings were
reported to the KP General Director and Executive Management Staff (US DOJ, 2021). Kosovo Police have made a public effort to raise awareness of the problem of domestic violence in Kosovo through billboards, television advertisements, and debates and are calling on witnesses and victims to report domestic violence to police (OSCE, 2021). In November 2021, KP and the OSCE Mission launched a joint campaign with messages that “One slap is violence; violence is a crime,” in an effort to promote a zero-tolerance policy for domestic violence (ibid.).

The focus on institution and capacity building, increasing the number of women on the police force, and continued salience of sexual violence in Kosovo make this an appropriate area to research whether increased numbers of women on police forces, women in positions of authority to make policy choices, and enhanced performance lead to increased perceptions of legitimacy.

Data

The data for this chapter come from an experimental survey administered in Kosovo in September 2019. The survey was given to a representative sample of all ethnic communities and equal numbers of men and women from the 38 major municipalities in Kosovo ages 18 and up (N=490). It was administered in Albanian and Serbian, the official languages of Kosovo. Weighting was introduced to the sample by multiplying the minorities by a factor of 2.41 for every one Albanian.5 This ensured 50 Serbian respondents and 50 respondents from other minorities. Responses were weighted accordingly in all analyses. The sampling method used is a multi-staged random probability method typical of surveys in Kosovo. Stage one accounts for the appropriate rural/urban divide (45% urban/55% rural) of the country. Stage two refers to selecting households using a random-house technique. This consists of an assigned starting point

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5 Analyses were conducted without weighting and found similar results.
in a given direction. In urban areas, the selected household is each third house/address on the left-hand side of the street. In block-of-flats the selected household is every third apartment, counting from the top floor in each entrance. In rural areas, the selected household is every third inhabitable dwelling on both sides of the interviewer's route. In rural settlements with dense and compact patterns, the selection procedure resembles the one for urban areas. Stage three selects one member of the household using the nearest birthday technique. Stage four accounts for substitution of a respondent after two attempts (one initial visit and one call back).

Participants rated trust, fairness, and performance of Kosovo Police in both a passive representation and active representation scenario involving domestic violence (see Appendix B for complete survey questions). In the passive scenario participants were randomly assigned a ratio of male to female police officers of either 9:1 or 5:5 for a police force that receives calls reporting domestic violence, conducts investigations, and makes determinations for which actions should be taken. Participants were also randomly assigned a police performance measure of 70% or 30% arrests and were told that arrests reduce the number of victims seriously injured or killed due to domestic violence. These numbers were chosen to more clearly indicate low and high representation and poorer and higher performance. They are based on a similar experiment from Ricucci, Van Ryzin, and Lavena (2014); the researchers chose these values based on several cognitive pretests carried out on graduate students that were found to be salient to respondents on both gender and performance factors. After reading the scenarios, respondents were asked to rate how seriously police pursue an investigation, how much of the time citizens can trust police in the scenario to do what is right, and how fair they would say police are likely to be in handling domestic violence cases.
For the active scenario, the same participants were then randomly assigned to a scenario where either a male or female had been promoted to oversee the handling of domestic violence cases. They were told the officer implemented a new system where victims of domestic violence meet with officers of their own gender to report the crime, and it is now mandatory to arrest perpetrators of domestic violence. They were then randomized into a group where domestic violence decreased by either 80 or 20 percent and told victims reported they feel more comfortable reporting domestic violence crimes to police. These thresholds are also based on research by Riccucci, Van Ryzin, and Lavena (2014). Respondents were again asked to rate how seriously police pursue an investigation, how much of the time citizens can trust police in the scenario to do what is right, and how fair they would say police are likely to be in handling domestic violence cases.

Because respondents were first assigned to passive and then to the active scenario, there should not be any influence from the active scenario on the passive; however, respondents could have been influenced by the passive scenario when answering questions about the active scenario. To ensure this was not the case, ratings of how seriously police pursue investigations, trust, and fairness in the active scenario were regressed on assignment to both passive representation and performance. Neither passive assignment variable was significant, indicating that exposure to the passive scenario did not influence ratings in the active scenario.

Randomization in each scenario meant all participants were assigned to two of eight possible groups for both the passive and active scenarios, as shown in figures one and two. Balance tests were carried out using a t-test to ensure randomization occurred. For the passive representation scenario, respondents were first randomized into a representative or non-representative group. No characteristics were significant except for age. For the assignment to
Table 1 below shows the descriptive statistics for assignment to the passive representation domestic violence scenario while Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the active representation domestic violence scenario. Approximately 52% of all respondents are female, 89% are Albanian, and 5% are Serb (before weighting, this was 61% Albanian and 18% Serb). The average monthly income is 648 Euros and the average age is 36. All models control for gender (female=1; male=0), age (a continuous variable), marital status (married=1; else 0), ethnicity (defined as Serb, Albanian, and other), administrative district (seven dummy variables indicating district the respondent resides in; these regional fixed effects are included in all analyses but not reported in tables), education (a categorical variable with six categories where 6th-9th grade is the lowest category and doctorate is the highest), and monthly income (ranging from less than 400 Euros/month to over 1000 Euros/month).

See Table 1

See Table 2

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Kosovo statistics show 92.9% of the population are Albanian, and 1.5% are Serb. However, these estimates may under-represent Serb and some other ethnic minorities because they are based on the 2011 Kosovo national census, which excluded northern Kosovo (a largely Serb-inhabited region) and was partially boycotted by Serb and Romani communities in southern Kosovo (CIA, 2020).
The dependent variables in this study capture components of procedural legitimacy: 1) how seriously police pursue investigations, 2) how often they can be trusted to do the right thing, and 3) how fair police are in handling investigations. Seriousness in pursuing investigations is strongly correlated with trusting police to do the right thing (both passive and active scenarios $r=0.8$), and fairness in handling investigations is moderately correlated with both seriousness and trust (passive: $r=0.5$ for both; active: $r=0.7$ for both) (see Appendix A Tables 5 and 6 for correlation tables). These correlations indicate overlap in the concepts being measured and represent a potential weakness in the current study. Further research may be necessary to isolate the various characteristics that make up legitimacy. Each of the dependent variables are rated using a five-point Likert scale. The main explanatory variables of interest are the two assignment groups respondents were randomly assigned to: how representative the police force is of the population and high or low police performance.

All analyses below report coefficients of linear regressions for separate female and male subgroups, similar to Riccucci, Van Ryzin, and Lavena (2014). See Table 6 in Appendix A for regressions on the full sample. Ordinal logits were also performed as a robustness check, and the same variables were found to be significant. Initially, all models were run with interactions between the two assignment variables, and the interactions were not significant in any models. This is consistent with findings from Riccucci, Van Ryzin, and Lavena (2014), where no interaction effects were found for performance and representation among minority respondents, though they did find a significant interaction for white respondents when looking at race and policing. These interactions were dropped in subsequent analyses.
Findings

Hypothesis one stated that women will rate units with higher levels of gender representation as more legitimate. As reported in Table 3 below, women who were assigned to the more representative group were more likely to give police higher ratings for how seriously they carried out investigations (p<0.05), how much they trusted police to do the right thing (p<0.05), and how fair they were in handling investigations (p<0.001). The effect for fairness was double that for seriousness and trust, with female respondents in the more representative group increasing ratings of police fairness by 0.634 on average and by 0.329 for seriousness and 0.307 for trust. The same assignment is not significant among male respondents for how seriously police pursue investigations and trusting police to do the right thing (p=0.24 and 0.22 respectively). However, being assigned to a more representative police force is correlated with men increasing ratings of perceptions that police handled investigations more fairly by 0.487 (p<0.10).

See Table 3

These findings show that, for women, a more representative police force increases perceptions in all three aspects of legitimacy while it only impacts men’s perceptions of fairness. Men may see women as being more fair, but this does not translate into perceptions that the work on the case (carrying out the investigation and trusting that they will do the right thing) will be impacted. Notably, the coefficients for fairness are higher for men and women than for the other two aspects of legitimacy. For both men and women, the change in ratings doubled for evaluations of fairness as compared to seriousness and trust: from 0.33 and 0.31 to 0.63 for women and from 0.25 and 0.23 to 0.49 for men respectively. Overall increase in ratings of officer fairness by women was 0.15 higher for women than for men. Interestingly, the increase in men’s evaluations of fairness was higher than the increase in women’s ratings of seriousness and
trust, indicating that representation has a greater impact on fairness than it does on seriousness and trust for both men and women. The rate of change in evaluations of seriousness and trust versus fairness are consistent with the strong correlation between seriousness and trust and the weaker correlation with fairness.

Hypothesis two states that women will rate units with higher levels of gender representation as more legitimate when bureaucrats actively pursue the interests of their group. In this experiment, this means women should rate units with a female officer overseeing domestic violence efforts as more legitimate. However, Table 4 below shows that neither men nor women being assigned to a group where a woman is promoted to lead domestic violence efforts is consistently correlated with increases in ratings of police officers. The only exception is for females, who increased ratings of trusting police to do the right thing by 0.257 (p<.10 in both cases). This effect on trust is smaller than the impact on any of the three areas when being assigned to a more representative group in the passive scenario. The active scenario only differed between whether a woman or man put an effective policy in place. This means that regardless of the gender of the person making the policy, the outcome was the same: a policy that was known to be effective was enacted. This may point to the importance of how effective the policy was rather than the gender of the officer establishing the policy. This aspect of performance is addressed in hypothesis three below.

Because the dependent variables in each of these hypotheses uses a Likert scale, a one-unit increase in evaluations of seriousness, trust, and fairness would move a respondent to the next higher category of ratings on average. Assuming the difference between categories in the scales are consistent, a one-unit increase for fairness would mean that a respondent who would have rated police as somewhat fair would rate them as very fair or move from very unfair to
somewhat unfair. This means that in the passive scenario, substantive effects of representation for women on seriousness and trust are quite small and effects on fairness for both men and women are moderately small. Effects of representation on trust for women in the active scenario are slightly smaller, but effectively the same as ratings of seriousness and trust in the passive scenario.

See Table 4

Hypothesis three states that women will rate units with higher levels of performance as more legitimate. Table 5 below shows that being assigned to a group with higher performance is significantly and positively correlated with perceptions of seriousness in pursuing investigations and trusting police to do the right thing in the scenario where respondents know the demographic makeup of police but no policy is discussed (the passive representation scenario) (p<0.001). It is not significant for perceptions of fairness in handling investigations for either men or women. This again shows a consistency in correlation between seriousness and trust.

The impact of improved performance on men and women’s ratings of trust is higher than the impact of being assigned to a more representative group in the passive scenario. On average, men and women rated police 0.8 higher for seriousness and 0.7 higher for trust when assigned to a higher performing force in the passive scenario; this is much higher than the 0.3 impact on seriousness and trust from being assigned to a more representative police force in the same scenario. This indicates that performance is more important than the demographic makeup of police.

See Table 5

Interestingly, performance matters for men and women in the case where a policy is put into place to improve handling of domestic violence cases in all areas of legitimacy (p<0.001 for
all except males in their perception of fairness in handling investigations, which is significant at the p<0.10 level). The impact of improved performance on men and women’s ratings is again higher than the impact of being assigned to a more representative group. In the active scenario, only women’s ratings of trust were higher; the increase was fairly negligible at 0.1. In contrast, women’s ratings of officers in each area of legitimacy rose on average by a full point, moving them from one category to the next (e.g, from often trusting the police to always trusting police or from rarely trusting police to sometimes trusting them). This indicates that performance is more important than the gender of the officer establishing the policy and has a more substantive impact. For men, the effect of performance was much more pronounced in ratings of seriousness and trust where ratings increased on average by 1.0, whereas the impact on ratings of fairness had a much smaller increase of 0.3. The active and passive scenarios differed in that an effective policy that leads to increased performance was tied to increased perceptions of all types of police legitimacy as compared to increased performance in the passive scenario, where the effect was seen only on ratings of seriousness and trust.

Research Implications and Limitations

This study contributes to the literature on representative bureaucracy by highlighting the different roles representation and performance play in how respondents rate the legitimacy of police in passive and active representation scenarios in a post-conflict setting. Findings are similar to those in other countries: the representation of women is correlated with higher ratings of legitimacy for women. In the passive representation scenario, where a respondent had little information about the policies of a force and could only see the demographic makeup of police, representation became an important influence on legitimacy for women in each of the dimensions of procedural legitimacy. Increasing the number of women on a force increased their
ratings of how seriously police pursue investigations, how much they trusted them to do the right thing, and how fair police are in handling investigations. In contrast, knowing the demographic makeup of the force only influenced men’s perceptions that cases would be handled fairly but did not significantly impact their perceptions of how well the case would be carried out in terms of seriously pursuing an investigation and being trusted to do the right thing. This suggests that both men and women associate women with fairness, but that it is shared values and lived experience of women that influence ratings of seriousness and trust, as theorized by existing literature.

Interestingly, performance was significantly correlated with higher ratings for men in the areas of legitimacy where representation did not influence them; namely, men rated seriousness in pursuing an investigation and trusting police to do the right thing higher when there was better performance but not higher representation, and performance was not significant for men in rating how fair police are. For men in scenarios where only demographic information is known and no policy positions have been stated, representation and performance seem to be markedly separate, perhaps suggesting distinct associations with the various aspects of legitimacy, with seriousness and trust on the one hand and fairness on the other. Literature on leadership indicates that fairness is seen as a more stereotypically female trait, and that may be playing out in evaluations here (Bruckmüller and Branscombe, 2010). This is affirmed by higher correlations between seriousness and trust and lower correlations of those concepts with fairness. Because fairness seems to be markedly female, it is unsurprising that both men and women appear to think increasing female representation on the force would increase fairness of that force’s response to domestic violence. Seriousness in carrying out an investigation and trusting police to do the right
thing may be seen as tied to outcomes of an investigation, whereas fairness may be seen as more intrinsically related to how women treat other women.

Both representation and performance are important to perceptions of legitimacy for seriousness and trust among women, whereas representation is the only significant factor of the two for rating fairness for women. Fairness seems to be measuring a notably different aspect of legitimacy than the other two dimensions for both men and women. This is consistent with higher correlations between seriousness and trust and could indicate that these are tapping into similar concepts. In considering seriousness and trust, women cared about both representation and performance while men were responsive only to performance in these aspects of legitimacy. However, men and women were consistent in their preference for more representation, while disregarding performance, in their perceptions of fairness.

Local context may also play into these findings. A study from the Kosovo Women’s Network (2015) found that respondents felt a need for improved inter-institutional cooperation; one respondent said, “Institutions don’t know their obligations, they send victims from one institution to another and re-victimize them in this way because they have to tell their story over and over again” (p. 315). Perhaps even if police are seen as being fair, there is a perception that a case will still not come to the “right” conclusions, harming perceptions of trustworthiness and how serious police pursue investigations. There may be little hope for a positive outcome if coordination between institutions does not occur. Further research is warranted.

Turning to the active representation scenario, where a policy was enacted that would benefit victims of domestic violence, performance mattered to both men and women for all three dimensions of legitimacy, who enacted the policy was not significant. Respondents seem to care more about the potential outcome of a policy being in place than they do about who is
responsible for making the change. This could point to the importance of representation when there is little information on how a force carries out their responsibilities and the only information available to evaluate the force on is whether women are present. However, when an effective policy is put into place, and this is known, respondents can rely on that information to rate officers. Implications of this finding are that if citizens know little about their frontline bureaucrats, representation becomes increasingly important. However, less representative forces might gain legitimacy by improving performance and enacting effective policies that will positively impact commonly under-represented groups.

It is important to note here that representation can be a mechanism for increased performance as bureaucrats actively pursue the interests of the groups they represent. This paper did not explore whether greater representation led to better outcomes for represented groups, and rather asserted what performance metrics were. This may have veiled the effects of representation in the active scenario. It may be that women are more likely to enact policies that better serve women, which would then increase performance and perceptions of legitimacy. Thus, representation would be driving legitimacy through increased performance. In the current study, all we can conclude is that performance is important; we cannot know whether a male or female leader would be more likely to drive those gains. More robust research should look at the link between representation and increased performance and then consider how that performance influences perceptions of legitimacy.

Passive representation serves as a means of allowing the under-represented to feel enfranchised, while active representation seeks to put into place policies that benefit under-represented groups. More research should be carried out on how passive and active representation may differ in their end goals and what influences those perceptions, including how
dimensions of legitimacy differ from one another. In understanding these dimensions, it is important to consider whether some aspects of legitimacy are more inherently gendered, influenced by rural/urban divides, or tied to the ethnicity and cultural background of the public. Other cultural factors that should be considered are how perceptions of corruption in the system may impact the salience of gender. A potential outcome could be that a system that is viewed as corrupt will have very few gains from increased representation, as the perception of corruptness outweighs any potential benefits of seeing oneself represented. Alternatively, perceptions of corruption itself may be gendered; if women are seen as inherently less corrupt than men, this could overcome a perceived corrupt system and add more credibility with increased representation.

Further research should vary levels of representation and performance beyond what was demonstrated here. Having ratings for only high and low representation on the one hand and 20-30% vs. 70-80% metrics for performance on the other prevents insight into how respondents may react to other doses. For example, when there is much higher performance (e.g., 95%) is this enough to eliminate gender differences in ratings of legitimacy? Would a ratio of 7 women to 3 men produce greater effects, or does the benefit of having female officers end at 50%? Further research on intensity of doses and threshold effects could be beneficial to understanding representation, performance, and interactions between the two.

Conclusion

While representative bureaucracy has been studied in a variety of policy areas in the US, little research has been done in other areas, particularly on the connection between passive and active representation, performance, and citizen perceptions of legitimacy in post-conflict areas. This chapter uses an experimental survey to understand how respondents react to more or less
representative police forces and higher and lower performance. In passive scenarios, female respondents rated units with higher female representation as more legitimate along each of the dimensions of legitimacy; for men, ratings only increased for how fair police are in carrying out investigations. Both men and women rated police units as more legitimate in the areas of how seriously they pursued investigations and how trustworthy they were when there was increased performance in the passive scenario., while performance was not correlated with fairness for men. In the active representation scenario, having a female in charge of a policy change was not correlated with higher ratings of police legitimacy among men or women, but higher performance was significant in all areas of legitimacy for both men and women. These findings may support other research that victims of domestic violence will benefit from female police officers. Studies that suggest better outcomes, higher reporting, and more outreach to women are confirmed here by perceptions that female officers can be trusted to do the right thing, will handle cases fairly, and be serious in carrying out investigations. More research should be done in other post-conflict areas and in Kosovo to better understand how representation and performance influence the various dimensions of legitimacy to understand their potential and differing uses as tools for building legitimacy.
Works Cited


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representative bureaucracy in the Commission’s staff policies. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 23(4), 817-838.


of diversity and minority rights. Nationalities Papers, 45(3), 442-463.


Thielemann, G. S., & Stewart Jr, J. (1996). A demand-side perspective on the importance of


Tables and Figures

Figure 1: Domestic Violence Randomization (Passive)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group 1: Low Representation, Low Performance (N=87)</th>
<th>Group 2: Low Representation, High Performance (N=112)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo Police in Qytet/Grad receive calls reporting domestic violence, conduct investigations of these crimes, and make determinations as to what actions should be taken. The officers assigned to this city include 9 men and 1 woman. According to a recent assessment, the police in Qytet/Grad made a mandatory arrest of the batterer in 30% of cases. Evidence shows that making such arrests reduces the number of victims seriously injured or killed as a result of domestic violence.</td>
<td>Kosovo Police in Qytet/Grad receive calls reporting domestic violence, conduct investigations of these crimes, and make determinations as to what actions should be taken. The officers assigned to this city include 9 men and 1 woman. According to a recent assessment, the police in Qytet/Grad made a mandatory arrest of the batterer in 70% of cases. Evidence shows that making such arrests reduces the number of victims seriously injured or killed as a result of domestic violence.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group 3: High Representation, Low Performance (N=125)</th>
<th>Group 4: High Representation, High Performance (N=120)</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Kosovo Police in Qytet/Grad receive calls reporting domestic violence, conduct investigations of these crimes, and make determinations as to what actions should be taken. The officers assigned to this city include 5 men and 5 women. According to a recent assessment, the police in Qytet/Grad made a mandatory arrest of the batterer in 30% of cases. Evidence shows that making such arrests reduces the number of victims seriously injured or killed as a result of domestic violence.</td>
<td>Kosovo Police in Qytet/Grad receive calls reporting domestic violence, conduct investigations of these crimes, and make determinations as to what actions should be taken. The officers assigned to this city include 5 men and 5 women. According to a recent assessment, the police in Qytet/Grad made a mandatory arrest of the batterer in 70% of cases. Evidence shows that making such arrests reduces the number of victims seriously injured or killed as a result of domestic violence.</td>
</tr>
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**Figure 2: Domestic Violence Randomization (Active)**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Group 1: Low Representation, Low Performance (N=132)</th>
<th>Group 2: Low Representation, High Performance (N=111)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recently in Qytet/Grad, a <strong>male</strong> officer was promoted to oversee handling of domestic violence cases. This officer implemented a new system where victims of domestic violence meet with officers of their own gender to report the crime, and it is now mandatory to arrest perpetrators of domestic violence. Rates of domestic violence have decreased by <strong>20%</strong> in the city, with victims saying they feel more comfortable reporting domestic violence crimes to police.</td>
<td>Recently in Qytet/Grad, a <strong>male</strong> officer was promoted to oversee handling of domestic violence cases. This officer implemented a new system where victims of domestic violence meet with officers of their own gender to report the crime, and it is now mandatory to arrest perpetrators of domestic violence. Rates of domestic violence have decreased by <strong>80%</strong> in the city, with victims saying they feel more comfortable reporting domestic violence crimes to police.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group 3: High Representation, Low Performance (N=112)</th>
<th>Group 4: High Representation, High Performance (N=135)</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Recently in Qytet/Grad, a <strong>female</strong> officer was promoted to oversee handling of domestic violence cases. This officer implemented a new system where victims of domestic violence meet with officers of their own gender to report the crime, and it is now mandatory to arrest perpetrators of domestic violence. Rates of domestic violence have decreased by <strong>20%</strong> in the city, with victims saying they feel more comfortable reporting domestic violence crimes to police.</td>
<td>Recently in Qytet/Grad, a <strong>female</strong> officer was promoted to oversee handling of domestic violence cases. This officer implemented a new system where victims of domestic violence meet with officers of their own gender to report the crime, and it is now mandatory to arrest perpetrators of domestic violence. Rates of domestic violence have decreased by <strong>80%</strong> in the city, with victims saying they feel more comfortable reporting domestic violence crimes to police.</td>
</tr>
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Passive Scenario by Group

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<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Group 1: Low Rep/Low Perf</th>
<th>Group 2: Low Rep/High Perf</th>
<th>Group 3: High Rep/Low Perf</th>
<th>Group 4: High Rep/High Perf</th>
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<th>Percentage</th>
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Active Scenario by Group

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<th>Group 2: Low Rep/High Perf</th>
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<th>Group 4: High Rep/High Perf</th>
<th># of Respondents</th>
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<td>Performance</td>
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<td>Representation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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Appendix A: Balance Tests

Table I. Balance Test for Representation in Passive DV Scenario

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<th>P-Value</th>
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Table II. Balance Test for Performance in Passive DV Scenario

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Table IV. Balance Test for Representation in Active DV Scenario

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Table V. Correlations

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</table>
Appendix B: Survey Questions

On the next page, you will be asked to read a description and answer a few questions about a hypothetical city in Kosovo named Qytet/Grad. Please consider the following information carefully and answer the questions as if you were a resident of Qytet/Grad.

Scenario with Domestic Violence (PASSIVE)

S1. Randomize: read only a OR b

| A) Kosovo Police in Qytet/Grad receive calls reporting domestic violence, conduct investigations of these crimes, and make determinations as to what actions should be taken. The officers assigned to this city include **9 men and 1 woman**. | B) Kosovo Police in Qytet/Grad receive calls reporting domestic violence, conduct investigations of these crimes, and make determinations as to what actions should be taken. The officers assigned to this city include **5 men and 5 women**. |

S2. Randomize: read only a OR b

| A) According to a recent assessment, the police in Qytet/Grad made a mandatory arrest of the batterer in **70% of cases**. Evidence shows that making such arrests reduces the number of victims seriously injured or killed as a result of domestic violence. | B) According to a recent assessment, the police in Qytet/Grad made a mandatory arrest of the batterer in **30% of cases**. Evidence shows that making such arrests reduces the number of victims seriously injured or killed as a result of domestic violence. |

Based on what you have just read, and assuming you were a resident of Qytet/Grad, please answer the following questions:

Q4. How would you rate how seriously the police pursue an investigation of the domestic violence complaint in Qytet/Grad?

1. Very seriously
2. Seriously
3. Somewhat seriously
4. Not very seriously
5. Not at all seriously

Q5. How much of the time do you think Qytet/Grad citizens can trust police to do what is right?

1. Almost always
2. Often
3. Sometimes
4. Rarely
5. Never

Q6. How fair or unfair would you say the police are likely to be in handling domestic violence cases in Qytet/Grad?
1. Very fair
2. Somewhat fair
3. Neutral
4. Somewhat unfair
5. Very unfair

Scenario with Domestic Violence (ACTIVE)

S3. Randomize: read only a OR b

| A) Recently in Qytet/Grad, a **female** officer was promoted to oversee handling of domestic violence cases. This officer implemented a new system where victims of domestic violence meet with officers of their own gender to report the crime, and it is now mandatory to arrest perpetrators of domestic violence. | B) Recently in Qytet/Grad, a **male** officer was promoted to oversee handling of domestic violence cases. This officer implemented a new system where victims of domestic violence meet with officers of their own gender to report the crime, and it is now mandatory to arrest perpetrators of domestic violence. |

S4. Randomize: read only a OR b

| A) Rates of domestic violence have decreased by **80%** in the city, with victims saying they feel more comfortable reporting domestic violence crimes to police. | B) Rates of domestic violence have decreased by **20%** in the city, with victims saying they feel more comfortable reporting domestic violence crimes to police. |

Q7. How would you rate how seriously the police pursue an investigation of the domestic violence complaint in Qytet/Grad under this new system?

1. Very seriously
2. Seriously
3. Somewhat seriously
4. Not very seriously
5. Not at all seriously

Q8. How much of the time do you think Qytet/Grad citizens can trust police to do what is right?

1. Almost always
2. Often
3. Sometimes
4. Rarely
5. Never

Q9. How fair or unfair would you say the police are likely to be in handling domestic violence cases in Qytet/Grad?

1. Very fair
2. Somewhat fair
3. Neutral
4. Somewhat unfair
5. Very unfair
Chapter Two: Ethnicity and Policing: Can Greater Representation Help Countries Move Beyond Ethnic Conflict?

This paper explores whether including ethnic minorities on police forces improves public perceptions of police legitimacy when addressing ethnically-motivated crimes. The theory of representative bureaucracy suggests that bureaucracies will be more responsive to the public and may garner additional legitimacy when they reflect the demographics of those they serve (Mosher 1968). This paper examines ethnic representation in Kosovo, a country that has experienced ethnic conflict, and employs an experimental survey to understand how minorities rate police officers responding to robberies in the areas of trust, seriousness in carrying out investigations, and fairness. This paper found that increased ethnic representation does not increase perceptions of legitimacy, but that police performance mattered for ethnic groups outside of Northern Serbs. Such findings imply that, in some contexts, even a less representative force can gain legitimacy by enacting effective policies that benefit less represented groups.

Keywords: ethnicity, post-conflict, representation, policing

Legitimacy in policing has continued to gain attention in practice and research, largely due to the understanding that legitimacy leads to more cooperation from the public, including compliance with law, a willingness to provide information, acceptance of police decisions, and reporting crimes (Boateng, 2017; Tyler 2005, Stoutland 2001, Sunshine and Tyler 2003, Hough and Roberts 2004, Rosenbaum et al. 2005, Jackson and Bradford 2010, Murphy and Cherney 2012, Mazerolle et al. 2013). Public perceptions of legitimacy are particularly important for countries that have undergone shifts in governance, borders, and ethnic conflict (Brinkerhoff, 2007). Police face serious legitimacy problems in deeply divided societies and are often evaluated on what they symbolize (i.e., defenders of a system where one group may have sociopolitical domination) rather than on their own merits (Weitzer, 1995). In areas where conflicts have occurred along ethnic and religious lines, these characteristics become particularly salient in future interactions with the state (Brinkerhoff, 2007). Yet, in much of the literature on police legitimacy in post-conflict settings, little is known about whether the perceived characteristics and values of police officers influence public evaluations of police legitimacy.
Researchers have identified gaps in understanding the theory of representative bureaucracy and advised applying the theory of representative bureaucracy in differing geographic and political settings and using additional methods of analysis, including experimental approaches (Andrews et al., 2015; Bishu and Kennedy, 2020; Headley et al., 2021). To better understand the mechanisms shaping legitimacy, this paper uses an experimental survey to examine the role of ethnic representation in the bureaucracy in Kosovo, a post-conflict area that experienced intense ethnic conflict and an attempted genocide at the hands of their previous government. Kosovo has since declared independence and enshrines representation as a value in their constitution and civil service laws. This political context provides an opportunity to understand how the theory of representative bureaucracy travels to post-conflict settings and whether there may be limits to its application.

Procedural justice (defined as fairness and appropriateness of procedures), performance, public trust, and confidence in police are core elements of legitimacy (Boateng, 2018; Hough et al, 2010; Hough, 2012). This chapter employs an experimental survey similar to Riccucci, Van Ryzin, and Lavena (2014) to understand how those living in post-conflict areas rate the legitimacy of police officers in the areas of trust, seriousness in carrying out investigations, and fairness when there is passive and active representation. Respondents were asked to rate each of these dimensions of legitimacy for police forces with varying levels of ethnic representation and performance. To better understand whether characteristics of police or actions have a greater influence, a passive representation scenario only provides demographic and performance information while an active representation scenario shows police acting in the interest of their co-ethnics. Surprisingly, in the passive representation scenario, only Albanians and non-Serb minorities rated units with more minority representation as more fair, while representation was
not significant for any ethnicity in rating police in the areas of seriously pursuing investigations and trust. All groups rated the police as more serious and trustworthy when there was higher performance, while only Serbs rated the police as more fair with higher performance. In the active representation scenario, having a minority in charge of a policy change was not correlated with higher ratings of police legitimacy among any group. While sharing an ethnicity did not have an impact on ratings of legitimacy, higher performance was significant in all areas of legitimacy for both majority and minority communities.

This study first establishes a theoretical framework to explore how representation, values, and performance are related. Next, potential contributions and hypotheses are presented. After the context of Kosovo is described, data, measures, and findings are presented.

**Theoretical Framework**

Representative bureaucracy is concerned with the proportional representation of populations in bureaucratic agencies as well as with the impacts that representation has on policy making and implementation (Meier and Nicholson-Crotty 2006). Passive representation in bureaucracy, that is how closely bureaucracies reflect the demographics of those they serve, is associated with citizens feeling represented in the bureaucracy, whereas active representation is associated with 1) organizational learning, where a bureaucrat informs or influences other bureaucrats to behave differently; 2) advocacy, where an officer directly presses for the interests of those they serve; or 3) legitimacy, where citizens feel the institutions representing them represent their interests and have a legitimate claim on power; this may include bureaucrats sharing and acting on values held by those they represent (Mosher 1968, Krislov 1974, Meier and Nicholson-Crotty 2006). The theory suggests that bureaucracies will be more responsive to publics and more accountable when they reflect the demographics of those they serve (Krislov
Krislov (1974) suggested that the notion of representation implies additional legitimacy as the smaller stands for and encapsulates the larger body represented. Passive representation can extend legitimacy to a public organization then through a more symbolic role (Selden 1997). This representation may help communities feel enfranchised when they see a diverse bureaucrat serve them (Riccucci and Saidel 1997; Selden 1997; Thielemann and Stewart 1996, as referenced in Meier and Nicholson-Crotty 2006). Meier and Nicholson-Crotty (2006) expand on the research to show the how representation can improve policy. They posit that a new theoretical link can be formed between passive and active representation by looking at how policy improves “even if the representative does not specifically act for the represented” (pg. 852).

The literature on representative bureaucracy has examined issues of ethnicity and race across a variety of policy areas. Standardized test scores for minority and nonminority students increase as school districts hire more minority teachers (Meier et al. 1999), and Black teachers are more likely to refer Black students to gifted programs (Nicholson-Crotty et al. 2011). In the U.S. federal procurement arena, increasing racial minority representation enables agencies to become more effective at achieving the legislatively mandated goal of promoting minority-owned small business participating in federal contracting (Fernandez et al. 2013). Similarly, the percent of minority administrators in the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Farmers Home Administration is correlated with the number of loan eligibility awards favoring their respective communities (Selden 1997).

In the area of law enforcement, results for increased racial or ethnic representation have been less consistent, with some research showing positive findings, and others showing null or
negative effects. Theobald and Haider-Markel (2008) find that Black citizens trust police officers more and perceive stops to be more legitimate when the officer is Black, and Hong (2016) finds that an increase in Black officers is correlated with a decrease in complaints filed by Black citizens in an analysis of policing in the UK and Wales. Likewise, Riccucci, Van Ryzin, and Jackson (2018) find that a police force composed of mostly Black officers is correlated with an increase in positive perceptions of performance, trust, and fairness among Black respondents; interestingly, they find that white respondents took a largely negative view of increased representation. Additionally, they found that Blacks may be more tolerant of increased police misconduct when there are more Black officers in the police department, suggesting that representation may mitigate poor performance. While these studies found an increase in trust, other studies failed to find a positive relationship when there is more representation on police forces. While Sharp (2014) found that racial representation in elected positions was correlated with decreases in racial bias, she also found that increased representation on the police force does not decrease bias and may even be positively associated with it. Additionally, Wilkins and Williams (2008) failed to uncover a link between Black representation among police officers and a reduction in racial disparities in vehicle stops. These opposing findings suggest more research should be done on race/ethnicity and representation to understand where the theory may have limited applications, or to see what other variables may be at play that moderate the effectiveness of increased representation.

Scholars have also looked at policing and representation from the perspective of gender. Research suggests a link between gender representation on police forces and positive outcomes (see Riccucci, Van Ryzin, and Lavena 2014; Andrews and Miller, 2013; Schuck, 2018; Meier and Nicholson-Crotty, 2006; Nicholson-Crotty et al., 2018). However, gender and ethnicity may
influence perceptions differently. Some research suggests a person’s evaluation of another person depends on the gender and ethnicity of both the person doing the evaluating as well as the person being evaluated (Xie, Flake, and Hehman, 2019). Xie et al. (2019) found that gender affected evaluations of attractiveness, trustworthiness, and dominance, while race did not; namely, they did not find differences in other-race versus own race perceptions and there were no consistent differences in majority versus minority perceptions. This research may explain differences in findings of how officers are rated when there is more ethnic reputation on the one hand and more gender representation on the other.

**Legitimacy and Values**

Legitimacy and societal context are important themes in research on policing. Four antecedents to legitimacy are procedural justice, performance, public trust, and confidence in police (Boateng, 2017; Hough et al, 2010; Hough, 2012). Some studies suggest that procedural justice and performance are more important than the other factors to legitimacy (Sunshine and Tyler, 2003, Tankebe, 2013; Boateng, 2018). Legitimacy is also discussed in public management literature as a mechanism of representation (see Riccucci, Van Ryzin, and Lavena, 2014; Peters, Maravic, and Schroter, 2015; Gravier, 2013; Theobald and Haider-Markel, 2009). Researchers have found evidence that passive representation influences citizen perceptions of performance, trustworthiness, fairness, and legitimacy of police (Riccucci, Van Ryzin, and Lavena, 2014; Theobald and Haider-Markel, 2009; Riccucci, Van Ryzin, and Jackson 2018).

Police face serious legitimacy problems in deeply divided societies and are often evaluated on what they symbolize (i.e., defenders of a system where one group may have sociopolitical domination) rather than on their own merits, and their image is poor due to their association with the state (Weitzer, 1995). Security-sector reform is political in addition to involving technical
reforms; powerful state actors may be seen as pursuing reforms agreed to in peace accords, all while working behind the scenes to gain more power, which can decrease the legitimacy of use of force (Brinkerhoff, 2005). Beetham (2013) proposes that justifiability of power holders must happen in terms of shared values with society. In areas where conflicts have occurred along ethnic and religious lines, these characteristics become particularly salient in future interactions with the state. Esman (1999, 365) emphasizes that the legitimacy of government in post-conflict areas is conditioned on seeing fellow ethnics wielding power in state bureaucracies, being able to compete and attain to those positions, and providing "sympathetic hearing" and protection of allocation of services and provision of benefits. This sympathetic hearing in providing services suggests that legitimacy and representation come from a shared source of understanding that could emanate from shared values and societal context. This leads to the following hypothesis:

H1: Ethnic minorities will rate units with higher levels of co-ethnic representation as more legitimate

Roche and Oberweittler (2018), writing on police-citizen relations, argued for a need to combine citizen perspectives of legitimacy and trustworthiness of police with the broader national context, including ideology, racial-ethnic cleavages, and religion in order to fully grasp police legitimacy. How a citizen perceives police will be inextricably linked with a social order, and a study of one without the other would leave the picture incomplete. For example, in a democracy, some posit that decisions should reflect the voices of the people living in them; when their voices are absent, and rights are not protected, this can have negative consequences for citizens’ attitudes toward police (Boateng, 2018; Perez et al. 2003; Karstedt and LaFree 2006; Hsieh and Boateng 2015). When bureaucrats mirror the demographic characteristics of those they serve, they are more likely to encompass their values and make decisions to benefit those
they serve (Meier et al. 1976). When these values are espoused and applied to decision making, they may influence public perceptions of how procedures are carried out, how appropriate resulting actions are, and how fair and trustworthy bureaucrats are seen as being.

Values and beliefs may account for the positive effects of representation. Research has linked background experience, attitudes of civil servants, shared values, and empathetic understanding to decision making (Van Riper, 1958; Lim, 2006). Shared beliefs and values that are held within gender and ethnic groups can lead to substantive results for the under-represented as bureaucrats articulate the interest of their groups in decision making processes (Lim, 2006; Meier and Nicholson-Crotty, 2006). Social identity theory is helpful in understanding why an individual may share and act on values of the group. This theory states that similarities within and differences between groups are enhanced when ‘us and them’ distinctions are salient, leading to distinctions that favor one’s own group (Tajfel and Wilkes, 1963). Ingroups play a role in socializing appropriate ways to think, feel, and act, and influence is gained by those who embody prototypical behaviors, values and attitudes, which leads to legitimacy and access to power from the group as leaders signal membership through use of rhetoric around these shared values (Reicher & Hopkins, 1996; Hogg, 2001; Hogg, Hains, & Mason, 1998; Hornsey, 2008). Research also suggests that low status groups may take different paths to gaining a positive view of their identity; they may engage in social change to overturn the existing hierarchy and make gains for their own group; focus only on dimensions that make the ingroup look good; make negative intergroup comparisons to flatter their own group; devalue actions that reflect poorly on the ingroup; or leave their group altogether (Hornsey, 2008; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner & Brown, 1978). Values and social context become influential in identifying ingroup membership and using this to gain increased standing.
Policing in particular is thought to reflect the sociopolitical context of the area (Weitzer, 1995), which points to a role for an officer or group’s values to be reflected in how a co-ethnic polices. Because the reflections of one’s own values is inherent to legitimacy, a potential mechanism for building legitimacy is likely through representation, particularly within bureaucracies, as residents interact most closely with bureaucracies when interfacing with the government. Because the ethnicity of police officers should be more salient to those who are usually underrepresented, minorities may feel more positively about minority representation on police forces than those from the majority community, which would lead them to rate officers as being more legitimate along the three dimensions discussed above.

Scholars have argued that certain conditions must be met for passive representation to translate to active representation: bureaucrats must have discretion when implementing policies; the policies that the bureaucrats have power to implement need to be salient to the demographic group in question; and the decisions and actions made by bureaucrats should impact the demographic group in question (Thompson 1976; Meier and Stewart 1992; Meier 1993; Meier and Nicholson-Crotty 2006; Keiser et al. 2002). A growing number of studies across a variety of policy domains have empirically demonstrated a link between passive representation and bureaucratic decisions and outputs favoring the represented demographic group when these conditions are met (e.g., Hindera 1993; Meier 1993; Selden 1997; Meier 1993; Meier and Stewart 1992; Meier et al. 1999; Bradbury and Kellough 2008; Nicholson-Crotty et al. 2011; Fernandez et al. 2013; Fernandez 2020). This leads to the following hypothesis:

H2: Ethnic minorities’ ratings of bureaucrats’ legitimacy will increase when a minority bureaucrat is seen actively pursuing the interests of their group.
The idea that policies will improve outcomes for represented populations may mean that police performance is driving evaluations of legitimacy. Research finds that government performance is predictive of public attitudes concerning the trustworthiness of and satisfaction with police and that performance and procedural justice, or perceived fairness of police, are correlated with police legitimacy (Sun et al., 2014; Skogan, 2009; Van Craen, 2012; Zhao et al., 2012; Karakus 2017). Effective service delivery can strengthen state institutions, which can benefit from a virtuous cycle of effectiveness and legitimacy (Ciorciari and Krasner, 2018). But because outcomes are not always apparent to citizens, this may need to be made more apparent in the community; research has shown that measuring performance can improve citizen trust in government indirectly by improving citizen’s perceptions of government performance (Yang and Holzer, 2006). Police may be able to find increased support from the public when they effectively control crime and criminal behavior (Hinds and Murphy, 2007), especially when this increase in effectiveness is known. Much of the research on representative bureaucracy focuses on positive outcomes for represented groups. Fernandez (2019) argues that increased representation leads to better performance as bureaucrats are equipped with linguistic and cultural competencies to serve a diverse citizenry and can induce compliance, cooperation, and coproduction. These outcomes may in turn lead to a perception of better performance by police which lends them more legitimacy, which may then lead to more cooperation from the public. This leads to the following hypothesis:

H3: Ethnic minorities will rate units with higher levels of performance as more legitimate.

Representation and performance each play a role in determining legitimacy, though recent literature indicates that there is not an interaction effect between the two in some contexts. Riccucci, Van Ryzin, and Lavena (2014) explore whether citizens more positively evaluate an
agency when there is both high gender representation and high performance and find that while both matter separately, there does not seem to be an interaction between representation and performance. Riccucci, Van Ryzin, and Jackson (2018) find mixed results for performance and representation. For white respondents, they found that higher representation had little influence when performance increased (measured by number of complaints) yet also found that whites reacted negatively to higher representation of African Americans when performance decreased. Conversely, they found that Black respondents generally rated police higher when there was more representation and even higher when there was good performance. On the issue of trust, white respondents rated police lower regardless of job performance when the number of Black officers increased while Black respondents rated police as more trustworthy regardless of performance when the number of Black officers increased. Consistent with findings from Riccucci, Van Ryzin, and Lavena (2014), they find that the interaction between representation and performance is not significant for Black respondents, though it is for white respondents. These studies indicate that performance and representation are significant separately, but that the interaction of the two is not consistent across groups. Despite a lack of consistent interaction, both performance and representation are thought to lead to better performance. Additionally, there does not seem to be a zero-sum game between police performance and procedural justice, or fairness, in predicting police legitimacy (Jonathan-Zamir & Weisburd, 2013; Karakus, 2017).

**Context**

The data for this study were collected in Kosovo. Kosovo has a population of approximately 1.8 million, with 93% counting themselves as Albanians (these numbers exclude the northern Serbian-majority regions) (Peterson, 2012). From its inception as a nation, the international community has stressed the importance of Kosovo as a multiethnic state, and
Kosovo’s leaders committed to protect the rights of ethnic communities (Bami and Weizman, 2020). Political representation in Kosovo is enshrined in the constitution, which requires that 20 of the 120 deputies of the Assembly of Kosovo must come from minority populations, with no less than 10 of those 20 seats being held by Serbs (Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, 2008). In addition to constitutional guarantees for political representation, and as evidence of the commitment to participation of all ethnic communities in the decision-making process, Kosovo provides a structure for minority representation in the bureaucracy through the 2010 Civil Service Law. The law states that all communities have a right to fair and proportional representation in all levels of the civil service, with ten percent of central positions reserved for members of non-Albanian communities and proportional representation required at the municipal level (OSCE, 2013). This law was extended to specify that 10% of senior posts must also be held by non-Albanian communities (ibid.). Article Three Item 1 on the Civil Service of the Republic of Kosovo states that “The Civil Service is composed of impartial, professional, accountable Civil Servants and reflects multiethnicity and gender equality” (Law on the Civil Service of the Republic of Kosovo, 2010). Further, Chapter 1 Article 5 Item 1.9 on Basic Principles of the Civil Service states that all “communities and their members have equal opportunities for participation in civil service and institutions of central and municipal administrations” (ibid.).

The 2010 civil service law is meant to ensure principles of “legality, non-discrimination, effectiveness and efficiency, accountability, impartiality and professionalism, transparency, and the principle of equal opportunities for women and ethnic minorities” (Law on Civil Service,

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7 The OSCE references the Law on Civil Service, Articles 5(1)(1.2), 5(1)(1.9), 11(1) and 11(2).
8 Note that they have not reached 100% compliance: There are 91,000 employees in the public sector in Kosovo (Gap Institute, 2015), and as of 2012, 7.85% of civil servants at the central level were from minority groups, with Bosniaks, Turks, and Serbs being over-represented (OSCE, 2013).
2010). There are 91,000 employees in the public sector in Kosovo (Gap Institute, 2015), and, as of 2012, 7.85% of civil servants at the central level were from non-Albanian communities, with Bosniaks, Turks, and Serbs being over-represented (OSCE, 2013).

While the importance of representation has been codified, non-Albanian communities in particular still report discrimination. The Serb community is under greater threat for robberies and thefts in their homes; in the first half of 2018, 100 incidents of thefts, break ins, verbal harassment, and damage to both individual Serb and Serb Orthodox Church property were reported (US Department of State, 2019). All ethnic minority communities continue to experience institutional and societal discrimination in employment, education, social services, and other basic rights (US Department of State, 2019). The UN Mission in Kosovo Media Observer reported in December 2019 that robberies were an everyday occurrence (UNMIK Media Report, 2019, December 24). UNMIK also reported that minority returnees to Pec, Istok, Klina, and Gorazdevac were often targeted by burglars, and that homes have been burned; police did not identify cases as interethnic incidents, but rather as a crime against property (UNMIK Media Report, 2020 Feb 3). While a 2018 US State Department report found zero interethnic incidents, UNHCR recorded 23 cases of violence against Serbs and one incident involving a Roma returnee during that same period (Radio Gorazdevac, 2020).

This violence follows an intense ethnic conflict between Serbs and other ethnic groups where police joined in on the violence against other ethnic groups when each was in power (Rogel, 2003; Mertus, 1999). The Serbian nationalist cause was pursued by Milosevic after seeing Kosovar police conflicts with Serbs in 1987 (Percy et al, 1995). Evidence exists that Serbs provoked police knowing this would bolster their nationalist cause (Glenny, 1996). The clash between the largely Albanian police force against the Serb minority community was televised
widely in Serbia, contributing to beliefs that Serbs were being persecuted in areas where they were minorities (Percy et al., 1995). However, ethnic Albanian Kosovars also met force at the hands of Serbian police. Serbian police rule in the late 1980s in Kosovo was marked by the arrest, interrogation, or interment of 584,373 Kosovo Albanians (Rogel, 2003). Police oppression continued against ethnic minorities, with “police commit[ing] the most wide-spread and worst abuses against Kosovo’s 90-percent ethnic Albanian population” (U.S. State Department Report, 1997).

Serbia retreated from Kosovo in 1999, leaving no functioning police service (Greene et al., 2012). Criminal gangs asserted control in lawless regions and ethnic violence by Albanians toward Serbs (ibid.). The United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) took over legislative and executive authority in 1999 with a top priority to establish a police service that could support law and order before transferring the institution over to Kosovo Police (ibid.) They gradually transferred power starting in 2001, and by 2006, Kosovans commanded all police stations and by 2008, all but one regional headquarter in N. Mitrovica (ibid.). This transition included a focus on recruiting for Serb ethnic minority representation and on improving the gender balance of police forces (ibid.).

In this paper, Northern Serbs and Southern Serbs are considered together in analyses, though it is important to note that the Serbian community in the North has a marked political context; Mitrovica North district, which contains the four Serb-majority norther municipalities, remains entangled with the Belgrade-sponsored parallel political regime (Meaker, 2017). This northern region is a contested area, where Serbia has sustained a symbolic monopoly; schools use the Serbian curriculum, and hospitals are run by Serbia’s Ministry of Health and local politicians run in both Serbia’s and Kosovo’s elections (Madison, 2022). Kosovar Serbs often
have little say in politics, as Serbia exercises de facto control in Northern Kosovo through the Serb List party (Weizman, 2019). In the security arena, however, only Kosovo Police and NATO soldiers patrol the streets. Neither Serbia nor Kosovo fully control the region, and local powerholders are able to insert themselves to provide order and make claims to authority (Madison, 2022). This may lead to differences between Serbs living in the north and south when it comes to how ethnicity is experienced, with more tensions in the north and fewer in the south. Future analyses should consider separating Serbs living in the four northern municipalities from other Serbs to better understand how those differences affect the impacts of representation on perceptions of legitimacy.

When Kosovo declared independence, it did so as a self-proclaimed multi-ethnic state with a focus on rights for minorities (Landau, 2016). Gaining legitimacy in the eyes of their own citizens is an important consideration for where the future of Kosovo stands. A 2019 survey found that more than half of citizens felt the country was headed in the wrong direction and that trust in government institutions and political parties is declining (National Democratic Institute, 2019). Trust remains highest for the security sector, i.e., KFOR, Kosovo Police (KP), and Kosovo Security Force (KSF) (ibid.). Eighty-one percent of respondents in the Kosovo Security Barometer stated they trust the KSF, and 59% stated they trust the KP, with another 30% saying they somewhat trust KP (Marku, 2019). Albanians had significantly higher ratings of trust compared to Serbs (62.6% vs. 17%) with other ethnic groups falling in between (46.7% said they trust KP) (ibid.).

The presence of laws protecting minority representation, coupled with the salience of ethnic violence in a post-conflict setting, makes Kosovo an appropriate area to study whether increased
passive and active representation are linked to citizen perceptions of legitimacy and police performance.

**Data**

The data for this chapter come from an experimental survey administered in Kosovo in September 2019 in the official languages of Kosovo, Albanian and Serbian. Participants rated trust, fairness, and performance of Kosovo Police in both passive representation and active representation scenarios about a break-in or robbery. In the passive scenario participants were randomly assigned a ratio of either 9:1 or 6:4 in a city with 60% Kosovar Albanians and 40% other ethnicities for a police force that receives calls reporting robberies, conducts investigations, and makes determinations for which actions should be taken. Participants were also randomly assigned a police performance measure of 70% or 30% arrests and were told that making arrests rather than giving fines reduces the number of robberies in neighborhoods. After reading the passive scenarios, respondents were asked to rate how seriously police pursue an investigation, how much of the time citizens can trust police in the scenario to do what is right, and how fair they would say police are likely to be in handling robberies. Figure 1 shows assignment to one of four possible groups for the passive scenario.9

See Figure 1

In the active scenario, participants were randomly assigned to a scenario where either a member from a non-majority or majority community had been promoted to oversee the handling of robbery cases. They were told the officer implemented a new system where victims of

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9 The sample used here is the same as that used in Chapter One of this dissertation. Respondents were first exposed to a passive and active domestic violence scenario, then the passive and active robbery scenario. Analyses do not consider all of the potential exposures in the survey as discrete groups. Respondents were exposed to different combinations of representation and performance assignment across the four survey pieces that could have influenced how they responded.
robberies meet with officers of their own ethnic community to report the crime, and it is now mandatory to arrest perpetrators of robberies. They are then randomized into a group where robberies decreased by either 80 or 20 percent since implementation of the new arrest procedures. See Figure 2 below for groupings. Respondents were again asked to rate how seriously police pursue an investigation, how much of the time citizens can trust police in the scenario to do what is right, and how fair they would say police are likely to be in handling robbery cases. Randomization for each scenario meant all participants were assigned to one of four possible groups for the passive scenario, as shown in Figure 1 above, and then to one of four possible active scenarios, as shown in Figure 2 below, yielding 16 different possibilities.

The survey was given to a representative sample of all ethnic communities and equal numbers of men and women from the 38 major municipalities in Kosovo ages 18 and up (N=490). Weighting was introduced to the sample by multiplying the minorities by a factor of 2.41 for each Albanian. This ensured 50 Serbian respondents and 50 respondents from other minorities. Responses were weighted accordingly in all analyses. The sampling method used is a multi-staged random probability method (typical of surveys in Kosovo). Stage one accounts for the appropriate rural/urban divide (45% urban/55% rural) of the country. Stage two refers to selecting households using a random-house technique. This consists of an assigned starting point in a given direction. In urban areas, the selected household is each third house/address on the left-hand side of the street. In block-of-flats the selected household is every third apartment, counting from the top floor in each entrance. In rural areas, the selected household is every third inhabitable dwelling on both sides of the interviewer’s route. In rural settlements with dense and

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10 Analyses were conducted without weighting and found similar results.
compact patterns, the selection procedure resembles the one for urban areas. Stage three selects one member of the household using the nearest birthday technique. Stage four accounts for substitution of a respondent after two attempts (one initial visit and one call back). Tables 1 and 2 below show the descriptive statistics for each group and scenario. For the full sample, 50% of respondents are female, 59% are Albanian, and 20% are Serb. With weighting, this is 52% female, 89% Albanian and 5% Serb. The average monthly income is 636 Euros, and the average age is 36.

See Table 1

See Table 2

For the passive and active scenarios, respondents were first randomized into a representative or non-representative group; they were also randomized into a high versus low performance group. Balance tests were carried out using a t-test to ensure randomization occurred. All characteristics were not significant for representation, while education was the only variable that was significant for assignment to high and low performance. For the active scenario, all t-tests were not significant for assignment to representative vs. non-representative police forces, while age was the only variable that was significant for assignment to high and low performance. Non-significant results of the t-test show that proper randomization occurred (see Appendix A for results of all t-tests).

The dependent variables in this study capture components of procedural legitimacy: 1) how seriously police pursue investigations; 2) how often they can be trusted to do the right thing; and 3) how fair police are in handling investigations. Seriousness in pursuing investigations is strongly correlated with trusting police to do the right thing (passive scenario $r=0.8$ and active scenario $r=0.9$), and fairness in handling investigations is moderately correlated with both
seriousness and trust (passive: $r=0.5$ for both seriousness and trust; active: $r=0.6$ for seriousness and $r=0.7$ for trust) (see Appendix A for correlation tables). This overlap in concepts is a potential limitation of this study. Rather than capturing unrelated aspects of legitimacy, models for seriousness and trust may be capturing overlapping aspects of legitimacy. Further research is necessary to isolate the various characteristics that constitute legitimacy. A qualitative approach to these underlying aspects of legitimacy could also be beneficial as it is not always clear whether models are capturing small differences in these aspects of legitimacy or confirming an effect on the portion of the concepts that are correlated. Results of regressions show consistency of concepts, in that respondents often rate seriousness and trust similarly, with fairness sometimes diverging from these two in evaluations of legitimacy. See Tables 7 and 8 and the discussion below for single factor variable analyses.

Each of the dependent variables are rated using a five-point scale. Analyses below report coefficients of linear regressions on each ethnic group. Ordinal logits were also performed as a robustness check, and the same variables were found to be significant in both models. The main explanatory variables of interest are the two groups respondents were randomly assigned to: 1) how representative the police force is of the population; and 2) high or low police performance. All models were run with interactions between the two assignment variables; none indicated a significant interaction between representation and performance on legitimacy except for of the case of fairness in the passive scenario ($p<0.10$) (see Table 6 in Appendix). This is partially consistent with findings of Riccucci, Van Ryzin, and Jackson (2018) when looking at race and policing; they found that the interaction was only significant for white (majority) respondents. Interactions were dropped in subsequent analyses, though both representation and performance assignment were included in all models.
Analyses were run separately by ethnic group (Albanians, Serbs, and Other Minorities), based on Riccucci, Van Ryzin, and Jackson (2018). Models control for gender (female=1; male=0), age (a continuous variable), marital status (married=1; else 0), administrative district (7 dichotomous variables indicating district the respondent resides in; these are included as regional fixed effects in all analyses but not reported in tables), education (a categorical variable with six categories where 6th-9th grade is the lowest category and doctorate is the highest), and monthly income (four categories ranging from less than 400 Euros/month to over 1000 Euros/month).

**Findings**

Hypothesis one stated that minorities will rate units with higher levels of co-ethnic representation as more legitimate. However, as Table 3 shows, Serbs did not rate police forces with more representation as more legitimate for any dimension of legitimacy, and other minorities did not rate the forces as more legitimate in the areas of seriously pursuing investigations and trusting police to do the right thing. Surprisingly, Albanians and Other Minorities rated forces with balanced ethnic representation as more fair in handling investigations (p<0.001). Having a more representative police force is correlated with a 0.5 increase in ratings of fairness for Albanians as opposed to Serbs and Other Minorities and a 1.1 increase for Other Minorities as compared to Albanians and Serbs. This indicates that Other Minorities are impacted more by representation than the majority community, an effect we would expect from the literature, where the represented react more positively to that representation. However, a more representative force was not correlated with rating police as more serious or trustworthy for any group. This suggests that ethnic representation is not a salient feature of legitimacy for any group in terms of seriousness and trustworthiness, but that fairness is somehow viewed more distinctly, at least by non-Serb communities.
Some controls were found to be significant, and these varied by ethnic group and area of legitimacy. For Albanians, education was a significant predictor of ratings of seriously pursuing investigations (p<0.05), while gender was significant for ratings of trust (p<0.10), and marital status was significant for ratings of fairness (p<0.05).

In the Serb models, marital status was negatively correlated with all ratings of legitimacy (p<0.01 for seriousness and trust and p>0.05 for fairness). In the Serb model for ratings of seriousness of pursuing investigations, living in the Gjilan district was positively correlated with ratings of seriousness of pursuing investigations (p<0.10 for the full Serb group). For ratings of trust to do the right thing, no control outside of marital status was significant for Serbs. For ratings of fairness, living in the Mitrovica district and income were positively correlated (p<0.05 and p<0.10 respectively).

In the Other Minority models, being female was positively correlated with ratings of seriousness in pursuing investigations (p<0.01) and with ratings of trusting police to do what is right (p<0.05). Living in Mitrovica was negatively correlated with seriousness in pursuing investigations and ratings of trust (p<0.01 and p<0.05 respectively). Living in Peja and Prizren were negatively correlated with ratings of seriousness (p<0.10 and p<0.05 respectively), while education was positively correlated with seriousness in carrying out investigations (p<0.05). Living in Gjilan, Mitrovica, and Prizren were all negatively correlated with ratings of trusting police to do the right thing (p<0.10; p<0.05; and p<0.10).

See Table 3

Hypothesis two states that minorities will rate units with higher levels of ethnic representation as more legitimate when bureaucrats actively pursue the interests of their group. In this experiment, this means minorities should rate units with a minority officer overseeing
policy responses to robberies as more legitimate than those that have a majority group member enact a policy. However, Table 4 below shows that assignment to a group where a minority is promoted to lead efforts against robbery is not significantly correlated with increases in ratings of police officers across the three aspects of legitimacy for any ethnicity. This may be due to the fact that the scenario only differed on who established the new policy that benefitted minorities in robberies (that is, whether someone from the majority community vs. minority community enacted the policy). Not having a substantial difference in the kinds of policies we might expect those from a minority community to enact specifically because they understand the needs of the community may be disguising expected effects. As with the passive scenario, this could also indicate that ethnic representation is not salient in evaluations of legitimacy, or it could point to the importance of how effective the policy is rather than who establishes an effective policy.

Controls varied by ethnicity and type of legitimacy. For Albanians, an increase in age was negatively correlated with ratings of seriousness in pursuing investigations and trusting police to do the right thing (p<0.10). Albanians living in Ferizaj and Mitrovica are positively correlated with ratings of seriousness in pursuing investigations and trusting police to do the right thing (p<0.05); living in Peja is positively correlated with trusting police to do the right thing (p<0.05). For Serbs, marital status is again negatively correlated with all ratings of legitimacy (p<0.10) and is the only significant control. For Other Minorities, the only significant control was that living in Peja was negatively correlated with ratings of trustworthiness of police (p<0.10).

See Table 4

Finally, hypothesis three states that minorities will rate units with higher levels of performance as more legitimate. Table 5 below shows that in the scenario where respondents
only know the demographic makeup of police but no policy is discussed (the passive representation scenario), for all ethnic groups, being assigned to a group with higher performance is significantly and positively correlated with perceptions of seriousness in pursuing investigations and trusting police to do the right thing (p<0.05 for Albanians; p<0.01 for Serbs; and p<0.001 for Other Minorities). For Albanians, being assigned to a higher performing force was correlated with a 0.4 increase in ratings for seriousness and a 0.3 increase in ratings for trust. Serbs assigned to a better performing group rated seriousness of police on average 0.6 higher for both, while Other Minorities showed the largest increases when assigned to higher performance, with an average increase of 2.0 for both seriousness and trust. This means that on average, they would move two categories, from rating forces as not at all serious in pursuing investigations or never trusting them to thinking they were somewhat serious or somewhat trustworthy; this could also mean that if they started out in these somewhat serious and trustworthy categories, having a higher performing force would increase their ratings on average to thinking the police were very serious in pursuing investigations or almost always trustworthy, a significant and meaningful change.

Unlike seriousness and trust, performance is not significant for perceptions of fairness in handling investigations for Albanians and Other Minorities but is significant for Serbs in the same scenario where only demographic makeup is known (p<0.05). On average, Serbs rated police 0.5 points higher for fairness when there was increased performance. This may be a large enough effect to push some respondents into the next higher category. This difference in ratings for fairness again shows a consistency in correlation between seriousness and trust but not fairness. The same controls were found to be significant in these models as stated above.
Unlike representation, performance matters for all groups across all measures of legitimacy in the case where a policy is put into place to improve handling of robberies (p<0.001 for all groups in all measures except where p<0.10 for Albanians rating of fairness). The effect sizes differed by ethnicity, with Albanians increasing ratings for seriousness by 0.7, Serbs by 1.5, and Other Minorities by 2.7. Numbers were similar for trust. These mean that Albanians on average may increase their ratings by a full category, Serbs by nearly two, and Other Minorities by almost three categories. This could have the effect of a respondent from another minority community increasing their rating that police are not very serious in pursuing investigations to rating them as very serious in pursuing investigations. Impacts on fairness were still substantive, but lower, with Albanians increasing ratings of fairness by 0.3, Serbs by 1.3, and Other Minorities by 1.5. This means Albanians are not likely to change categories, but do exhibit higher ratings of fairness, and would anticipate Serbs moving on average one category higher, with Other Minorities moving up 1.5. These show quite substantive impacts for increased levels of performance leading to an increased perception of legitimacy when it comes to policy settings.

See Table 5

Single factor analyses were conducted to test robustness of findings. Table 7 shows that the single factor models were consistent with findings for the three areas of legitimacy for Serb minorities; no area of legitimacy was significantly impacted by an increase in representation. However, the single factor analysis differed from ratings of fairness for Albanians and Other Minorities. In the models with three areas of legitimacy, Albanians and Other Minorities rated more representative groups in the passive scenario as more fair, while the single factor was not significant. Assignment to higher or lower representation was not significant for Albanians and Other Minorities when rating seriousness or trust; the single factor analysis had the same
findings as two of the measures of legitimacy for Albanians and Other Minorities. When looking at ratings of increased active representation across all areas of legitimacy, the factor was consistent with those findings; no group increased ratings of legitimacy when there was higher representation.

See Table 7

Findings for performance ratings were also consistent between the single factor and models with three areas of legitimacy. In the passive scenario where ratings are considered for seriousness, trust, and fairness, all ethnic groups rated the police as more serious in carrying out investigations and as more trustworthy when there was increased performance (ranging from p<0.001 to p<0.05), but only Serbs rated police as more fair when performance increased (p<0.05). In the single factor analysis shown in Table 8, all groups rated the police as more legitimate in the passive scenario, with Albanians ratings of police legitimacy increasing by 0.3, Serbs by 0.5, and Other Minorities by 1.4. This is consistent with ratings of seriousness and trust for all ethnic groups, and with Serbs for fairness. All ethnic groups rated the police as more legitimate in the single factor analysis and in the three areas of legitimacy in the active scenario when performance increased (p<0.001). In the active scenario, being assigned to a better performing force increased ratings on the single factor of legitimacy by 0.5 for Albanians, 1.1 for Serbs, and 1.9 for Other Minorities. For both representation and performance, seriousness and trust are driving findings in the factor analysis, with fairness attenuating the effect.

See Table 8

**Discussion**

This study contributes to the literature on representative bureaucracy by highlighting the different roles representation and performance play in how respondents rate legitimacy of police
in passive and active representation scenarios in post-conflict settings. It points to differences in the three aspects of legitimacy addressed here, and underscores how local context and ethnic relations may moderate expected outcomes of increased representation. Finally, this research indicates a need to understand other limiting factors of the theory of representation, such as how corruption and actions of police impact ratings of legitimacy, and how gender and ethnic representation differ from one another.

Only Albanians and Other Minorities showed more positive ratings of police when representation increased (0.5 increase for Albanians and 1.0 for Other Minorities), but fairness was the only evaluation for which increased representation had an effect. This could be because there is more buy-in for the idea of Kosovo as a legitimate country for non-Serb communities. Since Kosovo was founded upon the ideals of being a multi-ethnic state, Albanian and Other Minorities may view a representative force more favorably because it bolsters the credibility of Kosovo as a legitimate nation by living up to its professed ideals. Often, Northern Serb Kosovars do not participate in political processes or institutions, so increased representation could be seen as a concession for legitimacy because they are choosing to participate in a Kosovar institution. Interviews should be carried out to better understand whether these factors are at play.

In contrast to Other Minorities and Albanians, more representation of non-majority ethnic groups may not matter to Northern Serb Kosovars because of their history of distrust of police. Police have long been seen as servants of the regime (the State) rather than the people and are sometimes perceived as corrupt and untrustworthy (Balaj, 2019). While 63% of Albanians trust police, the same is true for less than 2% of Serbs (Avdiu, 2017). Serbs may not feel represented even if a member of their own community is on the police force because they are not seen as representing local interests. If evaluations of legitimacy are associated with police who are
viewed as corrupt and intimately tied to criminal structures (*ibid.*), potential gains of representation will be overcome or reversed. This seems to be true more broadly in research on corruption, where a negative correlation between corruption and legitimacy has been established and the argument is made that corruption reduces trust and confidence in police (Kaariainen 2007; Silva Forné 2016; Sabet 2012; Hsieh and Boateng 2015). This is also consistent with findings on the theory of representative bureaucracy, where Headley et al. (2021) found that positive effects of representation may be nullified or even perceived negatively if actions of bureaucrats toward the public are less than benign in personal, familial, or vicarious encounters. They found that even when there is public recognition of the need for more representation, bureaucrat’s attitudes and actions toward the public were more salient on impacting the public perceptions of bureaucrats. Northern and Southern Serbs have quite different experiences in Kosovo, with those in the north being more resistant to Kosovo authority and maintaining ties to Serbia, while those in the south have integrated into the state to a broader extent. This was seen in a recent rule change regarding license plates. The approximately 50,000 Serbs in Northern Kosovo have largely kept Serbian plates, while the nearly 50,000 Serbs in the rest of Kosovo generally use Kosovo plates. Protest in the streets and the resignation of 576 Serb officers, ten prosecutors, a government minister, and ten members of parliament followed the dismissal of a Serb KP officer in North Mitrovica after he refused to change to a Kosovo plate (Reuters, 2022; Petrequin, 2022; VOA, 2022). Future analyses should consider these groups separately to see whether representation may be more salient to these subgroups rather than Serbs as a whole.

Narrowing in on post-conflict settings, it may be that violence against ethnic groups in firsthand encounters, especially when carried out by the State, may prevent any positive outcomes expected from increased representation. Rather, to trust police, citizens may need to
actively see officers performing well to change perceptions of legitimacy. More research should be done on the influence of corruption on perceptions of police legitimacy and what factors can overcome or change those perceptions, particularly in post-conflict settings.

Considering the role of performance in the passive scenario, all groups rated police forces with better performance as being more serious and trustworthy, while only Serbs rated police as more fair when there was higher performance. In the active scenario, all groups rated police as more legitimate in terms of seriousness, fairness, and trust when there was an effective policy enacted with high performance. Respondents seem to care more about increased performance and effective policies than they do about who is responsible for making the change and the difference in performance has a large impact, moving ratings by 0.5-1 categories for Albanians, by 1.3-1.5 for Serbs, and by 2 to 3 for Other Minorities. This differs from findings by Ricucci, Van Ryzin, and Jackson (2018) that find that both representation and performance are significant for black and white respondents in a similar scenario. It may be that in post-conflict areas, it is not representation that is driving results and legitimacy, but rather that any effective governance or policy will be the real driver of positive public perceptions. Instead of the proposed pathway that links representation, outcomes, legitimacy, and compliance, a focus on effective policies and messaging improved performance may be the more effective path to legitimacy and cooperation in areas that have experienced intense ethnic conflict. Rather than focusing on and emphasizing ethnicity, this could be de-emphasized with a shift to more public outreach about the positive outcomes police have in their communities. However, increased representation could be important if it drives performance outcomes for underrepresented groups. Even in this case, explicitly focusing on performance gains seems to be more important than emphasizing representation.
The role of gender on police forces in passive scenarios is markedly different from these findings on ethnicity. A study from the same experiment in Kosovo found better gender representation increased ratings of legitimacy in all areas for women, but only for fairness among men. This differs from findings for increased ethnic representation in the passive scenario, where no group rated police as more serious in carrying out investigation nor as more trustworthy. This suggests that the way ethnicity and gender are experienced have different impacts on the role of representation in building legitimacy. For ratings of fairness in the passive scenario, however, increased gender representation was correlated with higher ratings of police for both men and women. This is similar to Albanians and Other Minorities correlating increased ethnic representation with higher ratings of fairness. In the scenario where a respondent had little information about the policies of a force and could only see the demographic makeup of police, representation became an important influence for women on how they rated legitimacy of police in all areas.

Unlike findings for representation, performance findings were consistent across gender and ethnicity (though with differing effect sizes for subgroups). In the scenario on gender where a policy was enacted that would benefit victims of domestic violence, performance mattered to both men and women for all three dimensions of legitimacy; however, the gender of the officer enacting the policy did not make a difference in ratings of legitimacy. Gender representation is important when citizens know little about the policies of their police force, but much like findings on ethnicity, legitimacy is driven here by enacting effective policies that benefited less represented groups and is dependent on police performance.

It is worth considering how gender is perceived differently than ethnicity. This could be due to traditional gender roles that are still predominant in Kosovo (Zemzadja, 2020). Some
scholars claim women’s characteristics, such as a conciliatory attitude and gentle nature, make them effective peacekeepers (Carreiras, 2011). Jordan (2002) identified important qualities for police officers working with victims of sexual assault to be professionalism, warmth, and sensitivity. Though men and women can have these qualities, they may be more gendered in a more traditional society, making gender salient in working with victims of domestic violence. Barnes, Beaulieu, and Saxton (2016) found three stereotypes that might explain how women overcome perceptions of corruption: the stereotype of women as more ethical and honest, as political outsiders, and as risk averse. Research has shown that an increase in female peacekeepers is associated with greater implementation of rights for women and a greater willingness to report rape in areas where sexual violence was prevalent during conflict (Narang and Liu, 2022).

There are limitations in this study. The first is a practical limitation of the context: Serbs and other minorities make up a considerably small portion of the population, which may dampen effects of representation. Weighting was used to partially overcome this barrier from a statistical perspective, though models with and without weighting had similar findings. Participants consisted of 290 Albanians, 97 Serbs, and 103 other minorities. After weighting to make this more representative of Kosovo’s population, this equated to 435 Albanians (89%), 26 Serbs (5%), and 29 other minorities (6%). The reality of being such a small minority may mean that high representation on police forces is still not salient.

Another limitation is that the performance scenarios used a large spread to ensure performance would be salient. However, this does not allow for an understanding of how performance impacts legitimacy in more moderate and extreme ranges. For example, would a much higher performance rating of 95% make ethnicity more salient? Is 80% considered high or
moderate performance by respondents? Additionally, the performance metric is assigned; we do not know whether having a majority or minority community would have led to better outcomes. Further research should look at whether there are positive outcomes when representation increases, and how that improved performance is perceived. Similar to the limitation with high and low performance, having a 6/4 ethnicity split vs. 9/1 does not allow for threshold effects. A higher percentage of minorities on police forces could have different impacts on ratings of legitimacy and studies should be designed to account for varying levels of representation.

Another limitation from the research design is that there is an overlap in concepts being tapped. Seriousness in pursuing investigations is strongly correlated with trust, while fairness in handling investigations was moderately correlated with both. It is unclear whether these are tapping the same characteristics and whether other factors of legitimacy are being excluded from analyses.

While this study is situated in Kosovo, it points to broader lessons on representative bureaucracy. Increased representation is shown in much of the literature to lead to positive results for the represented. However, this may be dependent on relationships among minority communities, as well as on how a minority community sees itself functioning in society. An assumption made in the literature is that co-ethnics share values, and those values will be recognized when a co-ethnic is seen in the bureaucracy. However, this does not speak to which values from a community are being represented and who from that community is being represented. Further research in the field of representative bureaucracy should look at potential pluralism within minority societies and what dynamics are at play with who serves in the bureaucracy. Some questions to be explored include: do all members of that ethnic group have equal access to serving the State? If they do, are there still thresholds in the amount of
representation that needs to be present for representation to be meaningful? And even when there is representation, who do these bureaucrats choose to serve? Some management and representative bureaucracy research addresses this last question of whether bureaucrats represent their own community, or whether the socialization of the bureaucratic institution and need to belong are at play; they find that increased Black and Latino representation in the US context was correlated with an increase in racial disparity, as shown through racial profiling (see Wilkins and Williams, 2008; Wilkins and Williams, 2009). Other research does not find this to be the case (see Hong, 2017). More research should examine what moderating variables led to these seemingly contradictory findings. This same question of whether groups represent their community or their institution also plays out along a gendered dimension in management research that asks whether women help other women advance in management settings, or whether they are incentivized to prove they are part of the majority group to gain internal legitimacy and have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo because it was a context in which they were successful; again findings are mixed with some research showing that increased female representation in management leads to increased representation in mid-management for women, while other studies show no or a negative effect (see Kurtulus and Tomaskovic-Devey, 2012; Joy and Lang, 2007; and Marques, 2009). Building on this literature may provide insights into inconsistent findings on when representation leads to positive outcomes, and when it may actually impede progress for the groups who are being represented.

This study also points to a need for more research on the impacts of perceived or actual corruption in the bureaucracy that may be muting or reversing expected impacts of perception. Corruption affects all systems to some extent, and the degree or severity of corruption may hold a key to understanding potential impediments to positive findings for increased representation. A
cross-cultural study of both post-conflict and other countries using an index for corruption could help understand the parameters of impact from perceived corruption.

Narrowing in on more post-conflict countries may also help add nuance to the theory of representative bureaucracy. While the expectation here was that an ethnic conflict would make ethnicity more salient, it is not clear how that level of violence and pressure from nearby countries with portions of these ethnic groups may moderate effects of representation. A better understanding of the post-conflict context may yield broader theoretical contributions to understanding how representation is moderated in those societies and lend insights into whether specific contexts contradict a broader perception that increased representation leads to positive outcomes.

Further research questions that need to be addressed in the literature include how dimensions of legitimacy differ from one another, and what influences these aspects of legitimacy. It is unclear whether certain types of legitimacy may be more influenced by values and representation, whether gender or ethnic. Research could also benefit from expanding to other areas of representation that are not as prevalent in the literature, including how urban and rural populations rate representation and legitimacy differently and whether better representation of these groups leads to more legitimacy. Further understanding of interaction effects between ethnicity and gender should be explored further and the field should expand its understanding beyond the binary view of gender.

**Conclusion**

While representative bureaucracy has been studied in a variety of policy areas in the US, little research has been done in other areas, particularly on passive representation and citizen perceptions of legitimacy in post-conflict areas. This chapter uses an experimental survey to
understand how respondents react to more or less representative police forces and higher and lower performance. This article found little evidence for representation affecting perceptions of legitimacy but did find a correlation between performance and legitimacy. Some reasons for this may be less trust of police overall from the Northern Serb minority community related to political control in the area and general distrust over historic militarization of police. More research should be done in other post-conflict areas and in Kosovo to better understand differences in ethnic and gender representation and its potential as a tool for building legitimacy. There are stark differences in findings for gender versus ethnic representation on perceptions of legitimacy. In a gendered scenario, female respondents rated units with higher female representation as more legitimate along each of the dimensions of legitimacy, while for men, ratings only increased for how fair police are in carrying out investigations. In the active scenario for gender, having a female in charge of a policy change was not correlated with higher ratings of police legitimacy among men or women (except for women’s ratings of trustworthiness). However, higher performance was significant in all areas of legitimacy for both men and women. This is similar to findings for ethnicity, where ethnic representation did not matter, but performance was significant for all dimensions of legitimacy for all ethnic groups. Neither gender nor ethnicity impact ratings of legitimacy when an effective policy is in place, while gender is important when only demographic information is known, though ethnicity is not. This seems to suggest that different mechanisms may be at play between active and passive scenarios and gendered vs. ethnic scenarios. More research is needed on how passive and active representation may differ in their end goals and what influences those perceptions. Additional research on how gender and ethnicity are experienced and how these lived experiences in turn influence perceptions may shed light on the subject.
Works Cited


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Table 3. Effects of a More Ethnically Representative Police Force on Perceptions of Legitimacy

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Table 4. Effect of a Minority Enacting a Policy Change on Perceptions of Legitimacy

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Table 5. Effect of Higher Performance on Measures of Legitimacy

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Table 6. Interaction of Representation and Performance on Measures of Legitimacy (N=490)

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Table 7. Effects of Representation on Single Factor of Legitimacy

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coeff</td>
<td>St</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albanian</td>
<td>0.267</td>
<td>0.100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serb</td>
<td>0.486</td>
<td>0.161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1.393</td>
<td>0.163</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Figure 1: Passive Scenario Randomization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group 1: Low Representation, Low Performance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(N=126)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo Police in Qytet/Grad, a city with 60% Kosovo Albanians and 40% other Kosovo communities, receive calls reporting robberies of homes, conduct investigations of these crimes, and make determinations as to what actions should be taken. The officers assigned to this city <strong>include 9 Kosovo Albanians and 1 officer from another community</strong>. According to a recent assessment, the police made a mandatory arrest of the perpetrator in <strong>30% of cases</strong>.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group 2: Low Representation, High Performance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(N=119)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo Police in Qytet/Grad, a city with 60% Kosovo Albanians and 40% other Kosovo communities, receive calls reporting robberies of homes, conduct investigations of these crimes, and make determinations as to what actions should be taken. The officers assigned to this city <strong>include 9 Kosovo Albanians and 1 from another community</strong>. According to a recent assessment, the police made a mandatory arrest of the perpetrator in <strong>70% of cases</strong>.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group 3: High Representation, Low Performance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(N=109)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo Police in Qytet/Grad, a city with 60% Kosovo Albanians and 40% other Kosovo communities, receive calls reporting robberies of homes, conduct investigations of these crimes, and make determinations as to what actions should be taken. The officers assigned to this city <strong>include 6 Kosovo Albanians and 4 officer from other Kosovo communities</strong>. According to a recent assessment, the police made a mandatory arrest of the robber in <strong>30% of cases</strong>.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group 4: High Representation, High Performance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(N=136)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo Police in Qytet/Grad, a city with 60% Kosovo Albanians and 40% other Kosovo communities, receive calls reporting robberies of homes, conduct investigations of these crimes, and make determinations as to what actions should be taken. The officers assigned to this city <strong>include 6 Kosovo Albanians and 4 officer from other Kosovo communities</strong>. According to a recent assessment, the police made a mandatory arrest of the perpetrator in <strong>70% of cases</strong>.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Figure II: Active Scenario Randomization**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group 1: Low Representation, Low Performance (N=120)</th>
<th>Group 2: Low Representation, High Performance (N=136)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recently in Qytet/Grad, an officer from the <strong>majority</strong> Kosovo community was promoted to oversee handling of robberies, a crime that disproportionately affects non-majority communities. This officer implemented a new system where victims of robberies meet with officers from their own ethnic community to report the crime and it is now mandatory to arrest robbers.</td>
<td>Recently in Qytet/Grad, an officer from the <strong>majority</strong> Kosovo community was promoted to oversee handling of robberies, a crime that disproportionately affects non-majority communities. This officer implemented a new system where victims of robberies meet with officers from their own ethnic community to report the crime and it is now mandatory to arrest robbers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The number of robberies has decreased by <strong>20%</strong> since the new procedure was implemented.</td>
<td>The number of robberies has decreased by <strong>80%</strong> since the new procedure was implemented.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recently in Qytet/Grad, an officer from a <strong>non-majority</strong> Kosovo community was promoted to oversee handling of robberies, a crime that disproportionately affects non-majority communities. This officer implemented a new system where victims of robberies meet with officers from their own ethnic community to report the crime and it is now mandatory to arrest robbers.</td>
<td>Recently in Qytet/Grad, an officer from a <strong>non-majority</strong> Kosovo community was promoted to oversee handling of robberies, a crime that disproportionately affects non-majority communities. This officer implemented a new system where victims of robberies meet with officers from their own ethnic community to report the crime and it is now mandatory to arrest robbers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The number of robberies has decreased by <strong>20%</strong> since the new procedure was implemented.</td>
<td>The number of robberies has decreased by <strong>80%</strong> since the new procedure was implemented.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix A: Balance Tests and Correlations

### Table I. Balance Test for Representation in Passive Robbery Scenario

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Group 1 Mean</th>
<th>Group 2 Mean</th>
<th>T-value</th>
<th>P-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age (cont)</td>
<td>37.13</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>3.71</td>
<td>3.62</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>-0.72</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>-0.90</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>-1.23</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>3.06</td>
<td>3.04</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>591.63</td>
<td>560.20</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic3</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>-0.72</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serb</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>-1.25</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N Serb</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>-1.06</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Serb</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>-0.56</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albanian</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table II. Balance Test for Performance in Passive Robbery Scenario

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Group 1 Mean</th>
<th>Group 2 Mean</th>
<th>T-value</th>
<th>P-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age (cont)</td>
<td>36.34</td>
<td>36.99</td>
<td>-0.47</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>3.63</td>
<td>3.69</td>
<td>-0.36</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>-0.37</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td>2.98</td>
<td>-1.14</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>2.92</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td><strong>0.02</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>597.87</td>
<td>555.69</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic3</td>
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<td>1.67</td>
<td>-1.37</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serb</td>
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<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N Serb</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.93</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other Serb</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albanian</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table III. Balance Test for Representation in Active Robbery Scenario

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Group 1 Mean</th>
<th>Group 2 Mean</th>
<th>T-value</th>
<th>P-Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age (cont)</td>
<td>36.81</td>
<td>36.53</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>3.68</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.90</td>
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<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>-1.18</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
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<td>2.86</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>3.07</td>
<td>3.03</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>601.17</td>
<td>548.29</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic3</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>-0.70</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serb</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>-1.06</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N Serb</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Serb</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>-1.56</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albanian</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table IV. Balance Test for Representation in Active Robbery Scenario

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Group 1 Mean</th>
<th>Group 2 Mean</th>
<th>T-value</th>
<th>P-Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age (cont)</td>
<td>38.62</td>
<td>34.86</td>
<td>2.77</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td>3.46</td>
<td>2.54</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>2.89</td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>3.05</td>
<td>3.06</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>578.06</td>
<td>573.91</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic3</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serb</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N Serb</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Serb</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>-0.37</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albanian</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table V. Correlation Between Aspects of Legitimacy for Passive Scenario

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Serious</th>
<th>Trust</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>0.774</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fair</td>
<td>0.497</td>
<td>0.535</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table VI. Correlations of Legitimacy Factors Active

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Serious</th>
<th>Trust</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>0.868</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fair</td>
<td>0.629</td>
<td>0.676</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B: Survey Questions

On the next page, you will be asked to read a description and answer a few questions about a hypothetical city in Kosovo named Qytet/Grad. Please consider the following information carefully and answer the questions as if you were a resident of Qytet/Grad.

Scenario with Theft/Break-in (PASSIVE)

S5. Randomize: read only A OR B

| A) Kosovo Police in Qytet/Grad, a city with 60% Kosovo Albanians and 40% other Kosovo communities, receive calls reporting robberies of homes, conduct investigations of these crimes, and make determinations as to what actions should be taken. The officers assigned to this city include 9 Kosovo Albanians and 1 from another community. | B) Kosovo Police in Qytet/Grad, a city with 60% Kosovo Albanians and 40% other Kosovo communities, receive calls reporting robberies of homes, conduct investigations of these crimes, and make determinations as to what actions should be taken. The officers assigned to this city include 6 Kosovo Albanians and 4 officer from other Kosovo communities. |

S6. Randomize: read only A OR B

| A) According to a recent assessment, the police made a mandatory arrest of the perpetrator in 70% of cases. Evidence shows that making such arrests rather than giving fines reduces the number of robberies in the neighborhood. | B) According to a recent assessment, the police made a mandatory arrest of the robber in 30% of cases. Evidence shows that making such arrests rather than giving fines reduces the number of robberies in the neighborhood. |

Based on what you have just read, and assuming you were a resident of Qytet/Grad, please answer the following questions:

Q10. How seriously do the police pursue an investigation of robbery in Qytet/Grad?

1. Very seriously
2. Seriously
3. Somewhat seriously
4. Not very seriously
5. Not at all seriously

Q11. How much of the time do you think Qytet/Grad citizens can trust the police to do what is right?

1. Almost always
2. Often
3. Sometimes
4. Rarely
5. Never

Q12. How fair or unfair would you say the police are likely to be in handling robbery cases in Qytet/Grad?

1. Very fair
2. Somewhat fair
3. Neutral
4. Somewhat unfair
5. Very unfair

*Scenario with Theft/Break-in (ACTIVE)*

**S7. Randomize: read only A OR B**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recently in Qytet/Grad, an officer from a <strong>non-majority</strong> Kosovo community was promoted to oversee handling of robberies, a crime that disproportionately affects non-majority communities. This officer implemented a new system where victims of robberies meet with officers from their own ethnic community to report the crime and it is now mandatory to arrest robbers.</td>
<td>Recently in Qytet/Grad, an officer from the <strong>majority</strong> Kosovo community was promoted to oversee handling of robberies, a crime that disproportionately affects non-majority communities. This officer implemented a new system where victims of robberies meet with officers from their own ethnic community to report the crime and it is now mandatory to arrest robbers.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**S8. Randomize: read only A OR B**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The number of robberies has decreased by <strong>80%</strong> since the new procedure was implemented.</td>
<td>The number of robberies has decreased by <strong>20%</strong> since the new procedure was implemented.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Q13. How seriously do the police pursue an investigation of robbery in Qytet/Grad under this new system?**

1. Very seriously
2. Seriously
3. Somewhat seriously
4. Not very seriously
5. Not at all seriously

**Q14. How much of the time do you think Qytet/Grad citizens can trust police to do what is right under the new system?**

1. Almost always
2. Often
3. Sometimes
4. Rarely
5. Never

**Q15. How fair or unfair would you say the police are likely to be in handling robbery cases in Qytet/Grad under the new system?**

1. Very fair
2. Somewhat fair
3. Neutral
4. Somewhat unfair
5. Very unfair
Chapter Three: Representation, Legitimacy, and the Potential Limiting Factor of Corruption

This paper explores whether citizen perceptions of legitimacy increase when co-ethnic representation on police forces increases. It also examines whether there may be limiting factors to the linkage between representation and legitimacy by looking at perceptions of corruption. The theory of representative bureaucracy suggests that bureaucracies will be more responsive to the public and may garner additional legitimacy when they reflect the demographics of those they serve (Mosher 1968). This paper looks at the post-conflict setting of Kosovo. Findings are mixed for representation leading to more legitimacy; some minorities significantly increase ratings of perceptions of seriousness and trust, while others show no effects. However, increased perceptions of corruption are consistently associated with negative perceptions of police legitimacy.

Keywords: ethnicity, gender, post-conflict, representation, policing

Legitimacy plays a central role in state building after conflict (Dagher, 2018). Gaining legitimacy is a priority in building post-conflict institutions because it improves citizen willingness to accept decisions and obey authorities and leads to compliance, cooperation, and engagement (Tyler and Jackson, 2013; Brinkerhoff, 2005; Paris and Sisk, 2009). Representative bureaucracy, where the public bureaucracy is structured to draw from all groups of society, is considered to lead to improved perceptions of legitimacy (Riccucci, Van Ryzin, and Lavena, 2014; Peters, Maravic, and Schroter, 2015; Gravier, 2013; Theobald and Haider-Markel, 2009) as well as to accountability, which is especially important in countries striving for political stability and peaceful change of government power (Dauda, 1990; Kingsley, 1944). Fernandez (2019) argues that increased representation leads to better performance as bureaucrats are equipped with linguistic and cultural competencies to serve a diverse citizenry and can induce compliance, cooperation, and coproduction.

A more representative bureaucracy can also lead to less corruption and better performance (Hong, 2016; Hong, 2017; Fernandez, 2019; Andrews, Ashworth, and Meier, 2014;
For example, Hong (2017) argues that greater representation and diversity reduces police misconduct and increases organizational integrity; this increased integrity influences bureaucrats’ attitudes and behaviors toward minority citizens, resulting in greater satisfaction of minority constituents. In an analysis of 60 national departments in South Africa, Fernandez and Lee (2016) found evidence that increased representation in the public service leads to better performance because more representative bureaucrats empathize with and advocate for historically disadvantaged communities.

Despite positive effects of representative bureaucracy in the literature, more research is needed on how broadly the theory can be applied and where there may be limitations to the role of representation in leading to legitimacy. Andrews et al. (2015) in a survey of the field of representative bureaucracy literature made several recommendations on how to advance the field, including calling for more research on differing institutional and geographic contexts. Headley et al. (2021) carried out qualitative research in the US on the limits of representation and found that the positive effects of representation may be nullified or that they may be negative if actions of bureaucrats toward the public are less than benign. They found that personal, familial, or vicarious encounters with bureaucrats have an influence on public perceptions of bureaucrats and note that even when there is public recognition of the need for more representation, bureaucrats’ attitudes and actions toward the public were more salient in impacting public perceptions of bureaucrats. They call for more empirical research to be done.

---

11 Note that the relationship between legitimacy and corruption seems to be bi-directional (Uslaner, 2002; Gola, 2021; McGwond, 2021; Kääriäinen, 2007; Tankebe, 2010). Widespread corruption causes a negative feedback loop that undermines institutions, leads to poor provision of services, and decays public trust (McGwond, 2021). This has implications for research in that directionality is not always apparent.
through additional types of data analysis and across other contexts to better understand the “breaking points” of representation (p.1041).

This paper seeks to answer that call by first asking whether the general theory of representative bureaucracy travels to post-conflict settings. It then addresses whether there may be moderating factors that disrupt the link between representation and positive outcomes. This work specifically looks at public perceptions of bureaucratic legitimacy to understand how the theory travels and explores whether general perceptions of corruption may negatively impact the pathway from representation to legitimacy. Understanding the relationships between and impact on one another are important as scholars strive to push the theory of representative bureaucracy forward. In addition to advancing the field, a better understanding of the limitations and benefits of representation could inform how governments in post-conflict areas go about establishing legitimacy to attain behavioral changes in the public, generate more positive interactions with the bureaucracy, and build increased cooperation from the public.

This paper is situated in the context of Kosovo, a post-conflict country that was constitutionally founded on the ideals of ethnic and gender representation both politically and in the bureaucracy. The bureaucratic area of study used here is policing, as that is a common area of research in the field of representative bureaucracy because of the close proximity and impact of policing on the public. It also allows for comparisons with research done in the US on policing. Policing is particularly important in the post-conflict setting as it is tied to the use of force, a primary role of government, and an area that is sometimes reflective of how ethnic conflict was undertaken.

Utilizing an experimental and nationally-representative survey carried out in Kosovo in 2019, this paper seeks first to establish the representation-legitimacy link through general
questions about bureaucratic legitimacy, as measured by survey respondents’ evaluation of the trustworthiness, fairness, and seriousness of bureaucrats. This is merged with data on the representativeness of local police forces in all municipalities in Kosovo. Next, survey data on public perceptions of police corruption are used to examine whether citizen perceptions of legitimacy are impacted and perhaps overwhelmed by perceptions of corruption, which may indicate a breakage in the link between representation and legitimacy. Findings are mixed for representation leading to more legitimacy but show that increased perceptions of corruption are associated with negative perceptions of police legitimacy. This paper also supports recent literature that asserts that the nature of an interaction will impact citizen perceptions of legitimacy of bureaucrats.

This study first establishes a theoretical framework to explore how representation, legitimacy, and corruption are related. Next, potential contributions and hypotheses are presented. After the context specific to Kosovo is laid out, data and measures are described. Finally, findings and implications are discussed.

Theoretical Framework

The theory of representative bureaucracy suggests that bureaucracies will be more responsive to the public and garner additional legitimacy when they reflect the demographics of those they serve (Mosher 1968). Representation is often expected to lead to legitimacy in the literature (see Riccucci, Van Ryzin, and Lavena, 2014; Peters, Maravic, and Schroter, 2015; Gravier, 2013; Theobald and Haider-Markel, 2009). Groeneveld et al. (2015) suggest that both passive and active representation may affect perceptions that all segments of society are included, which increases both legitimacy and effectiveness and therefore performance of bureaucracies. Selden (1997) noted that positive impacts of representation include a perception
of equal access to power, bureaucratic expertise, reflection of group preferences, and citizen cooperation. Each of these is related to legitimacy: Schuck (2018) posits that to maintain their legitimacy, leaders must reflect the value systems of those they serve, and Krislov (1974) asserts that representation implies legitimacy as those serving stand in for the larger body that they represent. This ties to Kingsley’s (1944) observation that civil servants were responsive to the public they served because they were immersed in the ideologies and thought in a similar manner as others in their class.

Because the reflections of one’s own values is inherent to legitimacy, a potential pathway to building legitimacy for governments is representation within bureaucracies, as citizens interact most closely with bureaucracies when interfacing with the government.

*Representation, Legitimacy, and Post-Conflict Areas*

Representation and legitimacy may be even more intimately tied in areas that have experienced conflict. An aim of state building is to establish the State as the highest authority, and research in post-conflict areas emphasizes the importance of legitimacy from the eyes of individuals and groups within the domestic population (Chesterman, 2007; Whalan, 2013). Post-conflict states in particular can gain legitimacy when individuals see co-ethnics competing for and attaining to political positions and serving in state bureaucracies (Esman, 1999). As researchers in representative bureaucracy indicate, a broadly representative bureaucracy signals that the government and bureaucracy are open and accessible to the general public (Long, 1952; Krislov, 1974; Mosher, 1968). The Department for International Development lists institutional legitimacy as a primary requirement for peace, security, and resilience in the long term (DFID, 2010). This long-term view is particularly important in areas that have not developed a strong state capacity. Scholars argue that legitimacy in stable countries may differ from those in more
fragile post-conflict states because they have a different starting point; stable countries have a buffer to weather crises, or a “reservoir of good will” to draw from that cannot be assumed in countries where processes and democratic institutions are still emerging (Seligson, 2002; Mischler and Rose, 2001; Brinkerhoff et al., 2012; Fisk and Cherney, 2017). Being able to reflect shared social values, neutrality, participation, and respect become important in building up a level of legitimacy and good will in post-conflict areas (Fisk and Cherney, 2017). Social identity theory suggests that legitimacy can be built by gaining influence and power through signaling belonging to a group; this can happen through use of rhetoric that indicates a leader acts, thinks, and behaves in accordance with group norms (Hornsey, 2008; Tajfel and Wilkes, 1963; Reicher & Hopkins, 1996; Hogg, 2001; Hogg, Hains, & Mason, 1998). This opens a role for bureaucrats who act on values of an ingroup to gain legitimacy.

Legitimacy based on the actions of the bureaucracy can be divided into performance legitimacy and procedural legitimacy. In performance legitimacy, legitimacy comes from government performance and effectiveness; thus, states possess performance legitimacy in the eyes of citizens when they improve living standards in addition to filling state functions (Francois and Sud, 2006). It is related to collective gains, distributive justice, favorable outcomes, and fairness (Scholte and Tallberg, 2018; Hurd, 2007). Procedural legitimacy, on the other hand, embodies efficiency, expertise, impartiality, participation, accountability, problem solving, and correct procedure (Tallberg and Zurn, 2017; Scholte and Tallberg, 2018; Hurd, 2007).

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12 However, the assumed positive effects of representation should be balanced with difficulties of focusing on ethnic differences in post-conflict settings. Some research on post-conflict peace building seems to suggest that emphasizing ethnicity in post-conflict areas may lead to more nationalistic tendencies, as citizens focus more on policy outcomes for their own group rather than for the nation (Pickering, 2009). For example, voters who identify strongly with their co-ethnic in a society with ethnic political parties will tend to vote for nationalistic parties because candidates focus on prioritizing outcomes for one’s own group over others; in contrast, voters who do not identify strongly with their own group will be more likely to be influenced by policy and candidates based on ideology or other social divisions, rather than ethnicity (ibid.).
Legitimacy is connected to perceptions of the fairness of decision-making by the government, and to perceptions of being treated with dignity and respect (Fisk and Cherney, 2017). Legitimacy then is a combination of how the public perceives fairness, trust, and bureaucratic effectiveness.

Representative bureaucracy literature has looked at some areas that have experienced conflict. In an analysis of 60 national departments in South Africa, Fernandez and Lee (2016) found evidence that increased representation in the public service leads to better performance because more representative bureaucrats empathize with and advocate for historically disadvantaged communities. However, while increasing the number of minorities represented in the bureaucracy is associated with achieving a higher percent of goals, results for increased gender representation were mixed and show that increasing the number of females among racial groups is not associated with effective organizations. In Northern Ireland, another post-conflict setting, O'Connor (2017) found that while bureaucrats do act on values, these values are not always aligned with identities related to race, gender, ethnicity, or similar demographic characteristics but rather to professional, learned identities. In Timor Leste, street-level bureaucrats were found to use their position to reinforce their authority (Roll, 2018). Due to mixed findings, this paper examines whether positive findings for representation translates into increased ratings of perceptions legitimacy when considering the demographic makeup of local police units in post-conflict settings. Given the importance of values, salience of access to power by minority groups, and the importance of legitimacy in post-conflict areas, this paper posits that:

**H1:** As the percentage of bureaucrats from under-represented communities increases in post-conflict areas, citizen perceptions of legitimacy of local units will increase.
Limiting Factors to Representation

While research on the effects of representation shows positive findings, there may be factors that moderate the linkage between representation and perceptions of legitimacy. Some public management literature speaks to normative ideas of administration and power dynamics therein. The New Public Administration movement explicitly saw a role for values in administration and felt administrators had been to blame for creating inequities in the system. They saw a need for reform in administration that would lead to more responsive policy and administration (Meier, 2000; see Marini, 1971; Waldo, 1970). The Friedrich-Finer debate highlighted questions of administrative responsibility, with Finer suggesting that administrators should be responsive to elected officials and warned against administrators acting for the good of the public outside of that responsiveness, and Friedrich advocating for technical expertise and being guided by popular sentiment, going as far as to suggest that a policy could be called irresponsible that did not give proper regard to preferences in the community, though his emphasis was on majority opinion (Friedrich, 1940; Finer, 1940). Meier and O’Toole (2006) assert that bureaucratic values have been omitted in the literature of bureaucratic control and are far more influential in explaining bureaucratic outcomes than are political factors; they argue that if a bureaucracy that is representative of the public exercises discretion and pursues its own interests, it will also pursue the interests of the public.

Ethical standards for public administrators were advocated by Appleby (1952), who saw a need for administrators to assume responsibilities, deal effectively with people, be good listeners, and avoid using power for its own sake (see additional discussion in Bailey 1966 and Rohr 1989). Meier (2000) asserts that the criterion of responsiveness requires the question to whom the bureaucracy is responsive, and notes that this can sometimes conflict with
competence, which involves the bureau using the best available knowledge to deal with problems and develop good solutions. The question of responsive to whom points to multiple possibilities: the general public, the portion of the public affected by a particular implementation of the law, organized interest groups, political institutions, and the law (Meier, 2000). Because multiple interests may be in competition, the discretion to decide which on behalf of one group over another may raise ethical questions. Kauffman (1956) discusses how many groups feel under-represented by an unwieldy bureaucracy. He notes that some groups feel disadvantaged because they do not see themselves as adequately represented, which leads people to support increased representativeness.

What if a bureaucracy, even a representative one, does not pursue the interests of the public or does not represent all portions of the public for which it is responsible? While representation may be positive in areas that do not have histories of unjust behavior, in contexts where citizens have experienced injustice and inequities at the hand of the bureaucracy, maltreatment prevents the positive benefits of demographic representation (Headley et al., 2021). O’Connor’s (2017) research on conflict management and post-conflict governance in Northern Ireland found that elite level bureaucrats may pursue their own professional interests or those of their class, rather than representing a primary racial or gender identity. He cites Hindera’s (1993) research on two types of associations: primary, those we are born into, such as race, gender, and ethnicity, and secondary, those that we create socially, such as through professional identities or involvement with an organization like a football club. It is not always clear which identity a bureaucrat will represent.

These limitations on the effects of representation suggest a potential moderating role for when bureaucrats do not represent those they are assumed to serve, or when their behavior runs
counter to the public good in general, especially when that behavior leads to decisions being administered in an unjust manner. Corruption is defined as the abuse of public power for private benefit or illegal behavior to manipulate affairs of state for personal gain (Tanzi, 1998; World Bank, 2020; Uslaner, 2002). Post-conflict settings in particular are fraught with histories of unjustness, where there has been ethnic conflict and the power of the state is wielded on behalf of one group over others. People who have personally experienced, or had family members personally experience, more corruption in interactions with the bureaucracy tend to not trust their motives; in the example of policing, this mistrust comes largely because they do not perceive the police as effective at dealing with crime and reducing risk (Jackson et al., 2014). Headley et al. (2021) found that personal and familial encounters with police influenced perceptions of officers. While they noted that the citizens they interviewed saw a need for increased representation, the authors found that police treatment of the public was more salient than representation itself and negative encounters could cancel assumed benefits of representation or even have negative effects for the public (ibid). Those who have experienced mistreatment firsthand will be less likely to see bureaucratic actions as legitimate, and this may further moderate the representation – legitimacy link.

Corruption goes against many of the ideals of representation and therefore may break the link between representation and legitimacy. Corruption is detrimental to democracy and undermines rules of law, contributes to instability, leads to violation of human rights, hinders government’s ability to provide basic services, and slows economic development (United Nations, 2004).13 Research in the Western Balkans, Eastern and Western Europe, Latin America,

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13 Note that some literature supports an “efficient grease” theory that argues that bribery, an act of corruption, can boost political and economic development by reducing red tape. Others argue that corruption can facilitate building political parties and stabilize the political environment (see Leff, 1964; Huntington, S. 1968; Bayley, 1967;
East Asia, and Africa finds that corruption negatively impacts trust in government institutions (Gola, 2021; Della Porta, 2000; Anderson and Tverdova, 2003; Seligson, 2002; Chang and Chu, 2006; Cho and Kirwin, 2007).

Widespread corruption creates a negative feedback loop that undermines institutions, leads to poor provision of services, and decays public trust (McGownd, 2021). Corruption is an important country-level predictor of trust in police, and individual-level experiences with corruption have been shown to be a strong indicator of mistrust of police (Kääriäinen, 2007; Tankebe, 2010). When trust declines in police, compliance with officers declines, police are less effective at fighting crime, and citizens may be less likely to seek assistance (Tyler, 2004; Tankebe, 2013; UN Women, 2011 as cited in Barnes et. al, 2018). In addition to negative outcomes for corruption in relation to procedural elements of policing, countries with higher levels of corruption are correlated with lower levels of confidence in government performance (Pellagata and Memoli, 2016). You (2006) found that corruption violated the perception of police carrying out just procedures and constituted a betrayal of trust, thus hampering legitimacy. This relationship holds for perceived levels of government corruption at both the local and central government level, where these are negatively correlated with evaluations of government performance (Moldogaziev, 2021). Research suggests that when there is minimal integrity established, ability to avoid crime and avoid corruption becomes increasingly important (Jackson et al., 2014). Fairness is also important in shaping respect of law, which increases when people perceive that they have been treated fairly (Tyler, 1990).

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Bequart-Leclerq, 1989). Findings from Lavallee(2008) reject this theory as it pertains to citizen’s trust and find that perception of corruption has a negative impact on citizen’s trust in political institutions.
While both representation and corruption have an impact on perceptions of legitimacy, little research has been done on whether corruption negatively impacts the representation – legitimacy link. Given the opposing nature of corruption to representing the public’s values, the following hypothesis is posed:

H2: People living in post-conflict areas who perceive bureaucrats as corrupt will rate bureaucrats lower on dimensions of legitimacy even when there is increased representation.

Policing as a Test Case for Representation

This study employs the context of policing to evaluate the effects of representation on legitimacy. Studies on policing in the US show that perceived legitimacy may motivate behavior through a sense of value congruence (Jackson et al., 2012). Experimental surveys have found positive effects for ethnic and gender representation on police forces, including that increased representation influenced perceived job performance, trustworthiness, and fairness of an agency (Riccucci, Van Ryzin, and Lavena, 2014; Riccucci, Van Ryzin, and Jackson, 2018). Theobald and Hieder-Markel (2009) found that citizen perceptions of police interactions were shaped by the race of the officer involved in the interaction, with black respondents rating police actions as more legitimate if a black officer was present, and whites being more likely to perceive police action carried out by white officers as more legitimate. Legitimacy is particularly important to policing because of the power given them; authorities must act in fair and just ways to be seen as rightful holders of power. Legitimacy encourages citizens to cooperate with officials, obey laws, and accept the state’s right to monopolize use of force (Jackson et al, 2014; Terrill 2001; McCluskey 2003; Tyler and Jackson, 2014).
Kosovo Context

The data for this study come from Kosovo. Kosovo has a population of approximately 1.8 million, with 93% counting themselves as Albanians (these numbers exclude the northern Serbian-majority regions) (Peterson, 2012). Ethnicity is particularly salient in Kosovo due to ethnic conflict and differences in language and religion that generally fall along ethnic lines. A short history of the area of the police force in Kosovo points to how under-representation led to abuse and corruption on the force.

Under the Yugoslav system, Kosovo was an autonomous region. With Slobodan Milosevic’s rise to power in Yugoslavia came a Serbian Nationalist agenda, which led to the revocation of Kosovo’s autonomy in 1989 and apartheid-like conditions in the region, where ethnic Albanians were purged from government positions to quash Albanian Nationalism (Greene et al., 2012). Violence in the area was largely motivated by ethnic tensions, with Serbs and Albanians inflicting violence on one another (Rogel, 2003; Mertus, 1999). Much of this violence occurred as police officers joined military groups in carrying out actions against citizens. Both Serbian and Albanian groups experienced oppression at the hands of police from the other group when each was in power (Percy et al., 1995; Glenny, 1996; and Rogel, 2003). Milosevic took up the nationalist cause after seeing Kosovar police conflicts with Serbs in 1987; this was televised widely in Serbia, contributing to beliefs that Serbs were being persecuted in areas where they were minorities (Percy et al., 1995). Some evidence exists that Serbs provoked police knowing this would bolster their nationalist cause (Glenny, 1996). Ethnic Albanian Kosovars also met force at the hands of Serbian police. During the late 1980s, Kosovo came under Serbian police rule, which was marked by the arrest, interrogation, or interment of 584,373 Kosovo Albanians (Rogel, 2003). A US Department Report (1997) says that police oppression
continued against ethnic minorities, with “police commit[ing] the most wide-spread and worst abuses against Kosovo’s 90-percent ethnic Albanian population.” This included not following legal procedures when extracting “confessions,” as well as the arbitrary arrest and detention of citizens.

After the 1999 NATO intervention that came as a response to increased state violence, Serbia retreated from Kosovo, and there was no functioning police service. The United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) took over legislative and executive authority in 1999 with establishing a police service that could support law and order before transferring the institution over to Kosovo Police as a top priority (ibid.) The transfer gradually started in 2001, and Kosovars assumed command of all police stations except one regional headquarter in N. Mitrovica by 2008 (ibid.). While UNMIK was still in charge, they focused on recruiting for ethnic minority representation, especially of the Serb minority, as well as including women to improve the gender balance of police forces (ibid.).

Since Kosovo declared independence in 2008, reforms in policing have included a focus on increasing ethnic and gender representation. The OSCE and the U.S. Embassy’s Department of Justice police support program (ICITAP) have worked to increase representation of women on the force (OSCE, 2019; U.S. Embassy Pristina, 2018). Despite these efforts women make up only 14% of KP, including 11% of uniformed officers (Farnsworth et al., 2018). There has been a movement to include more women in trainings, including a 2019 mandate that required 30% of participants at trainings to be female (Jones 2020).

While Kosovo is proclaimed to be a multi-ethnic state, it is the most ethnically homogenous state in the Balkans (Capussela, 2015 as referenced in Rrahmani, 2020). Seven ethnic groups serve as official minorities in Kosovo: Serbs (1.5%), Bosniaks (1.6%), Turks (1.1%), Askali
(0.9%), Gorani (0.6%), Egyptians (0.6%) and Roma (0.5%) (Kipred, 2014). Despite making up similar portions of the population, Serbs politically have a preferred status over other minorities. An example of this preferred status is that Serbian is an official language of Kosovo, even in regions where Serbs are not a majority (*ibid.*). Serbs also have an advantage with a minimum of ten seats in Parliament guaranteed for Serbs, while other communities hold one to three seats (Article 64 of the Kosovo Constitution). Further, Serbs and other minorities are over-represented in the civil service; there are 91,000 employees in the public sector in Kosovo (Gap Institute, 2015); as of 2012, 7.85% of civil servants at the central level were from minority groups, with Bosniaks, Turks, and Serbs over-represented (OSCE, 2013). In addition to differences between minority communities, there are differences within the Serb community that are important to note. Serb communities in the north experience a markedly different political context than Serbs in the south. The four Serb-majority norther municipalities are entangled with political regimes sponsored by Belgrade, which does not recognize Kosovo independence (Meaker, 2017). This northern area remains contested, and experiences heavy Serbian influence, as it is bordered by Serbia on the north; Serbia has maintained a symbolic monopoly in norther Kosovar schools, where they use the Serbian curriculum (Madison, 2022). Serbia’s Ministry of Health runs hospitals in the norther district of Kosovo and local politicians there run in both Serbia’s and Kosovo’s elections (*ibid.*). Serbia’s de facto control in Northern Kosovo through the Serb List party means Kosovar Serbs often have little say in politics (Weizman, 2019). This differs from the security sector, where only Kosovo Police and NATO soldiers patrol the streets. This division of power means neither Serbia nor Kosovo fully control the region, and local powerholders seek to provide order and make claims to authority (Madison, 2022). These contextual differences between Serbs in the northern and southern districts of Kosovo may lead
to differences between how ethnicity is experienced by each, with more tensions in the north and fewer in the south. Future analyses should separate Serbs living in the four northern municipalities from other Serbs to better understand how those differences affect the impacts of representation on perceptions of legitimacy.

Corruption is a major issue in the Balkans, and Kosovo is no exception. Being a young and developing democracy in transition with a communist past makes Kosovo and other Western Balkan countries more vulnerable to the threat of corruption (Gola, 2021). High-level corruption and wartime crimes are rarely prosecuted and corruption and inequality are prominent in Kosovo (Serwer, 2021; Dubard, 2021). Kosovo Serbs are marginalized in Kosovo society, which fuels resentment (Maloku et. al, 2016). In 2020, Freedom House rated Kosovo as partly free due to rampant corruption, weak institutions, and a lack of security and freedom for local press (Kosovo 2020: Freedom in the World Country Report 2020).

While Kosovo Police (KP) are the most trusted institution in Kosovo, with 61 percent of respondents in a nationally representative sample saying they trust police, corruption on the police force remains (Balaj, 2019). Among those who view KP as corrupt, traffic and border police are viewed as the most problematic parts of the police force while police management and local officers are seen as least corrupt (ibid.). The United Nations Office of Drug and Crime (2011) reported that nearly 10% of the adult population of Kosovo had “direct or indirect exposure to a bribery experience with a public official,” and “More than half of the population believes that corrupt practices occur often or very often.” The police force has been characterized as being under-resourced for handling criminal activity, and, while not free from corruption, there are examples of police being arrested and sentenced for criminal behavior, which shows a willingness to punish behavior in their own organization (McGownd, 2021). Gjinovci (2016)
cites that 80% of Kosovo citizens consider corruption a societal ill, and McGownd (2021) notes that it is widely accepted that northern Kosovo is a hub of organized crime. Yet due to restricted institutional control there, limited information is available on the scale of criminal elements.

There is criticism of KP officials in Northern Kosovo who have been involved in organized crime as well as concerns that the KP in that region have relaxed standards for minority officers in an effort to create a more ethnically diverse force (Balaj, 2019).

While the KP are the most-trusted institution in Kosovo, the least trusted institutions are other institutions involved with justice, where only 32 percent have trust in prosecution and 27 percent have trust in the courts (Balaj, 2019). Perception of corruption in these systems show that around 51 percent of respondents think the courts are corrupted, and 49 percent say that prosecution is affected by corruption (ibid.). Ciorciari and Krasner (2018) posit that governance functions are like links on a chain; failings in any link negate improvement in others. While the courts and prosecuting bodies are separate from the police, they do reflect the ability to follow through on holding offenders responsible for criminal behavior.

RCC’s annual report (2020) shows that Kosovars rank corruption as the main problem in Kosovo. A survey of 7,026 respondents found 34% totally agree that police are affected by corruption, 40% tend to agree, 16% tend to disagree, 4% totally disagree, and 6% refused to answer. In Kosovo, only 28% tended to agree or agreed totally that the government fights corruption effectively (RCC Balkan Barometer 2017 EU project).

Data

The data for this chapter come from two sources: 1) a survey administered in Kosovo in September 2019, and 2) from municipal profiles compiled by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe: Kosovo Mission (2018) on the demographic makeup of the Kosovo
Police (KP). Participants from the survey provided perceptions of trust, fairness, corruption, and performance of KP.

The survey was administered in Albanian and Serbian, the official languages of Kosovo, to a representative sample of all ethnic communities and equal numbers of men and women from the 38 major municipalities in Kosovo ages 18 and up (N=490). To ensure 50 Serbian respondents and 50 respondents from other minorities, weighting was applied to the sample by multiplying the minorities by a factor of 2.41 for every one Albanian.\(^\text{14}\) This survey used a format typically applied in Kosovo: a multi-staged random probability method. First, the method accounted for a 45% urban/55% rural divide to reflect demographics of the country. Then a random household technique was employed, where each third house, apartment, or dwelling on the left-hand side of the street was selected. Once a household was chosen, the member of the household with the nearest birthday was asked to participate in the survey. The final stage allowed for substitution of a respondent after two attempts were made at contacting the randomly selected participant (one initial visit and one call back).

Table 1 below shows weighted and unweighted descriptive statistics for the full sample. Approximately 52% of all respondents are female, 89% are Albanian, and 6% are Serb (before weighting, this was 59% Albanian and 19% Serb).\(^\text{15}\) The average monthly income is 636 Euros, and the average age is 36. All models control for gender (female=1; male=0), age (a continuous variable), marital status (married=1; else 0), ethnicity (dichotomous variables for Serb, Albanian, and other; Albanian was the excluded group in models not broken out by ethnicity),

\(^{14}\) Analyses were conducted without weighting and found similar results. 
\(^{15}\) Kosovo statistics show 92.9% of the population are Albanian, and 1.5% are Serb. However, these estimates may under-represent Serb and some other ethnic minorities because they are based on the 2011 Kosovo national census, which excluded northern Kosovo (a largely Serb-inhabited region) and was partially boycotted by Serb and Romani communities in southern Kosovo (CIA, 2020).
administrative district (seven dichotomous variables indicating district the respondent resides in), education (a categorical variable with six categories where 6th-9th grade is the lowest category and doctorate is the highest), and monthly income (with four categories ranging from less than 400 Euros/month to over 1000 Euros/month).

See Table 1

Dependent variables in this study capture aspects of legitimacy from the survey. Respondents were asked how seriously KP investigate crimes in Kosovo, how often KP can be trusted to do the right thing, and how fair they think KP are (see appendix for full set of survey questions). Each of these dependent variables are rated using a five-point Likert scale, where five indicates more positive feelings along each dimension, and one indicates more negative evaluations. For the question of how seriously KP investigate crimes, respondents were given the options of 1=not at all seriously; 2=not very seriously; 3=somewhat seriously; 4=seriously; or 5=very seriously. For how often they trust KP to do the right thing, respondents answered 1=never; 2=rarely; 3=sometimes; 4=often; or 5=almost always. In answering how fair local police are, respondents answered 1=very unfair; 2=somewhat unfair; 3=neutral; 4=somewhat fair; or 5=very fair.16

The main explanatory variables of interest for the full set of respondents come from two sources. First, the municipal profile data from the OSCE (2018) includes the percentage of Serb police officers (ranging from 0 to 95 percent), percentage of other minority officers (ranging from 0 to 35 percent), and percentage of women on the police force (ranging from 0 to 26%). The OSCE states that they have regional centers in all districts and local teams in each

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16 The sample used here is the same as that used in Chapters One and Two of this dissertation. Respondents rated legitimacy of police in hypothetical domestic violence and robbery scenarios after given information on representation and performance. They were asked about their views of local Kosovo Police after exposure to these experiments, which may have primed them in these evaluations.
municipality collecting data, but it is unclear whether units self-report these numbers, or whether there is some external validation. Because the collection process is unclear, there could be unknown bias. Second, a five-point Likert scale question on the perception of corruption was asked during the survey. In response to how corrupt the respondents saw KP as being, they could answer 1=very corrupt; 2=corrupt; 3=somewhat corrupt; 4=a little corrupt; or 5=not at all corrupt. It is important to note that while the percentage of officers comes from an external source, ratings for legitimacy and corruption come from the same survey, so there is a possibility for common source bias. Common source bias exists when measurement error is not random and can be contributed to coming from the same source or when the variation between concepts is a function of how the data are measured (Richardson, Simmering, and Sturman, 2009; Meier and O’Toole, 2012). Because there may be perceptual errors where different respondents describe phenomenon differently from one another but likely have a correlated perceptual bias in how individuals rate dependent and independent variables, analyses with common source bias may indicate a relationship where there is none (Favero and Bullock, 2015). Meier and O’Toole (2012) note that false positives are more likely than false negatives, so especial attention should be paid to claims that assert there is a relationship when there is none (Meier and O’Toole, 2012). However, they note that their research applies to administrative self-assessments and may not apply to citizens evaluations of administration, and even with administrative self-assessments, assessments about observable behavior were less prone to common source bias than other questions (ibid.). A perception of corruption or legitimacy should be taken as just that, a perception, rather than as evidence of actual corruption or legitimacy.

Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for explanatory variables. Additional controls include respondent age, gender, marital status, district, and education, as shown in Tables 1 and 2.
Analyses below report coefficients of linear regressions for the full group and for subsets of ethnic groups (Albanian, Serb, and Other minorities). Ordinal logits were also performed as a robustness check (models not shown here), and the same variables were found to be significant in both models. Regional fixed effects are included in all analyses but not reported in tables. Interaction effects between corruption and percent Other Minority officer and between corruption and percent Serb officers were included in initial models. No interaction was significant for ratings of trust and fairness. The interaction between percent Other Minority officers and corruption was only significant for seriousness in pursuing investigations. Interactions were omitted in all other models.

Findings

Hypothesis one states that as the percentage of officers from underrepresented communities increases, ratings of legitimacy of police will increase for underrepresented groups. Table 3 below shows weighted results for the full sample. An increase in the percentage of any minority officer is not significant in the full model, but being Serb as compared to Albanian is negatively correlated with all ratings of legitimacy; being Serb is correlated with a 0.7 decrease in ratings of seriousness, a 0.6 decrease for trust, and a 0.4 decrease in ratings of fairness (p<0.001 for both seriousness and trust and p<0.10 for fairness). Age is positively correlated with perceptions of fairness (p<0.10) while being from Prizren is negatively correlated with fairness (p<0.05); no other controls are significant. Hypothesis one does not hold in the full model. Rather than positive effects for co-ethnic representation, the only significant findings are that Serbs, as compared to Albanians, have negative ratings for all factors of legitimacy. Some contextual factors may be at play here, where a history of maltreatment at the hands of police
may be overriding potential positive effects of representation. This is explored further in the discussion and limitations section below. These models are tested again on subgroups for each minority population, as shown in Table 4 below.

See Table 3

To understand whether different ethnic groups rate officers differently based on ethnicity, Table 4 shows weighted results for ethnic subsets of the population. Controls are included but not shown. For Serbs, neither an increase in Serb nor other minority officers are correlated with ratings of legitimacy. Living in Gjilan is positively correlated with ratings of seriousness and trust by Serbs (p<0.05 and p<0.10 respectively), and marital status is negatively correlated with ratings of fairness (p<0.10).

For other minorities, an increase in minority officers is positively correlated with seriousness and trust but not fairness; this increase is fairly inconsequential with an average increase of 0.1 in ratings (p<0.10 and p<0.05). Age is positively correlated with ratings of seriousness and trust (p<0.05 and p<0.001), while education is positively correlated only with trust for other minorities (p<0.05). An increase in Serb or all minority officers was not significant for Albanian ratings of seriousness, trust, or fairness, nor were any controls significant. The question of whether an increase in officers of one’s own ethnicity leads to increased perceptions of legitimacy only partially holds: minorities other than Serbs have an increase in ratings for seriousness and trust when minority officers increase, but there is no effect for an increase in the number of Serb officers for any group.

See Table 4
For women and men, an increase in the percentage of females on the police force was not significant for ratings of seriousness, trust, or fairness (see Table 5 below). Being Serb was negatively correlated with all dimensions of legitimacy as compared to Albanian respondents with a 0.7 decrease for seriousness, 0.6 decrease for trust, and 0.4 decrease for fairness (p<0.001, p<0.001, and p<0.10 respectively); age was positively correlated with fairness (p<0.10). While there are mixed results for ethnicity, the hypothesis that increased representation will lead to an increase in perceptions of legitimacy does not hold for increased female representation on police forces.

See Table 5

The second hypothesis examines whether corruption is a moderating factor for the link between representation and legitimacy, namely that people who perceive police as corrupt will rate police lower on dimensions of legitimacy than those who do not. Table 6 shows that perceiving police as less corrupt is positively correlated with all areas of legitimacy, with a 0.4 increase in perceptions of seriousness and trust and a 0.5 increase in perceptions of fairness when there is a one-unit change in perception of less corruption of police (p<0.001). This means that on average respondents who rate police as one step less corrupt move up 0.5 categories in their evaluations of police legitimacy. This may be enough to move some to the next category. The percentage of other minority officers is also correlated with increased perceptions of trustworthiness of police but is very low with a change of 0.014 in perception of trustworthiness

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17 Models that included interaction effects (not included here) show that perceiving police as very corrupt, corrupt, somewhat corrupt, or a little corrupt (as compared to not at all corrupt) are all negatively correlated with ratings of legitimacy (ranging from p<0.001 and p<0.01). The only interactions that were significant were between perceiving the police as very corrupt and an increase in other minority police on evaluations of seriousness (p<0.05) and seeing the police as somewhat corrupt interacting with an increase of minority officers (p<0.10).
with a one percent increase in the number of other minorities on the force (p<0.10). Compared to Albanian respondents, being Serb was negatively correlated with evaluations of seriousness in carrying out investigations, where they decreased on average by 0.5 and by 0.4 for trusting police to do the right thing (p<0.05).

See Table 6

Respondents were asked an open-ended question about what influenced their rating of trust in KP, and 58 of 317 respondents who answered this question explicitly mentioned that they took corruption into consideration. Hypothesis 2 in this study is supported given that corruption has a consistent effect on all areas of legitimacy. While it is unclear how much of an impact it has on the relationship between representation and legitimacy, corruption is an important indicator of legitimacy and may be masking some effects of representation here. Respondents were also asked about a traffic incident they experienced in the last year, what the ethnicity of the officer was, whether they were asked for a bribe, and whether they perceived the police as behaving well. The nature of the firsthand interaction with a bureaucrat was showed that asking for a bribe (a negative and corrupt act) was negatively correlated with ratings of legitimacy (p<0.001); on the other hand, respondents who perceived that the police behaved rated the interaction as more legitimate (p<0.05, analysis not shown here). In these interactions, Serb ratings for Albanian officers were negatively correlated with ratings of legitimacy (p<0.01), while a Serb officer was not significant for ratings of legitimacy. Being Serb was also positively correlated with an increase in stops in the last 12 months (p<0.001). This confirms other research that states that Serbs experience higher traffic fines (Biserko, 2019).
Discussion and Limitations

This paper asks whether there is a link between representation and legitimacy, and what factors might moderate that linkage. The first question of increased co-ethnic representation in the bureaucracy leading to increased perceptions of legitimacy saw mixed results. This opens up several areas of discussion. One dynamic at play here is that the different dimensions of legitimacy are not equally impacted by increased representation, indicating that seriousness in carrying out tasks, trusting bureaucrats to do the right thing, and seeing bureaucrats as fair may be motivated and influenced by different variables, and that representation is more important in some of these areas of legitimacy over others.

The lack of positive outcomes for some minority groups points to another important dynamic at play: a reality is that identities are not always fixed characteristics but rather are shaped by lived experience, including how a person perceives themselves and by how others treat them (Headley, 2021). As social identity theory suggests, people from lower status groups have several options to gain a positive social identity: engage in social change for the group to gain status, devalue other groups, or disassociate from their own group altogether (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner & Brown, 1978). This difference in evaluation of other-group minorities could be due to differences in how varying ethnic minority groups are perceived by one another in relation to their own group. The different treatment of ethnic minority communities that make up fairly similar percentages of the population may lead to tensions and mistrust between the groups. That seems to be playing out here as other minorities see officers from their own groups as more legitimate, but do not rate factors of legitimacy higher for an increase in other group representation.
An explanation of no positive findings for Serbs may be that identities vary across individuals within groups, creating subsets of ethnic groups. Which or whose values are represented within the larger group will depend on the context of a given area (Andrews et al., 2015; Meier, 2000). This may mean that the ingroup of interest here is not a minority group as a whole but rather a subset of that group. In this case, the question may not be whether Serbs perceive increased representation as more legitimate, but rather whether a subset, such as Northern or Southern Serbs, perceives increased representation of their group as more legitimate.

One of the influences shaping the lived experience of Northern Serbs is from the dynamics between Kosovo and Serbia, with Serbs in the north feeling that neither country has their best interest in mind. Political entities in Serbia and political representatives in northern Kosovo portray the Kosovar government as oppressive in Northern Kosovo and encourage Serbs living in those regions to resist the government (ibid.). Pressure from Serbia was illustrated when the Serbian government pressured Kosovo Serbs to resign their positions on the police force in Kosovo (Balaj, 2019). Otherwise, they were met with harassment during border crossings (ibid.).

A more recent example of the division between these groups and impact on policing was seen in November 2022, when a rule went into effect requiring all Kosovars to adopt license plates from Kosovo. A Serb police officer in North Mitrovica refused to change from his Serbian license plates and was dismissed by central authorities in the capitol of Pristina; this led to 576 Serb officers, ten prosecutors, a government minister, and ten members of parliament resigning, accompanied by several thousand ethnic Serbs protesting in the streets (Reuters, 2022; Petrequin, 2022; VOA, 2022). There are approximately 50,000 Serbs living in northern Kosovo, and 50,000 living in other areas; those in the north largely have kept Serbian plates, while those in other areas largely use Kosovar plates (Reuters, 2022). These differences in group dynamics with
respect to the legitimacy and authority of Kosovo may lead some Serbs to view Serb representation either as a non-event or as a negative. Future analyses should include subsets of Serb populations to understand whether representation is positive for those that are less exposed to contention in the north.

Another factor at play may stem from the fact that Serbs in northern municipalities tend to distrust police partially because they see them as linked to organized crime (Balaj, 2019). Minority police (including Serbs) in particular are sometimes seen as less professional and capable because the Kosovo Police have lowered standards for grading minority members who apply to the police force in the name of promoting a multiethnic force; this is seen as leading to lower performance and efficiency of police and less capable to fighting corruption (ibid.). This perception may be leading Serbs to think that having more Serbs on the force will not increase seriousness in pursuing investigations or engender trust. Serbs may see the increase in violence as evidence of poor performance and perhaps even corruption. This may be evidence for Van Riper’s (1958) argument that while representation in the long run may be of value to democracy, it has a tendency to promote chaos and corruption in the short term. As a young country, Kosovo may not be far enough along in the building up of its bureaucratic institutions to have left behind the chaos to realize the benefits of representation, at least not in the eyes of some of its Serb minority community.

Though interaction effects are unclear, there still seems to be a stronger and more consistent effect for corruption over representation. It may be that feelings around ethnicity are more nuanced and prone to political influence both from within and without Kosovo, while corruption may be more objectively seen as bad. This study shows that seeing police as corrupt decreases perceptions of police on all dimensions of legitimacy. While many respondents cited
corruption as a reason for how they rated police, further research should include interviews that discuss the dynamics between representation, corruption, performance, and legitimacy of police.

As referenced, Headley et al. (2021) find limitations of representation in contexts where citizens have experienced past maltreatment by the bureaucracy. The authors suggest that some correcting for past wrongdoings must be undertaken for representation to be efficacious. Post-conflict settings are not the only areas that experience corruption and misconduct by bureaucrats. More research should examine in further detail how the limits of representation prevent positive findings shown elsewhere.

Each of the areas above, while situated in Kosovo, are not exclusive to that country. Other countries have experienced ethnic conflict and the question of how to rebuild and gain legitimacy for their institutions. Particular dynamics of ethnic groups within and across groups may play out in very different ways, as will the conception of the self. Understanding when group dynamics are stronger than personal identity and vice versa will help understand when representation will be more likely to have an impact. Further research in a variety of geographic and policy contexts should be undertaken to explore which values within groups are represented, and how within group dynamics may show limits of positive effects of representation. Research should also consider what interactions are like between groups to better understand why some groups may perceive other groups negatively, while viewing other groups positively, and what conditions motivate members of a group to engage in social change.

There are limitations in this study. Despite the assumption that people know the local makeup of police, we cannot be sure this is the case. It may be that even a more representative police force does not impact ratings of legitimacy because people may not know what the local demographics of police entail. Other findings in Kosovo that explicitly tell the gender or
ethnicity of an officer show that gender is important to ratings of legitimacy for women in hypothetical scenarios, though they do not have an impact here. Women may simply not know what representation looks like on their local force, and therefor findings here may not actually represent how the public feels about representation.

Inconsistent findings for women on police forces may also be explained by another limitation: it may be that there are not enough women on local forces to have a significant impact on perceptions of bureaucrats. Not meeting a threshold may be masking positive findings that may exist for representation. The maximum female representation on a force in any municipality was 26 percent. Looking at the makeup of women on police forces in municipalities in Kosovo, the 10th percentile had a local police force with 4% female officers; the 25th percentile had a force with 8%; 50th percentile had 11%; 75th had 16.5%; and 90th had 26% female. Further research should be done to see what levels of representation are meaningful for female respondents. This study suggest it is greater than the existing representation of women on KP forces and may need to be closer to 50 percent for women to feel female presence makes a difference.

Another limitation raised above is the issue of common source bias. Ratings of seriousness, trust, fairness, and corruption all came from the same study. Perceptions can be especially prone to error in findings, as between-respondent ratings may not have the same perception of a scale, yet within person ratings will (Favero and Bullock, 2014). This can tend to bias findings. To overcome this limitation, an objective measure of corruption could be helpful in illuminating how corruption and representation affect one another. Additionally, adding actual performance information or asking for evaluation of police performance could shed light on gaining legitimacy.
Finally, while these findings are nationally representative and drawn from a random sample and therefore should be internally consistent, the unique context of Kosovo may make some of these findings less generalizable. The nature of ethnic relations, both between and within groups, is highly specific to how violence was carried out during the conflict. It has also been broadly influenced in the post-conflict timeframe due to pressures from the international community who want to see Kosovo succeed, as well as by those countries who do not recognize Kosovo.

Conclusion

This paper uses the context of Kosovo to explore how the theory of representative bureaucracy travels to post-conflict settings. It also set out to explore questions of where boundaries may be on the impact of increased representation by suggesting that corruption and the nature of interactions with bureaucrats could moderate the linkage between representation and legitimacy. The bureaucratic area of study addressed here was policing, though these findings may extend to other areas of practice within Kosovo and other contexts.

A nationally representative survey carried out in Kosovo in 2019 was used to first explore the representation-legitimacy link using general questions about bureaucratic legitimacy. Survey data on public perceptions of police corruption was used to examine whether citizen perceptions of legitimacy are impacted and perhaps overwhelmed by perceptions of corruption, which may indicate a breakage in the link between representation and legitimacy.

Findings were mixed for the link between representation and ratings of legitimacy, but corruption was shown to be negatively correlated with legitimacy. The mixed results for representation point to the importance of understanding regional contexts on how ethnic groups interact. More research should be done on varying political contexts to better understand where
increased representation is likely to be meaningful, and what boundaries there may be on the effects of increased representation.
Works Cited


Huntington, S. (1968), Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven, Yale University Press.


Kennedy, B. (2008) ‘Putting Representative Bureaucracy into Context: A Qualitative Analysis of


### Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Full Set, N=490

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<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Weighted</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Unweighted</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>246</td>
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<td>244</td>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>157</td>
<td>32%</td>
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<td>181</td>
<td>37%</td>
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<td>18%</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;1000</td>
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<td>13%</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>District</strong></td>
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<td>74</td>
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<td>Gjilan</td>
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<td>4%</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mitrovica</td>
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<td>101</td>
<td>21%</td>
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<td>Peja</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pristina</td>
<td>139</td>
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<td>113</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prizren</td>
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<td>17%</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>20%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>St Dev</td>
<td>Min</td>
<td>Max</td>
</tr>
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<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
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<td>Seriously Investigate Crimes</td>
<td>2.899</td>
<td>1.134</td>
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<td>Trust KP to do the Right Thing</td>
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<td>1.018</td>
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<td>Fairness</td>
<td>3.112</td>
<td>1.143</td>
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<td>Corrupt</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent Serb Police</td>
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<td>Percent Albanian Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent Other</td>
<td>3.68</td>
<td>7.39</td>
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<td>34.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Women Officers</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26.32</td>
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Table 3. Impacts of Representation on Legitimacy Factors, N=490

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<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
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<th>St Error</th>
<th>Trust Coeff</th>
<th>St Error</th>
<th>Fairness Coeff</th>
<th>St Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent Serb Officers</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent Minority Officers</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Female Officers</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>-0.014</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serb</td>
<td>-0.684</td>
<td>0.182***</td>
<td>-0.556</td>
<td>0.161***</td>
<td>-0.353</td>
<td>0.207*</td>
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<td>Other Minority</td>
<td>0.104</td>
<td>0.165</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>0.156</td>
<td>0.223</td>
<td>0.164</td>
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<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.129</td>
<td>0.121</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.122</td>
</tr>
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<td>Age</td>
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<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.009</td>
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<td>0.140</td>
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<td>0.078</td>
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<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
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<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
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<td>Constant</td>
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<td>0.354***</td>
<td>3.225</td>
<td>0.406***</td>
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<td>0.054</td>
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### Table 4: Impact of the Percentage of Minority Officers on the Police Force on Legitimacy Factors for Minority Groups

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<th>Variables</th>
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<td>Coeff</td>
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<tr>
<td>% Serb KP</td>
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<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.002</td>
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<td>% Minority KP</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R2</td>
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<td>0.094</td>
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</tr>
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<td>% Serb KP</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.002</td>
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<tr>
<td>% Minority KP</td>
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<td>Adjusted R2</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>% Serb KP</td>
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<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.003</td>
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<tr>
<td>% Minority KP</td>
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<td>0.029*</td>
<td>0.050</td>
</tr>
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<td>Observations</td>
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<td></td>
<td>103</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adjusted R2</td>
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<td>0.279</td>
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### Table 5: Impact of the Percentage of Female Officers on Legitimacy Factors, N=490

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<th>Fairness</th>
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<td>Coeff</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Minorities</td>
<td>0.101</td>
<td>0.164</td>
<td>0.098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.085</td>
<td>0.062</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.476</td>
<td>0.342</td>
<td>3.449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R2</td>
<td>0.073</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>Seriously Investigate</td>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>Fairness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>0.438</td>
<td>0.369</td>
<td>0.460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Serb KP</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Minority KP</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.053</td>
<td>0.105</td>
<td>0.109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital Status</td>
<td>0.092</td>
<td>-0.044</td>
<td>-0.070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serb</td>
<td>-0.486</td>
<td>-0.389</td>
<td>-0.145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Minority</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>-0.016</td>
<td>0.125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.060</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>-0.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.190</td>
<td>1.998</td>
<td>1.689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R2</td>
<td>0.243</td>
<td>0.179</td>
<td>0.2363</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6. Effect of Corruption and Ethnic Representation on Legitimacy Factors, N=490
Appendix

Citizen Perception Survey:

Thank you for participating in this survey, which should take only about 30 minutes to complete. Your participation is entirely voluntary, and you don't have to answer any questions that you don't want to. Your survey responses are confidential and will be reported only in the aggregate. If you have questions at any time about the survey or our procedures, please email Kimberly Madsen at kdmadsen@iu.edu.

Hypothetical City

On the next page, you will be asked to read a description and answer a few questions about a hypothetical city in Kosovo named Qytet/Grad. Please consider the following information carefully and answer the questions as if you were a resident of Qytet/Grad.

Scenario with Domestic Violence (PASSIVE)

S1. Randomize: read only a OR b

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A) Kosovo Police in Qytet/Grad receive calls reporting domestic violence, conduct investigations of these crimes, and make determinations as to what actions should be taken. The officers assigned to this city include 9 men and 1 woman.</th>
<th>B) Kosovo Police in Qytet/Grad receive calls reporting domestic violence, conduct investigations of these crimes, and make determinations as to what actions should be taken. The officers assigned to this city include 5 men and 5 women.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

S2. Randomize: read only a OR b

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A) According to a recent assessment, the police in Qytet/Grad made a mandatory arrest of the batterer in 70% of cases. Evidence shows that making such arrests reduces the number of victims seriously injured or killed as a result of domestic violence.</th>
<th>B) According to a recent assessment, the police in Qytet/Grad made a mandatory arrest of the batterer in 30% of cases. Evidence shows that making such arrests reduces the number of victims seriously injured or killed as a result of domestic violence.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Based on what you have just read, and assuming you were a resident of Qytet/Grad, please answer the following questions:

Q4. How would you rate how seriously the police pursue an investigation of the domestic violence complaint in Qytet/Grad?

6. Very seriously
7. Seriously
8. Somewhat seriously
9. Not very seriously
10. Not at all seriously

Q5. How much of the time do you think Qytet/Grad citizens can trust police to do what is right?

6. Almost always
7. Often
8. Sometimes  
9. Rarely  
10. Never

Q6. How fair or unfair would you say the police are likely to be in handling domestic violence cases in Qytet/Grad?
   6. Very fair  
   7. Somewhat fair  
   8. Neutral  
   9. Somewhat unfair  
   10. Very unfair

(ACTIVE)

S3. Randomize: read only a OR b

A) Recently in Qytet/Grad, a female officer was promoted to oversee handling of domestic violence cases. This officer implemented a new system where victims of domestic violence meet with officers of their own gender to report the crime, and it is now mandatory to arrest perpetrators of domestic violence.  

B) Recently in Qytet/Grad, a male officer was promoted to oversee handling of domestic violence cases. This officer implemented a new system where victims of domestic violence meet with officers of their own gender to report the crime, and it is now mandatory to arrest perpetrators of domestic violence.

S4. Randomize: read only a OR b

A) Rates of domestic violence have decreased by 80% in the city, with victims saying they feel more comfortable reporting domestic violence crimes to police.  

B) Rates of domestic violence have decreased by 20% in the city, with victims saying they feel more comfortable reporting domestic violence crimes to police.

Q7. How would you rate how seriously the police pursue an investigation of the domestic violence complaint in Qytet/Grad under this new system?
   6. Very seriously  
   7. Seriously  
   8. Somewhat seriously  
   9. Not very seriously  
   10. Not at all seriously

Q8. How much of the time do you think Qytet/Grad citizens can trust police to do what is right?
   6. Almost always  
   7. Often  
   8. Sometimes  
   9. Rarely  
   10. Never
Q9. How fair or unfair would you say the police are likely to be in handling domestic violence cases in Qytet/Grad?

6. Very fair  
7. Somewhat fair  
8. Neutral  
9. Somewhat unfair  
10. Very unfair

Scenario with Theft/Break-in (PASSIVE)

S5. Randomize: read only A OR B

| A | Kosovo Police in Qytet/Grad, a city with 60% Kosovo Albanians and 40% other Kosovo communities, receive calls reporting robberies of homes, conduct investigations of these crimes, and make determinations as to what actions should be taken. The officers assigned to this city include 9 Kosovo Albanians and 1 from another community. | B | Kosovo Police in Qytet/Grad, a city with 60% Kosovo Albanians and 40% other Kosovo communities, receive calls reporting robberies of homes, conduct investigations of these crimes, and make determinations as to what actions should be taken. The officers assigned to this city include 6 Kosovo Albanians and 4 officer from other Kosovo communities. |

S6. Randomize: read only A OR B

| A | According to a recent assessment, the police made a mandatory arrest of the perpetrator in 70% of cases. Evidence shows that making such arrests rather than giving fines reduces the number of robberies in the neighborhood. | B | According to a recent assessment, the police made a mandatory arrest of the robber in 30% of cases. Evidence shows that making such arrests rather than giving fines reduces the number of robberies in the neighborhood. |

Based on what you have just read, and assuming you were a resident of Qytet/Grad, please answer the following questions:

Q10. How seriously do the police pursue an investigation of robbery in Qytet/Grad?

6. Very seriously 
7. Seriously 
8. Somewhat seriously 
9. Not very seriously 
10. Not at all seriously

Q11. How much of the time do you think Qytet/Grad citizens can trust the police to do what is right?

6. Almost always 
7. Often 
8. Sometimes 
9. Rarely 
10. Never
Q12. How fair or unfair would you say the police are likely to be in handling robbery cases in Qytet/Grad?

6. Very fair
7. Somewhat fair
8. Neutral
9. Somewhat unfair
10. Very unfair

(ACTIVE)

S7. Randomize: read only A OR B

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A) Recently in Qytet/Grad, an officer from a non-majority Kosovo community was promoted to oversee handling of robberies, a crime that disproportionately affects non-majority communities. This officer implemented a new system where victims of robberies meet with officers from their own ethnic community to report the crime and it is now mandatory to arrest robbers.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B) Recently in Qytet/Grad, an officer from the majority Kosovo community was promoted to oversee handling of robberies, a crime that disproportionately affects non-majority communities. This officer implemented a new system where victims of robberies meet with officers from their own ethnic community to report the crime and it is now mandatory to arrest robbers.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

S8. Randomize: read only A OR B

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A) The number of robberies has decreased by 80% since the new procedure was implemented.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B) The number of robberies has decreased by 20% since the new procedure was implemented.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q13. How seriously do the police pursue an investigation of robbery in Qytet/Grad under this new system?

1. Very seriously
2. Seriously
3. Somewhat seriously
4. Not very seriously
5. Not at all seriously

Q14. How much of the time do you think Qytet/Grad citizens can trust police to do what is right under the new system?

1. Almost always
2. Often
3. Sometimes
4. Rarely
5. Never
Q15. How fair or unfair would you say the police are likely to be in handling robbery cases in Qytet/Grad under the new system?

1. Very fair
2. Somewhat fair
3. Neutral
4. Somewhat unfair
5. Very unfair

General View of Police and Safety Questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>G1. How legitimate do you think the Kosovo Police are as an institution?</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not at all legitimate</td>
<td>Not very legitimate</td>
<td>Somewhat legitimate</td>
<td>Legitimate</td>
<td>Very legitimate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>G2. How often do you trust your local Kosovo Police to do the right thing?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>G3. How seriously do KP investigate crimes in Kosovo?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not at all seriously</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>G4. How fair do you think the local KP are?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very unfair</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>G5. How corrupt are the KP?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very Corrupt</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>G6. Whom do the KP serve?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Citizens</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### G7. How safe do you feel in your home?
- Very unsafe
- Mostly Uncertain
- Somewhat
- Mainly safe
- Very safe

### G8. How safe do you feel in your village/town?
- Very unsafe
- Mostly Uncertain
- Somewhat
- Mainly safe
- Very safe

### G9. How safe do you feel in Kosovo?
- Very unsafe
- Mostly Uncertain
- Somewhat
- Mainly safe
- Very safe

### G10. How big of a threat is domestic violence in Kosovo?
- Large threat
- A threat
- Somewhat
- A little bit of a threat
- Not at all a threat

### G11. How big of a threat is robbery of homes in Kosovo?
- Large threat
- A threat
- Somewhat
- A little bit of a threat
- Not at all a threat

### Personal Experience

**E1.** Have you interacted with a police officer in the last twelve months?
- 1. Yes
- 2. No

*If “No”, skip question E2.*

**E2.** Was the interaction for a traffic stop?
- 1. Yes
- 2. No

Think back to your last interaction with police for a traffic stop, either while you were a driver, passenger, or a pedestrian. Then answer the following questions: *(If no interaction, skip questions E3 through E12).*

**E3.** Were you a:
- 1. Driver
- 2. Passenger
- 3. Pedestrian

**E4.** When did this occur?
- 1. In the last 12 months
- 2. 13-24 months ago
3. 3+ years ago

E5. Did the police officer have a legitimate reason for stopping you?
1. Yes
2. No

E6. Did the police officer have a legitimate reason to search the vehicle?
1. Yes
2. No
3. N/A; did not search vehicle

E7. Did the police officer have a legitimate reason to search you, frisk you, or pat you down?
1. Yes
2. No
3. N/A; officer did not search me

E8. Looking back at (this/the most recent) incident, do you feel the police behaved properly?
1. Yes
2. No

E9. Were you asked for a bribe during the most recent traffic stop?
1. Yes
2. No

E10. Were you arrested or issued a ticket during the most recent traffic stop?
1. Yes, arrested
2. Yes, issued a ticket
3. No

E11. What was the ethnicity of the officer who stopped you on your most recent traffic stop?
1. Albanian
2. Serb
3. Roma, Ashkali, or Egyptian
4. Bosnian
5. Turkish
6. Other
7. Don’t recall

E12. How many times have you been stopped by traffic police in the last 12 months?
1. 1
2. 2-4
3. 5-7
4. 8+

E13. Think of how you rated your trust in Kosovo Police. What are the most important factors to you in evaluating trust in the Kosovo Police and their performance?

_____________________________________________________________________________________

Demographic questions

D1. What is your age?
1. Under 20
2. 20-24
3. 25-34
4. 35-44
5. 45-54
6. 55-59
7. 60-64
8. 65-74
9. 75-84
10. 85+
11. Prefer not to say
D2. What is your gender?
1. Male
2. Female
3. Prefer not to say
D3. What is your marital status?
1. Single
2. Married
3. Divorced
4. Other/prefer not to say
D4. Do you consider yourself to be…
1. Albanian
2. Ashkali
3. Roma
4. Bosniak
5. Turk
6. Gorani
7. Serbian
8. Egyptian
9. Other
10. Prefer not to say
D5. What is the last grade or degree you completed?
1. Grades 6-9
2. Grades 10-13
3. Associate Degree
4. Bachelor Degree
5. Master Degree
6. Doctorate
7. Prefer not to say
D6. What was your total household income last month?
1. Less than 400 euros per month
2. 400-700 euros per month
3. 700-1000 euros per month
4. Above 1000 euros per month

D7. In which municipality do you live?

________________________________________

D8. Are you a citizen of Kosovo?
1. Yes
2. No
3. Prefer not to answer
Kimberly DeGroff Madsen  
Indiana University, School of Public and Environmental Affairs  
Email: kdmadsen@iu.edu  
1315 E 10th Street, Bloomington, IN 47405

**Education**

*Indiana University*
- Ph.D. Public Affairs, December 2022
- M.A. Slavic Languages and Literatures, May 2014

*Brigham Young University*
- M.P.A., Public Administration, June 2016
- B. A. Russian, August 2008

*University of Southern California*
- M.P.D. Public Diplomacy, Communications, and International Relations, May 2010

**Professional Experience**

**Sep 2019 – current: LEGISLATIVE FINANCE OFFICER**  
State of Utah Legislature, Utah  
- Worked as a Legislative Financial Analyst from 2019 – 2022 and was promoted to a Senior Financial Analyst in July 2022 and to Finance Officer in October 2022
- Analyze budget and performance outcomes for the Department of Health and Human Services Division of Child and Family Services and the Department of Workforce Services
- Manage statewide employee compensation and retirement benefits for LFA
- Present recommendations to the Social Services Appropriations Subcommittee
- Draft appropriations bills and calculate the fiscal impact of proposed legislation
- Co-created and presented performance measure training for all state agencies

**Sep 2015 – May 2019: RESEARCH ASSISTANT & ASSOCIATE INSTRUCTOR**  
Indiana and Brigham Young Universities, Indiana and Utah  
- Taught a course on public-private partnerships and collaboration to 64 students
- Developed a project on minority representation and civic outcomes in Kosovo
- Conducted statistical analyses of organization types and civic-mindedness of citizens
- Researched effects of female representation in police forces on sexual assault cases

**May 2016 – July 2015: ANALYST**  
U.S. Government Accountability Office, Washington DC  
- Audited IRS’s customer service efforts for the 2016 IRS filing season
- Lead and documented interviews of the National Tax Advocate and IRS senior officials
- Developed case selection criteria, a data collection instrument, and an analysis plan
- Presented research design to the Managing Director of the Strategic Issues team
- Attended training on public speaking, the audit process, and social media use in public affairs

**Apr 2015 – Aug 2015: DIRECTOR OF COMMUNICATIONS**  
Days for Girls International, Washington  
- Created corporate sponsorship materials and met with potential corporate partners
- Established connections with New York City Council and secured an invitation to round table
Jan 2014 – Jul 2015 DIRECTOR OF INT’L OUTREACH

More Good Foundation
Orem, UT

- Set strategic vision for our 10 international teams
- Recruited and hired six international leads
- Visits to international sites grew 300%
- Held weekly meetings to train Team Leads and Social Media Specialists
- Networked with key leaders in international areas of interest

Jun – Dec 2013 RUSSIAN LANGUAGE INSTRUCTOR

Indiana University
Indiana

- Taught first-year Russian for the Department of Slavic Languages and Literature
- Developed curriculum/taught Level 3 accelerated Russian

July 2013 ASSISTANT FOR IU SIBERIA STUDY ABROAD

Indiana University
Tyumen, Russia

- Interacted with journalists in Russia and with outreach in Indiana to publicize the program
- Handled accommodations and all interactions at train stations and airports for group of 12
- Interpreted at university meetings and at various sites, including oil fields

Jan – Sep 2013 PROJECT DESIGNER

ROTC Project Go
Indiana

- Researched effective instructional methods and created on-line instructional modules for intermediate- and advanced-level Russian language learners
- Collaborated with the team to ensure coherence among elements of the project

Jul 2011 – Feb 2012 PUBLICITY COORDINATOR

Foundation for Religious Diplomacy
Orem, UT

- Recruited sponsors for our conference on Mormon and Methodist dialogue in DC
- Promoted the conference to NGOs, universities, and local organizations

Aug – Oct 2011 PROGRAM ASSISTANT

Washington Leadership Program
Indiana

- Coordinated interviews of prospective students with faculty; corresponded with students
- Organized events, including catering and publicity, and administrative support

2009–2011 CONSULTANT

Courage to Hope
Provo, UT

- Created a public diplomacy campaign to raise awareness of domestic abuse in Ukraine
- Spearheaded research for an educational media campaign on domestic abuse
- Consulted on founding documents submitted to Amnesty International

Mar – May 2010 SOCIAL MEDIA CONSULTANT

The Tiziano Project
Los Angeles, CA

- Created a new social media strategy and strategic communication plan for the organization
- Researched best practices for non-profit use of social media
- Presented plan to the board of directors

Sept – Dec 2009 RESEARCHER

USC Center on Public Diplomacy
Los Angeles, CA

- Researched public diplomacy and media in the European Union and Russia
- Produced an annotated bibliography on epistemic communities and global governance

May – Aug 2009 PUBLIC AFFAIRS INTERN

Religious Organization
Moscow, Russia

- Coordinated with the National Public Affairs Committee of Ukraine to restructure PA
- Collaborated on public affairs initiatives and was point person for media coverage
- Translated documents for government officials, conferences, and publications
Volunteer Positions
Founding Member of the Rumsfeld Foundation Alumni Leadership Council, Oct 2021 – Present
Utah Advisory Committee Member, U.S. Global Leadership Coalition, May 2021 – Present
Board Chair and Former Governance Chair, Utah Council for Citizen Diplomacy Board. April 2022 – Present
Member of the NCSL International Task Force and Network, December 2020 – January 2022
ASPS Conference Committee Member, Association of SPEA Ph.D. Students Board. Indiana University, May 2017 – May 2018

Publications


Works in Progress
Baggetta, M. and Madsen, K. “Beyond Content Types: Assessing the Relationship of Association Structures to Member Political Participation.”

Christensen, R., Shaker, G., and Madsen, K. “Corporate Social Responsibility and Employee Philanthropy.”

Madsen, K. “Distrust in Government Institutions a Nudge away from Civic Behaviors?”

Madsen, K. “Implicit Bias and Behavior among Public Servants: In Search of a Causal Mechanism for RB.”

Madsen, K. “Representative Bureaucracy as a Key to Legitimacy: The Case of Policing in Kosovo”


Nicholson-Crotty, J., Madsen, K. and Li, D. “Women and Policing: Do Female Managers Affect Use of Force by Departments?”

Witesman, E. and Madsen, K. “Public Service Values and Attitudes on Whistleblowing.”

Scholarly Blog Posts
**Government Reports**

Issue Briefs for the State of Utah Legislature include: Review of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Programs and Expenditures (2020 and 2021 General Sessions); Federal Funds – Department of Workforce Services (2020 and 2021 General Sessions); Fees – Department of Workforce Services (2020 and 2021 General Sessions)

Utah Victim Services Overview: Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault (2022 Interim), coauthor

Budget of the State of Utah 2020, 2021, and 2022, coauthor

Compendium of Budget Information, all Department of Workforce Services sections

Legislative Fiscal Analyst Initial Summary of the Governor’s Fiscal Year 2022 Budget, coauthor/project manager for this office-wide publication

Office of the Legislative Fiscal Analyst 2021 General Session Budget Summary, coauthor/project manager


**Conference Presentations**


“This Isn’t Your Babushka’s Textbook: Moving Toward a Multimedia eFormat in Russian Language Learning” with Elena Doludenko and Tyler Madsen. April 2013. Midwest Slavic Annual Meeting. Columbus, OH.

**Fellowships and Grants**

Virtual Student Federal Service Fellow, U.S. Mission to International Organizations, December, 2019

Research Fellow, Kosovar Centre for Security Studies, 2019

Fellow, Rumsfeld Foundation Graduate Fellowship, 2018-2019 and 2019-2020

Kosovo International Summer Academy Scholarship, July 2017

Title VIII Grant for Estonian, 2017


Foreign Language and Area Studies (FLAS) Fellowship for the study of Russian, 2012-2013

Title VIII Grant for the study of Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian, 2012

**Courses Taught**

SPEA-V 336: Managing External Collaborations and Networks, 2018-2019

SLAV-N 231: Accelerated Second-Year Russian, Summer Language Workshop, Indiana University, 2013

SLAV-R 101: First-Year Russian, Slavic and East European Languages and Cultures, 2013
Certificates

NCSL Legislative Staff Certificate Program, November 2020

Kosovo International Summer Academy, “Peace Building in Post-Conflict Areas—Diplomacy, Leadership, and Negotiations, Prishtina, July 2017

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Course: Verification through Diplomacy and Science. Administered through the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization. Vienna, September 2014