UNDERSTANDING INTERGOVERNMENTAL MECHANISMS IN U.S. HOMELESSNESS POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

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David Lee
To my wife and my parents
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Multi-organizational arrangements have become major policy implementation tools in practice; however, relatively little is known empirically about the roles of governments, particularly intergovernmental mechanisms, inside multi-organizational arrangements. In order to fill the gaps between practice and scholarship related to multi-organizational arrangements in public management and policy contexts, this dissertation studies the importance of intergovernmental mechanisms as effective policy tools related to public policy implementation and program outcomes. More specifically, this dissertation presents three empirical studies on U.S. homelessness policies in order to attempt to understand how intergovernmental mechanisms and governmental activities affect homelessness policy implementation and program outcomes. These three studies are based on the following research questions. First, are the outcomes of programs based in intergovernmental strategies better than the outcomes of programs not based in intergovernmental strategies? Second, what are the determinants of awarding federal grants to local homelessness programs? Third, does the existence of strategic plans make a difference in local homelessness programs?

In order to answer these research questions, I developed a panel dataset containing 208 U.S. county governments’ homelessness, socioeconomic, and housing characteristics over a 10-year period. Then, I merged this dataset with data from three homelessness policies and programs: 1) the U.S. Interagency Council on Homelessness (USICH) and its program Opening Doors, 2) the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) and its program Continuum of Care (CoC), and 3) county
government strategic plans on homelessness. Findings from this dissertation provide
empirical evidence to understand the important roles of intergovernmental mechanisms
and governmental activities on policy implementation and program outcomes. In
addition, this dissertation provides a research framework designed to understand multi-
organizational arrangements as effective policy tools in public management and policy
contexts.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Statement of the Problem

As working across organizational boundaries (Kettl, 2006) has become a pressing issue for both public managers and public management scholars, multi-organizational arrangements have become major policy and program implementation tools. In studies of public management and policy, multi-organizational arrangements have been used to understand citizen participatory mechanisms (Booher, 2008; Fung, 2006; Fung & Wright, 2003; Kathi & Cooper, 2005), network formation (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001; Romzek, LeRoux, Johnston, Kempf, & Piatak, 2014; Weber, 2009) and structure (Mandell and Steelman 2003; Moynihan 2008; O’Toole and Meier 2004; Provan and Kenis 2008), relational contracting (Bertelli and Smith 2010; Gazley 2008; Van Slyke 2009), information technologies (Dunleavy, Margetts, Bastow, & Tinkler, 2006) and many other aspects that go beyond the management of single organizations.

Although past research has made significant and meaningful contributions to our understanding of multi-organizational arrangements (i.e., studies of collaboration, networks, alliances, partnerships and governance in public management and policy contexts), one aspect of such research appears to have gone missing: government. More specifically, more needs to be learned empirically about the roles of governments and intergovernmental mechanisms in multi-organizational arrangements. Furthermore, the field needs to know the impact of intergovernmental management as a means to provide public services in order to solve social problems.
Early policy implementation studies highlighted the roles (and failures) of government. Even the earliest network studies (Hanf & O’Toole, 1992; Hull & Hjern, 1987) focused primarily on the relationships between government organizations. Moreover, the importance of governments and the relationships between governments have been critically raised by practitioners who experienced the failure of government and intergovernmental mechanisms from Hurricane Katrina (see, Townsend, 2006). Hurricane Katrina showed what happens when government processes and intergovernmental relations are inadequate to respond to the natural disaster. This example is a classic case of a wicked social problem (Cigler, 2007) in terms of there being an ineffective communication strategy among different levels of governments and types of organizations (Kapucu, Arslan, & Collins, 2010), and accountability challenges in governance structures (Koliba, Mills, & Zia, 2011).

After experiencing the failure of government and intergovernmental mechanisms, the U.S. federal government submitted a document that pointed out 125 lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina (Townsend, 2006). In this document, the roles of government were highlighted as important factors for effectively coordinating interagency efforts across different levels and types of organizations in order to create a well-structured preparedness plan and to effectively carry out a national level response plan at the state and local level. Thus, government agencies can and should establish multi-organizational arrangements for training, educating, and capacity development to facilitate effective collaborative systems (Townsend, 2006). As the federal government plays a vital role in initiating and managing intergovernmental mechanisms, local and state actors, including
nongovernmental organizations, assume important roles as key service providers and partners to successfully implement federal programs and policies.

Although the federal government pointed out the important roles of governments and intergovernmental mechanisms for wicked problems (see, Townsend, 2006), service delivery mechanisms over the past several years have expanded to include nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in public policies and programs, and the de-emphasis on government organizations and their representatives is somewhat expected. However, NGOs have not eclipsed the power or centrality of government agencies. Additionally, service delivery mechanisms cannot be easily maintained without support from governments or the relationships between governments, and wicked social problems cannot be easily solved by NGOs alone.

So, what of intergovernmental management and intergovernmental policy implementation processes? What about the intergovernmental mechanisms that involve federal, state, and local governments? What about the roles of governments in multi-organizational arrangements? What about the lessons learned from the failure of governments and intergovernmental mechanisms during Hurricane Katrina? In a policy space that exists in a largely intergovernmental world, the lack of attention given to managing interorganizational and interpersonal relations across different levels of governments constitutes a major empirical gap, not just for studies of intergovernmental relations and management, but for public management and policy broadly defined.

The argument raised in this dissertation is simple: research on the role of intergovernmental management and its impact must increase. Whether the policy area is homelessness, health care, immigration, climate change, emergency management or a
whole host of social policies, such as marriage equality and the legalization of marijuana, understanding the intergovernmental mechanisms in the U.S. federal system should be a primary imperative of public management and policy scholars. In turn, future research should begin to emphasize—again—the intergovernmental aspects of the policy implementation process. If practice has once again outpaced scholarship on intergovernmental systems, then how can public management research close the empirical gap? What are the critical issues of a successful policy implementation process in this intergovernmental world?

Unfortunately, there is a paucity of research that demonstrates the important roles of intergovernmental mechanisms in public policy and program implementation processes. Although multi-organizational arrangements are viewed as effective tools by which to implement public policy or make public decisions, it is difficult to clearly understand service delivery mechanisms and policy implementation processes when we do not consider both the roles of governments inside multi-organizational arrangements and the intergovernmental mechanisms that permeate many different policy areas. For example, vertical intergovernmental mechanisms should be taken into account when a collaboration is formed by intergovernmental programs and implemented by intergovernmental grants at the state and/or local level. In addition, horizontal intergovernmental mechanisms should be accounted for when more than one agency at the same level of government is involved in the collaboration. However, current research on collaborative, multi-organizational arrangements mainly focuses on the important roles of NGOs and it minimizes the role of intergovernmental mechanisms to provide public services.
Purpose of the Dissertation

Clearly, one should not overstate this argument. Research does exist that focuses on federalism, intergovernmental relations, and, to some degree, the politics of the types of multi-organizational relationships in which public managers are entrenched (Berry & Brower, 2005; Caruson & MacManus, 2006; Conlan & Posner, 2008; Stever, 2005; Thompson, 2013). The intent of this dissertation is to try to reintroduce intergovernmental mechanisms, including intergovernmental management, programs, and grants, as important factors in public management research, in some cases maybe the most significant variable (Kincaid & Stenberg, 2011; Radin, 2008; Stalebrink, 2009), in determining the effectiveness of public programs. Further, this dissertation aims to reemphasize the important roles of governments in studies of collaboration research in public management. More specifically, this dissertation focuses on the roles of governments in collaborative strategic planning at the local level in public program effectiveness that cannot be achieved by single organizations (Agranoff & McGuire 2004). As a result, the major areas of this dissertation cover three underappreciated, but important, areas in the studies of multi-organizational arrangements in both the public management and public policy fields:

- The roles of intergovernmental programs on public policy or program outcomes,
• The roles of intergovernmental grants on public policy implementation processes,

• The roles of local governments and their strategic plans on public policy or program outcomes.

In order to explore these three important areas, both quantitative and qualitative empirical research was conducted in this dissertation. Before exploring these important areas, I will provide a review of previous literature on multi-organizational arrangements (i.e., collaborative public management and public network management), particularly focusing on the collaborative structures and processes used to achieve policy goals and produce effective outcomes. Collaboration research has become a major area of research in the public management field. As such, most empirical research on collaboration focuses on the managerial behaviors needed to operate complicated multi-organizational arrangements (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001; Agranoff & McGuire, 2003) as well as the effective network structures of multi-organizational arrangements (Provan & Milward, 1995; Provan & Milward, 2003) in order to solve public problems that cannot be solved by single organizations. In particular, it is difficult to expect successful collaborative processes and outcomes without fiscal and administrative resources within vertical intergovernmental structures or collaborative management practices within horizontal intergovernmental or interorganizational structures.

After introducing recent research trends on multi-organizational arrangements, this dissertation will explore three empirical studies of U.S. homelessness programs.
More detailed information on these homelessness programs can be found in chapter 3. The contents of this dissertation are as follows: First, this dissertation explores the important aspects of intergovernmental mechanisms on public policy and program outcomes. More specifically, this dissertation examines the effects of vertical intergovernmental alignment in one program on local homelessness outcomes. The federal strategic planning program Opening Doors is the first federal level, comprehensive homelessness program in the U.S. This plan uses intergovernmental mechanisms to implement federal strategic planning at the state and local levels. Local governments participate in and benefit from this federal strategic planning if they are located within a state and locality that has formally participated in programs associated with this federal strategic plan. Local governments that do not meet this criteria do not participate in the intergovernmental mechanism. Thus, this federal program allows me to compare different outcomes between local governments that are intergovernmentally aligned vertically with local governments that do not experience vertical intergovernmental alignment.

Second, I examine the determinants of intergovernmental grants on local homelessness programs in order to understand the flows of intergovernmental grants mechanisms based on a local program perspective rather than from a purely governmental perspective. One of the most important aspects of understanding vertical intergovernmental mechanisms is understanding the financial resources that flow from the federal to state government or federal to local; however, empirical evidence on this issue has heavily relied on governmental perspectives that include either the political preference of grant providers or the administrative capacity of grant receivers. Thus,
relatively little is known about what particular characteristics of local programs are the key determinants to receiving program-targeted intergovernmental grants. In order to clarify intergovernmental grant mechanisms in local programs, this study examines what affects the flows of intergovernmental grants on homelessness program implementation process at the local level in order to determine whether intergovernmental grants go to local homelessness programs based on need, ability, capacity, or something else.

Third, I study the roles of government in multi-organizational arrangements on local homelessness outcomes. In particular, this study examines whether local governments that have strategic plans on homelessness reduces the homelessness population more or less than local governments that do not have strategic plans. Thus, this study examines the impact of strategic plans on the size of the local homelessness population (i.e., program outcome). Thus, I first conduct a panel data analysis in order to examine the effects of local governmental strategic plans on local homelessness outcomes. After that, I also conduct a sub-sample analysis to examine the impact of collaborative strategic planning process within the plans on local homelessness outcomes.

Overall, this dissertation attempts to develop a broad understanding of intergovernmental mechanisms in public management and policy research. More specifically, this dissertation will help to clarify missing link(s) between collaborative frameworks and intergovernmental mechanisms in public management and policy research. This dissertation also tests these intergovernmental mechanisms and their impacts on the effectiveness of local homelessness programs in order to assert the importance of intergovernmental mechanisms in studies of multi-organizational arrangements.
**Structure of the Dissertation**

This dissertation is structured as follows. In the next chapter, chapter 2, I will review the literature on multi-organizational arrangements in public management and policy. I will also focus on past research dedicated to collaborative processes and structures that are typically studied in the program implementation and service delivery process. In this chapter, I will also provide a research framework for this dissertation and present three major research questions. After that, the third chapter will introduce homelessness programs and agencies, such as the federal strategic plan on homelessness, federal and state homelessness agencies, and local homelessness programs, used in this dissertation. Three empirical chapters (i.e., chapter 4, 5, and 6) will then follow with an independent literature review, a description of the data used for each empirical analysis, the findings of the empirical analysis, and the implications and conclusions for each set of analyses. Then, the final chapter (i.e., chapter 7) will explain the overall findings of the three empirical analyses to understand the important aspects of intergovernmental mechanisms and governmental activities in homelessness programs.
Chapter 2: Literature Review

Overview

Multi-organizational arrangements have frequently been studied in collaboration and network contexts. Although previous research on multi-organizational arrangements has focused on their varying effects (i.e., from effective and efficient public policy and program outcomes, to democratic processes that include civil society, such as nonprofit advocates, as independent actors, to public policy and program decision-making processes), this dissertation particularly focuses on program effectiveness and outcomes by which to employ multi-organizational arrangements (Agranoff & McGuire, 2004; Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006).

Many of the studies have approached multi-organizational arrangements as collaborative structures. Collaboration is a concept that has been increasingly studied in American public management research since the 1990s, although a perusal of the literature suggests that collaboration has existed in practice for many decades. Due to societal changes and the presence of complex social problems, often called wicked social problems, the traditional hierarchical structure of government cannot always, and sometimes can never, solve wicked social problems effectively. In order to solve wicked social problems, government sometimes must collaborate with other levels of governments or other types of organizations. In the last few decades, a variety of collaboration research has been published. Some of this research has attempted to develop conceptual frameworks for understanding collaborative structure and process, as
well as outcomes (see Agranoff & McGuire, 2004; Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006; Ansell & Gash, 2008; Emerson, Nabatchi, & Balogh, 2012).

According to previous studies, a collaborative structure (i.e., multi-organizational arrangement) is formed when purposeful strategic actions are used to “solve problems that cannot be solved, or solved easily, by single organizations” (Agranoff & McGuire, 2004, p. 4) in order to “achieve jointly an outcome that could not be achieved by organizations in one sector separately” (Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006, p. 44) and “carry out a public purpose that could not otherwise be accomplished” (Emerson, Nabatchi, & Balogh, 2012, p. 2). This being so, collaboration is understood as a composite of multi-organizational arrangements from different types of organizations used to share information, resources, activities, and capabilities in order to achieve a joint outcome. Thus, multi-organizational arrangements are formed by governments to solve wicked, complicated problems and are known as collaborative structures that involved different types of organizations as well as different levels of governments.

The collaborative structure alone cannot guarantee the achievement of effective outcomes; therefore, we must consider the collaborative processes inside the structure. Collaborative processes, while sometimes muddled and a barrier to problem resolution (McGuire & Agranoff, 2011), are comprised ideally of managerial practices used to facilitate collaborative efforts among participants and within the operation of multi-organizational arrangements in order to build constructive engagement on the part of the participants (Emerson, Nabatchi, & Balogh, 2012) so that they we are willing to share both tangible and intangible resources (Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006). As such, previous findings are only particularly useful when attempting to understand how to
achieve positive outcomes and, therefore, reach collaborative advantage within multi-organizational arrangements (Huxham, 1996). In order to understand the research on structural perspectives of multi-organizational arrangements, previous studies have used the term “network” to identify one type of formation and structure. For example, Milward and Provan’s studies of network structures in local health service areas demonstrated the importance of the relational characteristics of multi-organizational arrangements to the satisfaction levels of service recipients (see Milward & Provan, 1998; Milward & Provan, 2003; Provan, Huang, & Milward, 2009; Milward, Provan, Fish, Isett, & Huang, 2010). Further, Provan and Kenis (2008) argued that different types of network structures exist in local health service areas: participant-governed networks, lead-organization-governed networks, and network administrative organizations. Each type of network structure has different levels of trust, numbers of participants, level of goal consensus, and competency levels (Provan & Kenis, 2008). In order to produce effective outcomes, these different types of structures require different managerial techniques because of different levels of tensions and dynamics among the participants (Kenis & Provan, 2009; Provan & Milward, 2001).

In addition to Provan and Milward’s studies of network structures, research on the structural perspectives of multi-organizational arrangements has been developed by participants’ positions within network structures, the levels of complexity of wicked social problems they encountered, and the types of resource exchanges in local emergency networks (Kapucu & Garayev, 2012). Additionally, Kapucu and his colleagues studied structures of multi-organizational arrangements in order to improve information communication strategies among participating in order to effectively respond
Apart from the structural perspectives of multi-organizational arrangements research, previous research has also focused on the managerial practices within the collaborative structures in order to create effective collaborative processes among the participants (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001; Agranoff & McGuire, 2004; Huxham & Vangen, 1996). For example, previous empirical research has supported arguments for the positive effects of collaborative leadership on effective local emergency/disaster management networks (McGuire & Silvia, 2009; Silvia & McGuire, 2010).

Other researchers have studied the results of collaborative processes to understand the important roles of managerial practices in multi-organizational arrangements. Thomson, Perry, and Miller (2006) focused on the importance of trust, mutuality, and autonomy on, as well as the history and size of, multi-organizational arrangements. Klijn, Steijn and Edelenbos (2010) demonstrated how particular management strategies determine content and process outcomes.

These two streams of previous research provide meaningful implications about program effectiveness and outcomes. Managerial behaviors and techniques differ from single organizations. Specifically, public managers that deal with complicated social problems must deal with complicated structures of multi-organizational arrangements and determine appropriate methods to motivate persons from different types of organizations (Agranoff & McGuire, 2004; McGuire, 2006). Second, working with other organizations requires more complicated management practices than single organizations as different types of organizations participate based on different goals, cultures, and reasons (Vangen
& Huxham, 2012). Third, a dynamic and evolving process exists within the structures of multi-organizational arrangements that can vary over time (Provan, Huang, & Milward, 2009).

Overall, previous research on network structure, network management, and collaborative public management has identified and elevated the important roles of multi-organizational arrangements in the public sector. Previous research has identified why certain types of structures of participants produce effective public services and program outcomes. In Figure 2-1, the boxes can be understood as effective structures that include both public and nonprofit organizations, as well as governments. Past research also has focused on the ways by which to build stable and effective collaborative processes in order to create harmonious collaborative or network structures among participants who come from different types of organizations with different goals and cultures.
Figure 2-1. The Multi-organizational Arrangements in Previous Research
Although previous empirical findings provide meaningful implications for developing conceptual frameworks for multi-organizational arrangements in the public sector, we should interpret their findings cautiously as such frameworks may not cover all structures of multi-organizational arrangements in public policy/program implementation. As explained earlier, recent research trends on multi-organizational arrangements have missed one important factor with regard to understanding structures of multi-organizational arrangements and their mechanisms: the roles of governments and intergovernmental management. Relatively little is known about the roles of governments and governmental activities, even though major initiators and managers of multi-organizational arrangements are often governmental agencies. Thus, this dissertation mainly focuses on the roles of governments and intergovernmental mechanisms to improve performance, based on outcome-oriented perspectives that previous research has often missed. The purpose of this dissertation is not intended to disregard the research on federalism and more traditional views of intergovernmental relations. However, this dissertation has a different perspective from which to understand intergovernmental mechanisms, which should also be considered a part of multi-organizational arrangements that aims to achieve policy goals and produce program outcomes in effective ways.

One possible reason for the lack of attention given to intergovernmental mechanisms and governments in studies of multi-organizational arrangements may be due to the fact that NGOs have become major service providers of public policies, services and programs (Provan & Milward, 2000; Romzek & Johnston, 2002; Salamon, 1995). Decentralization in public management (Pollitt, 2005) and devolution of U.S.
federalism (Cho & Wright, 2004) have moved research interests from the federal to the state or local levels, which has enhanced the importance of local action. Thus, the roles of governments and intergovernmental mechanisms have become relatively less important than those roles of NGOs and interorganizational relationships. Moreover, some target populations receiving the benefits of public programs perceive NGOs as more effective service providers than governments. Thus, citizens who actually receive the policy outcomes perceive governments as less effective than NGOs in terms of local public service delivery (Van Slyke & Roch, 2004). In addition to the perceptions of citizens in terms of service quality, empirical evidence has pointed out that NGOs actually can, and often do, provide better quality public services than governments (Goldsmith, 1997; Kettl, 1993). Based on the important and effective roles of NGOs in public policy and service areas, the public sectors and their spheres have become less distinctive than ever before as NGOs have taken on alternative roles to serve public services (Frederickson, 1999; Kettl, 2006). Overall, recent research on multi-organizational arrangements has focused on the effectiveness of NGOs at the local level.

The local level in American federalism includes county, city, or other municipal governments and previous research that has focused on managerial practices and structural perspectives within multi-organizational arrangements has focused on the local level. As such, other levels of government are sometimes viewed as obstacles that can delay effective local public service delivery, and different levels of governments may be viewed as one of the participants that requires additional time and costs to produce program outcomes and achieve policy goals. Otherwise, different levels of governments may not be the main interests to be considered as major participants for understanding
multi-organizational arrangements to produce high quality public services and outcomes since they may not take any roles as service providers.

However, we cannot understand the complete framework of multi-organizational arrangements and their mechanisms to maintain policy and program implementation process without understanding and including different levels of governments that are actually related to public policy and program implementation processes in practice. If we do not consider different levels of governments and their roles in our analytical frameworks, then our findings will have limited results that fail to reflect the actual understanding of multi-organizational arrangements and their mechanisms in the real world. Thus, this dissertation attempts to explore the underappreciated issues concerning the roles of governments and intergovernmental mechanisms in studies of multi-organizational arrangements. In order to explain the conceptual and theoretical framework to derive three major empirical research questions of this dissertation, previous literatures on collaboration, strategic planning, and intergovernmental relations and management are examined in the next section.

**Importance of Intergovernmental Management in Multi-Organizational Arrangements**

This section provides a systematic review of the previous collaboration research. The objective of multi-organizational arrangements (i.e., cross-sector collaboration, collaborative governance, and networks) in the public sector is to provide higher quality of public services or outcomes than can be provided by single organizations. As such, the
previous literature used in this section is chosen from the empirical research that focused on that particular area of collaboration.

In order to be as comprehensive and systematic as possible in this section of the literature review, I used a search strategy to identify 748 articles published between 2000 and 2014 from 13 academic journals (Administration and Society, American Review of Public Administration, Governance, International Public Management Journal, International Review of Administrative Science, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Local Government Studies, Public Administration, Public Administration Review, Public Management Review, Public Performance and Management Review, Publius: Journal of Federalism, and Review of Public Personnel Administration) ostensibly focused on this topic. In order to focus only on those articles of particular interest to this dissertation, I developed a coding process that was used to determine which of the articles were explicitly about collaboration, both empirically and conceptually. The resulting study contains 253 articles on collaborative public management utilizing multi-organizational arrangements. These articles originated from 11 journals.

Next, I employed a coding process in order to determine whether the selected articles used government or intergovernmental variables in their empirical models. After reviewing the selected articles, I discovered that just less than one-half (126) of the articles used intergovernmental variables in their models (see, Appendix 2-1 for a list of 126 articles); however, ‘government variable’ and ‘intergovernmental variable’ were mainly considered to be control variables in a regression model or as just one of the many nodes in a network model (for example but not limited to, Eilers, 2002; Feiock, Lee, &
Rather than a primary interest in their models. Although actual public policies and programs are implemented by government organizations, the existing literatures on collaboration research do not treat ‘government’ or ‘intergovernmental mechanism’ as major areas of research.

In addition, this coding process was able to determine that research interests are inclined toward ‘collaborative’ and ‘management’ instead of ‘public’ in the existing literatures. Such research frameworks are often based on either network or organizational behavioral theories (for example but not limited to, Blair, 2002; Ha & Feiock, 2012; Isett & Provan, 2005; Milward et al., 2010; Park & Rethemeyer, 2014) in order to clarify the importance of multi-organizational arrangements and processes. Furthermore, the research questions asked in the empirical articles are mostly focused on multi-organizational arrangements in ways that allow the researchers to explain effective service delivery mechanisms in inter-local frameworks (for example but not limited to, Berry, Krutz, Langner, & Budetti, 2008; Chen, 2008; Eilers, 2002; Graddy & Chen, 2006; Milward & Provan, 2003).

Again, the main argument of this dissertation is not intended to overstate the paucity of intergovernmental research in the existing literatures. Intergovernmental mechanisms have been considered one of the important policy tools in policy implementation research (see, O’Toole, 1996; O’Toole, 2000). O’Toole (1996) argued that the orientations of policy have shifted from federal government to state governments and nongovernmental organizations, which introduces the complicated formations of policy networks in the implementation process. The trends of this policy shift can be
understood by the perceptions of government employees (Cho & Wright, 2004) and the results of national legislation from Congress to prove the growing numbers of public policy and program that operated by multi-actor arrangements (see, Hall & O’Toole, 2000). Additionally, there are various streams of empirical studies in intergovernmental research (for example, Bowman, 2004; Chen & Thurmaier, 2009; Mossberger & Hale, 2002).

Thus, the purpose of this dissertation is to look again at the important roles of governments and intergovernmental mechanisms in collaboration research. First, Hurricane Katrina is one of many cases that champion the importance of government and intergovernmental mechanisms to solve wicked social problems in practice. Second, this review of previous research suggests that intergovernmental mechanisms and their impacts on service delivery mechanisms are not considered to be important factors in empirical studies. What if a research framework cannot reflect the real world in public management and policy contexts?

As explained earlier, when a research framework is focused on the effectiveness of service delivery mechanisms and policy process or program implementation at the local level, intergovernmental practices, especially vertical intergovernmental mechanisms, are often considered to be barriers that prevent efficient and effective service delivery processes, and governments, especially local governments, are considered to be as less effective service providers than NGOs.

In local policies and programs, positive program outcomes may not occur without collaboration within vertical intergovernmental mechanisms. Further, local programs may provide even greater positive outcomes if governments that include both local
governments and other, “higher” levels of governments were able to provide stable and active collaborative frameworks for other organizations. As a result, intergovernmental management and governmental activities should be included in our understanding of multi-organizational arrangements in program implementation processes. According to McGuire (2006), the concept of intergovernmental management goes beyond intergovernmental relations. Intergovernmental management is not just a structure of multi-level governmental involvement, but also managerial behaviors and practices among different levels of governments. In addition, Agranoff and McGuire (2004) stated that “the types of mutual adjustment and joint activity we see in such horizontal environments have existed in the vertical, intergovernmental context for decades, and such activity reigns in significance even today” (p. 495). Multi-organizational arrangements in horizontal environments aim to achieve effective program outcomes. I adopt this logic to explain why models of program effectiveness require a consideration of vertical intergovernmental management as well.

Local governments and programs often need financial and administrative support that the federal or state governments can provide. In addition, other levels of governments, such as the federal or state governments, often need local governments or NGOs at the local level to act as effective service providers to their citizens or target populations in order to achieve their desired outcomes. In the end, the federal, state, and local governments are better off when they work together (McGuire, 2006). Given the wicked social issues that need to be solved, local governments or NGOs can become more effective service providers than federal or state governments because of their knowledge and professionalism where the wicked problems exist. Overall, local
governments and NGOs may be able to provide more stable and effective public programs when they are part of a multi-organizational arrangement that includes federal, state, and local governments, and NGOs.

It should be noted that multi-organizational arrangements that involve intergovernmental mechanisms, both vertical and horizontal aspects, were described by Elazar (1964) more than 50 years ago. In his article, Elazar introduced the concept of cooperative federalism where the federal, state, and local governments, as well as NGOs, work together to achieve policy goals. Bargaining and negotiating processes become key behaviors in intergovernmental collaborations that include all levels of governments (Agranoff & McGuire, 2004). Agranoff (2001) argued that grants and regulations are not the only ways by which to explain intergovernmental mechanisms; numerous partnerships, such as agreements and joint ventures with local governments and NGOs, are also considered intergovernmental mechanisms. Agranoff and McGuire’s early work (1998a; 1998b; 1998c), studied intergovernmental management by local economic development managers in 237 Midwestern cities. Their findings support the argument that local managers have strategic actions, including bargaining and negotiating behaviors, that can be used to work with the federal government in order to achieve their development goals. Additionally, Agranoff and McGuire offered models of action in intergovernmental management (e.g., jurisdiction-based management, network management) in order to highlight the intergovernmental mechanisms among different levels of governments (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001).

Based on this empirical work by Agranoff and McGuire, it is apparent that local governments are active players in the American federal system and have become major
components of intergovernmental management. In American federalism, the roles of the federal government have certainly not decreased (Agranoff, 2001). Still, many national objectives and policy goals of the federal government are implemented using multi-organizational arrangements across state and local levels. Within these intergovernmental mechanisms that involve federal, state, and local governments, as well as NGOs, the practices of collaborative or network management in the public sector are not limited to nongovernmental organizations; intergovernmental structures and processes must be considered in any study of program outcomes. Also, management of intergovernmental mechanisms can sometimes lead to intergovernmental “alignment” among participating multi-level governments.

Considering intergovernmental program alignment, I propose that local governments and their programs are able to produce effective program outcomes when they are aligned programmatically. Some local actors may define vertical involvement as impediments due to the time and cost that local public managers tolerate when they communicate with other levels of governments (Agranoff & McGuire, 1998c). Furthermore, local actors may be willing to utilize autonomy and self-discretion when they implement services. In previous research, it has been shown that local actors concerned about vertical intergovernmental relationships can prevent facilitative collaborative process at the local level (Eiler, 2002). Considering frequent communication and interaction as important collaborative processes, and autonomy as an important indicator to achieve effective outcomes within the multi-organizational arrangements, vertical alignment is sometimes necessary (Townsend, 2006).
This dissertation aims to highlight the important aspects of vertical governmental actions, from administrative support through program alignments to funding support from the flow of federal grants to local governments. Thus, the foundation of this dissertation is to understand multi-organizational arrangements that include vertical intergovernmental mechanisms and explore whether vertical intergovernmental mechanisms actually provide positive impacts on local programs implemented through multi-organizational arrangements. In order to understand the roles of vertical intergovernmental relationships, I focus on the effects of vertical intergovernmental program alignment and their impacts on local program outcomes in U.S. federal homelessness program in the first empirical study. In the second empirical study, I examine the determinants and effects of federal intergovernmental grants. The analyses that follow examine these topics within the context of homelessness in order to examine the important roles of vertical intergovernmental mechanisms in terms of their systematic program alignment and financial support. Thus, the first two research questions are as follows:

- **Q1:** Are the outcomes of programs based in intergovernmental strategies better than the outcomes of programs not based in intergovernmental strategies?

- **Q2:** What are the determinants of awarding federal grants to local homelessness programs?
Importance of Collaborative Strategic Planning in Local Programs

The research in this dissertation assumes that the objective of a multi-organizational arrangement is to produce and provide outcomes that cannot be provided by single organizations (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001). In order to produce effective outcomes, collaboration and intergovernmental alignment becomes an important tool to manage multi-organizational arrangements. Based on the previous research, cross-sector collaboration is intended to “tackle tough social problems and achieve beneficial community outcomes” (Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006, p. 44). Cross-sector collaboration means diverse sectoral participation that includes public, nonprofit, and civil societal sectors. As such, collaboration in multi-organizational arrangements is not an easy task to achieve; it takes time and effort to create synergy among multiple organizations to effectively produce desired outcomes from multi-organizational arrangements. In order to develop favorable collaborative structures and processes, some scholars have argued for the importance of identifying the initial conditions within which to frame collaborative structures among multiple participants. These include formal and informal agreements (Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006) and joint action capacity (Emerson, Nabatchi, & Balogh, 2012).

While it may be difficult for NGOs to initiate collaborative structures in order to invite a number of participants from different sectors, governments can take a leading role in initiating multi-organizational arrangements that deal with wicked societal problems so that other organizations are willing to become involved. Bryson, Crosby, and Stone (2006) proposed that policy makers are most likely to initiate cross-sector collaborations when they believe that collaborative efforts will be more effective than
single governmental efforts. Additionally, and perhaps most important, cross-sector collaborations are most likely to succeed when formal agreements exist that clearly define goals, outcomes, and processes (Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006).

One way to make multi-organizational arrangements work as collaborative structures is to initiate and agree to a clear formal arrangement such as a strategic plan (McGuire, 2006). Governments often initiate strategic plans because public policy makers and administrators willing to set up cross-sector collaborations are appropriate to form stable, planned, multi-organizational arrangements. The development of strategic plans requires a planning process that is implemented through collaborative efforts with different levels of governments and different types of organizations. Strategic planning, defined as “a deliberative, disciplined effort to produce fundamental decisions and actions that shape and guide what an organization (or other entity) is, what it does, and why it does it” (Bryson, 2014, p. 4), has been considered an innovative way by which to improve public sector performance (Bryson & Roering, 1988; Poister, 2010; Poister & Streib, 2005; Poister, Pitts, & Edwards, 2010). Strategic planning should also include “a clear mission statement, the identification of stakeholders, the delineation of strategic goals and objectives, and the development of strategies to achieve goals” (Berry, 1994, p. 323). Strategic plans are thus assumed to be meaningful guides for public action.

Strategic planning is often performed and implemented through multi-organizational arrangements when their desired outcomes are to solve wicked social problems. According to Clark and Fuller (2010), a collaborative strategy is defined as “the joint determination of the vision, and long-term collaborative goals for addressing a given social problem, along with the adoption of both organizational and collective
courses of action and allocation of resources to carry out these courses of action” (p. 87). Governments expect collaborative actions and allocation of resources with other organizations in order to achieve desired outcomes and policy goals set by a collaborative strategic planning process.

Collaborative strategic planning can be a useful strategy to avoid conflicts of interest within multi-organizational arrangements where too many participants seek to adjust diverse goals based on their personal desires and in the absence of clearly defined collaborative instructions. Although it takes time and effort to create harmonious (or at least non-conflictual) collaborative processes inside multi-organizational arrangements, strategic plans are effective guides through which to create consensus among participants in order to produce effective program outcomes. Collaborative strategic planning enables participants to overcome such difficulties from different organizational cultures, goals, and reasons to participate that are most likely to occur during collaborative process through negotiations and communications with others during the development of a collaborative strategic plan. Nathan and Mitroff (1991) called this process as a negotiated order. A negotiated order is to build shared goals and norms from an interactive process among the stakeholders and participants to build a deliberative and comprehensive strategic plan to be used to solve the most difficult public problems. This process is particularly beneficial when attempting to reach positive outcomes because the participants have already shared their interests and built common norms and beliefs, even before the actual collaborative process has begun. This helps foster a collaborative advantage (Huxham, 1993; Huxham, 1996).
The strategic plan developed by a negotiated order helps build shared understanding and goal consensus among the participants before the actual process of implementation. This can provide enormous benefits for participating organizations with regard to reducing conflicts of interests and building a common understanding of each other in order to start the process to achieve the end goal. Consensus building, which can be defined as a facilitating process in which a leader plays a vital role in a deliberative discussion process among the participants (Innes & Booher, 1999a; Innes & Booher, 1999b). Overall, a collaborative strategic plan provides a more favorable collaborative environment for participants by building common norms and understandings, as well as by building goal consensus throughout the negotiation process.

Local governments are able to initiate relatively harmonious and successful collaborative environments when they lead the collaborative strategic planning. The planning begins before collaborative processes are instituted and provides clear guidance on how the organizations will work together in order to achieve successful outcomes. A collaborative strategic plan can create and maintain a collaborative advantage because synergy is achieved when collaborative participants can share not only decisions and resources, but also a common mission, vision, strategy, values, and power (Huxham, 1993). For example, a successful collaborative strategic plan would provide clear guidance in each phase of the collaborative process, from process setting to direction setting to structuring (Gray, 1985).

Although conceptual frameworks of cross-sector collaborations tout the benefits of strategic planning (Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006; Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2015), empirical evidence related to the effectiveness of collaborative strategic planning in
public management and policy studies is scarce. As the development of strategic plans includes collaborative strategic planning processes and the benefits of strategic plans are clearly defined goals, objectives, and action strategies, local governments utilizing strategic plans may have different program outcomes than those local governments that are not using strategic plans. Thus, the final research question is as follows:

- **Q3:** Does the existence of strategic plans make a difference in local homelessness programs?

I answer these three research questions in order to determine and understand the important roles of intergovernmental management and governmental activity in the implementation process.

In the next chapter, I introduce homelessness programs in the U.S. More specifically, I explain such programs as well as discuss the intergovernmental mechanisms that link the different levels of governments.
This dissertation asserts the importance of intergovernmental mechanisms and governmental roles that are often missed from previous research (see Figure 2-1) in order to fully understand multi-organizational arrangements that incorporate different levels of governments (see Figure 2-2). Figure 2-2 provides a research framework for the intergovernmental mechanisms that this dissertation examines. In this dissertation, U.S. homelessness programs are used to examine the important roles of intergovernmental mechanisms and governments in the local program implementation process. At the local level, homelessness programs include both government and NGO as service providers, program directors, and decision makers, as shown in the bottom box in Figure 2-2. Thus, the bottom box that indicates local programs in Figure 2-2 is equivalent to the whole box, which represents multi-organizational arrangements in previous research in Figure 2-1. As such, the upper box in Figure 2-2, which indicates vertical intergovernmental management that includes both federal and state governments, is often missed in studies of multi-organizational arrangements, although the vertical levels of governments are able to provide financial and administrative support to local programs. Accounting for the vertical aspects of governmental activities in multi-organizational policy implementation enables us to develop a more complete model of policy and program implementation processes that includes federal, state, and local governments, as well as NGOs.

In order to examine the roles of governments and intergovernmental management within multi-organizational arrangements, this dissertation particularly focuses on three research questions (see Figure 2-2). The first two research questions focus on the effects of vertical intergovernmental management on local program effectiveness and its
outcome. The first question (Q1) focuses on program effectiveness: Do local programs that are “aligned” with vertical intergovernmental policy intent (i.e., an intergovernmental program) have better program outcomes than local programs that are not so aligned? The second question focuses on the determinants of intergovernmental financial resources on local programs (Q2): What factors influencing flows of federal grants to local homelessness programs? The third question (Q3) focuses on the roles of governments within local homelessness programs. This study tests whether local governments with collaborative strategic planning have better program outcomes than local governments without a strategic planning process: Does collaborative strategic planning make a difference in local homelessness programs? In the third empirical study, this dissertation also explores the varying effects of collaborative strategic planning on local homelessness program outcomes, not just the existence of collaborative strategic planning.
Three empirical studies in this dissertation examine homelessness programs in the U.S. Homelessness is considered a serious social issue that cannot be solved easily by single organizations or individual levels of government. Previous research has found that homelessness is not only related to housing issues, but also connected to additional social issues, such as health, drugs, crime, and education (Galea & Vlahov, 2002; Galster, Pettit, Santiago, & Tatian, 2002; Masten, Sesma, Si-Asar, Lawrence, Miliotis, & Dionne, 1997; Orwin, Scott, & Arieira, 2003). In addition, the determinants of homelessness are related to many local characteristics, such as housing, the economy, a person’s demographic characteristics, and even the weather (Bassuk & Rosenberg, 1988; Byrne, Munley, Fargo, Montgomery, & Culhane, 2013; Lee, Price-Spratlen, & Kanan, 2003). However, homelessness policies may not be welcomed by some local governments, as they may cause conflicts with other local governments’ preferences (e.g., economic development) and local citizens’ preferences (Dear, 1992; Law, 2001; Oakley, 2002). Thus, no single government or organization can easily deal with homelessness issues.

In the U.S., numerous efforts have been undertaken by different levels of governments and types of organizations to address homelessness. For example, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) provides a number of homelessness programs, and the U.S. Interagency Council on Homelessness (USICH), which consists of 19 federal cabinet secretaries and agency heads, has also partnered with many state and local governments and NGOs to deal with homelessness. In addition, many local governments have produced their own strategic plans to end homelessness. In
order to understand the roles of intergovernmental management that aims to deal with homelessness, this dissertation provides a comprehensive understanding of both federal and local government homelessness programs:

- USICH and its intergovernmental program (Opening Doors)
- HUD and its intergovernmental grant and local program (Continuum of Care)
- Local governments and their collaborative efforts (Strategic Plan on Homelessness).

Since each empirical chapter describes the characteristics of each program, this section briefly introduces an overall understanding of the federal and local governmental efforts toward ending homelessness.

**U.S. Interagency Council on Homelessness and its homelessness program, Opening Doors**

The U.S. Interagency Council on Homelessness (USICH) is a federal governmental planning body that coordinates the federal response to homelessness and create[s] a national partnership at every level of government and with the private sector to reduce and end homelessness in the nation, while maximizing the effectiveness of the federal government in contributing to the end of homelessness (U.S. Interagency Council on Homelessness, 2012, p. 2).
The USICH was authorized by the McKinney Homeless Assistance Act of 1987. According to this act, the USICH is an independent agency that evaluates federal assistance and programs related to homelessness in order to provide effective coordination among federal agencies and departments and create linkages among state and local governments and NGOs. The USICH underwent a number of modifications and re-authorizations for many of the assistance programs that partnered with the “Departments of Education (ED), Health and Human Services (HHS), Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Labor (DOL), Veteran Affairs (VA), General Social Administration, and Federal Emergency Management Agency” (U.S. Interagency Council on Homelessness, 2012, p. 1) in order to deal with homelessness in the U.S. The most recent re-authorization of USICH was based on the Homeless Emergency Assistance and Rapid Transition to Housing (HEARTH) Act in 2009.

In its initial stage, the USICH partnered with the heads of 16 federal agencies under the McKinney Act (Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Education, Energy, Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban Development, Interior, Labor, Low Income Opportunity Board, Transportation, Veteran Affairs, Corporation for National and Community Service, Federal Emergency Management Agency, General Services Administration, Postmaster General); however, the current council members, which are related to partner organizations, are the heads of 19 federal departments and agencies that included five additional departments and agencies (Social Security Administration, Justice, Office of Management and Budget, White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, USA Freedom Corps) (U.S. Interagency Council on
Homelessness, 2012, p. 2). The USICH has coordinated a number of homelessness programs since the Reagan administration in 1987. In the Reagan administration (1987-1988), the major focus of the USICH was to focus on studies related to homelessness and its correlating governmental activities in order to recommend appropriate policies. However, the USICH received criticism from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and Congress due to insufficient information explaining the use of federal funds, homelessness-related services, and unsupportive assistance to initiate homelessness programs they had planned.

In the George H.W. Bush administration (1989-1992), the USICH was reshaped due to this criticism. As such, it was during this administration that the USICH first announced its outreach programs (known as Program Alerts) to highlight the urgency of the homelessness issue, the Council Communiqué, and two national programs particularly aimed at those with a serious mental illness.

However, the USICH was not reauthorized during the Clinton administration (1993-2000) and, instead, became a working group under guidance of the White House staff. In this new role, the USICH did not receive any direct funding from Congress. However, USICH was supported by HUD in terms of its operation during the Clinton administration. During this period, the USICH provided one national plan on chronic homelessness population via a presidential order and, in conjunction with HUD, began to collect regional data related to the homeless population. In the George W. Bush administration (2001-2008), USICH was reauthorized as an independent, federal agency. During this administration, the USICH expanded coordination with other federal departments and agencies as well as with state and local governments. During this
process, USICH created 10 regional coordinator positions and collaborated with HUD to extend its homelessness program and administrative systems toward regional areas effectively. These regional coordinators supported state and local governments during the creation of the State Interagency Councils on Homelessness (SIC), which has the same structures as USICH.

The HEARTH Act of 2009, during the Obama administration, amended the USICH. Overall, the USICH has expanded exponentially to deal with all types of homelessness at the national level. For example, the head of HUD took the leading role at the USICH and facilitated their collaborative work with NGOs at the local level. In 2009, the White House and Congress agreed on the importance of developing a national, comprehensive plan to end homelessness. Although the USICH has provided a number of programs to deal with homelessness since its inception, this decision marked the first time that the USICH had the active support of the president and Congress to develop an approach that would align the various federal resources and the involvement of different levels of governments and types of organizations in order to end homelessness.

In 2010, the USICH announced Opening Doors, the nation’s first ever comprehensive strategic plan to prevent and end homelessness among all populations (U.S. Interagency Council on Homelessness, 2012). This plan is a roadmap to facilitate joint actions with all levels of government and all organizations in order to achieve four major goals:

- end chronic homelessness in five years
- prevent and end homelessness among Veterans in five years
• prevent and end homelessness for families, youth, and children in 10 years
• set a path to ending all types of homelessness.

In addition, Opening Doors clearly identified several strategies, action plans, timelines, resources, and key participants in order to achieve these goals. The strategic plan highlights intergovernmental collaboration with all levels of government as well as with NGOs. The USICH collaborates with each state’s State Interagency Council on Homelessness (SIC) in order to effectively implement the action plans and strategies outlined in Opening Doors. According to a report provided by the USICH (2011),

…every state and territory has been encouraged by USICH to establish a State Interagency Council on Homelessness by legislative action or Governor’s Executive Order with representation at the cabinet level from the mainstream income support, health care, behavioral health, human services, veterans, corrections, transportation, education, and labor departments and agencies (U.S. Interagency Council on Homelessness, 2011, p. 1).

The benefits of the SIC include collaboration with federal, state, and local governments in order to secure financial and administrative resources, as well as the development of a state strategic plan, based on Opening Doors. Further, the SICs are intended to implement Opening Doors to their regions, which means that local regions under the SICs are directly affected by the benefits of Opening Doors. The basic functions of the SICs are to align their structures and strategies with both the USICH and
Opening Doors so that the SICs can pursue (or not) intergovernmental alignment across all levels of government.

The development and implementation of Opening Doors heavily relies upon the participation of all levels of government and NGOs, including advocacy groups, professional groups, housing development groups, and for-profit organizations. Thus, Opening Doors is based in intergovernmental mechanisms and highlights the role of the government as an important player who can either initiate strategic plans or convene a collaborative process. Further, USICH is also highly rooted in an intergovernmental process with state governments using SICH and regional coordinators, as well as with different levels of governments and types of organizations.

Through the Opening Doors plans, USICH endorses local governments taking the lead in the fight against homelessness, as the issue is embedded in local geographic and socioeconomic characteristics. According to the USICH (2012), efforts to end homelessness are now grounded at the local level and the role of the federal government is to increase local participation. Further, Opening Doors enables the USICH to focus on the implementation process (U.S. Interagency Council on Homelessness, 2012).

Based on the history of USICH and the characteristics of Opening Doors, both the agency and the program are valid contexts through which to examine the important roles of intergovernmental mechanisms, particularly focusing on intergovernmental programmatic alignments, in determining local program effectiveness. More detailed information of the characteristics and operations of the USICH and Opening Doors is explained in chapter 4.
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Continuum of Care

In addition to the USICH, HUD is a federal department that also provides various homelessness assistance programs. Its major role is to provide financial support to local governments or programs in order to address homelessness; a large amount of the financial support is aimed at developing housing properties. Like the USICH, HUD restructured its programs under the HEARTH Act of 2009. Since then, via its Continuum of Care (CoC) program, HUD began three major homelessness assistance programs: Shelter Plus Care (SPC), Supportive Housing (SH), and Section 8 Moderate Rehabilitation Single Room Occupancy (Section 8). In addition, HUD has two more major homelessness assistance programs: Emergency Solution Grants (ESG) and Rural Housing Stability Assistance (RHSA) programs. Furthermore, HUD operates seven additional homelessness programs, which are targeted toward specific homelessness populations, such as veterans and AIDS programs.

Thus, HUD publicizes its three major programs that include CoC, ESG, and RHSA programs as their main homelessness assistance programs. As two of these programs are for general purpose projects and one is specifically focused on rural areas, they can be categorized as follows. The ESG and CoC are the main homelessness programs used to target a broad section of the homeless population nationwide. The ESG program provides financial resources to state and local governments based on the consolidated strategic plans they developed. In the consolidated plans, the governments provide economic development and community service programs to their regions. Within these programs, they can address homelessness as it is related to housing development properties. HUD considers allocating ESG to state or local governments based on the...
qualities of their consolidated plans and the information of homeless housing development properties inside the consolidated plans.

Unlike the ESG, the characteristics of CoC are more program-oriented, when HUD tries to allocate CoC grants. While the ESG is based on the consolidated plan of a single, local government (either state, county, or city), the CoC is based on the local CoC body, which is composed of multi-organizational arrangements. Thus, the CoC program aims to end homelessness at the local level and has a local planning body as the multi-organizational arrangement to address the issue. According to information listed on HUD’s website, there were more than 400 CoCs across the U.S., as of 2015. Each CoC focuses on a designated geographic region and provides a broad range of homelessness programs from housing services, such as permanent housing properties and transitional housing properties, to other supportive services, such as homeless population data collection and homelessness management information systems.

As mentioned earlier, the structure of the CoC includes state and/or local governments as well as NGOs, including homelessness advocates and representatives from religious organizations, housing development organizations, health and education service organizations, and financial organizations, and including homeless individuals. The structures vary across the CoCs and are based on the needs and characteristics of the local homeless environments. The major roles of various organizations involved in a CoC are to participate in the homelessness planning and implementing roles, and in establishing CoC grant application processes (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2009). In the planning and implementing processes, each CoC has a leading agency and governing board that organizes and operates various homelessness
programs by working with service providers that can be either governments or NGOs. Since CoCs can develop various types of homelessness services from housing development to supportive services, CoCs often need to receive financial support from HUD. Thus, the CoCs annually initiate CoC grant application processes to prepare for federal grant competitions in order to secure financial resources through which to implement various programs at the local level. Both planning and application processes require collaborative efforts with other organizations, including governments and state interagency councils, and participation in the CoCs in order to successfully seek federal homelessness grants. Thus, the CoCs are multi-organizational arrangements that are critical to HUD’s major programs to fight homelessness, which means that the CoCs are also like intergovernmental mechanisms – administrative and financial relationships – between a federal department (HUD) and local programs (CoC).

In order to receive financial resources from HUD, the application process considers various aspects of the CoC and local homelessness characteristics of geographic areas that each CoC serves. Such characteristics include information on 1) the severity and size of the local homelessness problem, 2) the types and sizes of the homelessness programs served by the CoC and the participating organizations within the CoC program, 3) the performance of the CoC programs in the previous year, and 4) other considerations. Unlike other financial relationships between federal and local governments, CoC grants are based on local homelessness programs and their characteristics. I assume that there is relatively less room for political or governmental administrative characteristics than other financial relationships between federal and local governments, but more room for program-oriented characteristics than other financial
relationships. In order to understand the important roles of financial aspects of intergovernmental mechanisms on local program effectiveness, this study examines the key determinants of local program characteristics on the flows of federal financial resources to local programs. More detailed information on the CoC is explained in chapter 5.

**Local Strategic Plans on Homelessness**

Using both the USICH and HUD, as well as the programs that they manage as valid case studies, this dissertation aims to examine the roles of intergovernmental mechanisms on multi-organizational arrangements with regard to local program effectiveness and outcomes. Additionally, this dissertation examines county government homelessness strategic plans and the collaborative aspects of designing and implementing the strategic plans in order to explore the roles of governments in multi-organizational arrangements. The strategic plans used in this dissertation are not related to the consolidated plans for local governments to receive ESG from HUD. These strategic plans are specifically designed to deal with homelessness populations within their particular, local areas.

Governments can initiate the development of the strategic plans. They can create a governing board, in which representative from all levels of governments take a leading role. In addition, the strategic plans are designed to provide participating organizations with guidance on implementing the plan. Currently, 207 homelessness strategic plans exist at the local level (i.e., county and city governments). This dissertation examines all county level governments’ strategic plans, which enables me to control for local
socioeconomic and housing characteristics via the use of census data. As a result, 164 county government strategic plans are incorporated into this study.

The development of strategic plans can be undertaken for two reasons. First, some county governments develop strategic plans when there is the need from civil society and local NGOs. Second, other county governments have decided to develop these plans in order to satisfy the funding requirements to receive block grants from their state governments. Further, the implementation of the strategic plans varies across county governments based on the types of organizations that are involved in the strategic plans. Thus, it is obvious that multi-organizational arrangements exist in the strategic plans, and that the composition and purpose may vary. In addition, the qualities or characteristics of the strategic plans also vary across county governments. As a result, the final empirical study in this dissertation examines the effects of county governments’ strategic plans and their collaborative strategic planning processes on local homelessness populations. More detailed information on the strategic plans is explained in chapter 6.
Chapter 4: In the Right Place at the Right Time:  
Intergovernmental Alignment and Program Effectiveness

Do federal programs in the U.S. lead to successful outcomes in local governments? If so, what is the explanation for such intergovernmental program success? If not, why not? Answers to these venerable questions dot the landscape of intergovernmental public administration research (Bickers & Stein, 2004; Caruson & MacManus, 2008; Lubell, Feoick, & Ramirez, 2005; McCann, Shipan, & Volden, 2015; Radin, 2006). Multiple levels and layers of governments sometimes work together, sometimes not, but there is little doubt that subnational governments make strategic decisions regarding whether to engage in federal programs collaboratively or to reject the guiding policy and remain on the sidelines. Often, subnational governments need the resources provided by the federal government and thus will take part in implementing the federal program to achieve effective program outcomes that cannot be achieved by single governmental activities. Managing intergovernmental program collaboratively can be routine and, in many cases, required activity in jurisdictions of all sizes.

Intergovernmental collaboration assumes that governments are interdependent and that they need each other to successfully carry out particular policymaking and administrative functions. Federal governments need state (and local) governments not only as active service providers, but also as experts on locally oriented social problems. At the same time, state (and local) governments often have very few reasons to avoid federal programs, if the programs can benefit their own governmental activities and not incur greater costs to the subnational government. As multiple governments are looking
for “solutions designed to solve problems that go beyond one organization” (Agranoff & Radin, 2015, p. 153), each level of government may choose to align strategically with another in order to achieve widely espoused policy goals.

The act of aligning administrative processes or decisions across levels of government, or what I refer to as “intergovernmental alignment,” is not an idea that is non-controversial (see, Agranoff & McGuire, 2001; O’Toole, 1988). When different levels of government, particularly the federal and state governments, are allied in the alleviation of a national and/or local social problem, a range of outcomes can occur. The motivations for such alignment vary as well. For example, consider a policy area such as public, K-12 education. The federal program No Child Left Behind was a federal policy adopted in 2001 that “aligned” the policy goal of a better educated society across the federal and state governments (and local governments in its implementation). However, many states argued that the alignment was coerced, mandated, and did not take the unique characteristics of a state and its localities into account (Krane & Koenig, 2005; National Conference of State Legislatures, 2005). What was an intended intergovernmental alignment instead resulted in multiple efforts at resistance by many different states (Dinan & Krane, 2006). Some federal programs, such as the move to electronic voting equipment in states, are considered voluntary so that alignment is a strategic decision by a state, and not a coerced one. The response of states to federal programs is often one of adopting, adapting, or opting out (Hale & Brown, 2013). In addition, the implementation of various policies has been plagued by “partisanship, pushback, and uncertainty” (Bowling & Pickerell, 2013), resulting in a “fragmented federalism” rather than one I would consider to be aligned. Scholars have also bemoaned
the apparent opportunism that pervades American federalism (Conlan, 2006; McGuire, 2006), leaving state governments with little choice but to align or dissent. Aligning levels of government in a federal system is thus not always appropriate, workable, or acceptable to state governments. Indeed, any attempt to attain intergovernmental alignment may be antithetical to American federalism in that uniformity is not necessarily the aim of a federal system (Wildavsky, 1984).

On the other hand, state governments also make strategic choices to align with federal goals and/or policy implementation processes. State policies might be developed in response to federal guidelines, as in the case of education waivers or health insurance/Medicaid (Radin, 2006). I cannot say states directly align with the federal government on implementing the associated programs. Often, “these policies are created in response to a perceived need to which the federal government has failed to respond, even though it may be a ‘national interest’” (Bowling & Pickerill, 2013, p. 23). Clearly, the ability of states to share policy goals and respond accordingly on behalf of the jurisdiction is consistent with federal principles and practice (Agranoff & McGuire, 1998b; Agranoff & McGuire, 2003).

When is intergovernmental alignment a proper strategy to adopt? The answer is not simple. The scope and extent of intergovernmental alignment are based on the strategic decisions of state and local governments as a means to solve public problems that cannot be solved by single governments. This suggests that federal governments cannot achieve their goals and objectives without the support of other levels of governments. State and local governments may have less incentive to follow the objectives of federal governments without proper financial inducements or legal
mandates; intergovernmental alignment can be made by strategic decisions when state or local governments need to adopt federal government recommendations to solve wicked social programs. However, relatively little is known about whether intergovernmental alignment actually produces effective intended outcomes.

In this chapter, I focus on the important case of vertical intergovernmental alignment where state governments have responded to federal programs or policies. The main purpose of this chapter is to examine the incidence and impacts of intergovernmental alignment as a policy implementation tool to produce successful program outcomes (O’Toole, 2000). Thus, I studied a federal homelessness plan and examined the changes in local (county) homelessness outcomes when alignment exists between the federal and state governments. The research reported here enables us to understand how vertical intergovernmental alignment can achieve federal program outcomes in the absence of financial inducements or legal mandates. Thus, a general research question is as follows:

- What is the role of intergovernmental alignment in relations between federal program effectiveness and local program outcomes?

Many issues must be resolved through intergovernmental relationships. Homelessness in the U.S. is one such problem that can be defined as a wicked problem since previous studies have demonstrated that the prevalence of homeless individuals is related to various socioeconomic and housing conditions (Culhane & Kane, 1998; Early, 2004; Kuhn & Culhane, 1998; Orwin, Scott, & Arieira, 2003). Additionally, homeless
individuals face health, education, and drug-related issues that have potentially enormous social costs for society (Mansur, Quigley, Raphael, & Smolensky, 2002; Quigley & Raphael, 2001; Quigley, Raphael, & Smolensky, 2001). These findings support the argument that homelessness is one of many wicked problems that single governments cannot effectively or adequately address.

As one means to address this wicked problem in the U.S., the Obama Administration and Congress agreed in 2009 to design the first federal level, comprehensive strategic plan to end homelessness. The U.S. Interagency Council on Homelessness (USICH), an independent federal partnership that involves 19 federal departments and agencies, was the lead actor for developing and implementing the plan. In 2010, USICH developed the strategic plan through intergovernmental collaboration and effort, thus highlighting the partnerships with state and local governments to implement federal homelessness policy goals and program objectives. In order to collaborate with state and local governments to address homelessness, USICH highly recommends that a state government develop a state interagency council on homelessness (SIC), which follows the objectives and structures of USICH.

According to the cross-agency implementation mechanisms of USICH, this study is able to analyze the federal strategic planning partnership in order to explore the role of intergovernmental alignment as an effective tool to provide better federal program outcomes for local governments as county governments may receive different program impacts based on the strategic decisions of state governments of whether to align with USICH. To answer this question, I gathered county level chronic homelessness data within the U.S. between 2008 and 2013. Thus, I compare program outcomes (i.e., chronic
homeless individuals) of the federal plan between counties where intergovernmental alignment exists and counties where intergovernmental alignment does not exist.

In the next section, I provide a brief look at intergovernmental research within the public administration context and highlight the importance of intergovernmental alignment in public policy and program evaluation. I then introduce the federal homelessness agency (USICH) and its intergovernmental mechanisms to implement the federal plan (Opening Doors) to entire U.S. regional areas. Next, I explain dataset and methodology, and then discuss the results. The final section summarizes and explains the implications of findings.

**Understanding Intergovernmental Alignment and Program Effectiveness**

The American federal system consists of multiple types and levels of governments, including federal, state, county, municipalities, and special districts. Under this multi-governmental system, different levels of governments often collaborate with each other to solve wicked public problems. These intergovernmental relationships include various types of multi-governmental structures, including legal/political structure, interdependency, externalization, and network actions (Agranoff, 2014). Vertical intergovernmental alignment is one intergovernmental strategy for aligning objectives and strategies of other governments in order to achieve the goals and objectives of different levels of governments (see, O’Toole, 1988).

Although intergovernmental relations can be in any form and combination of different levels of governments, the preponderance of intergovernmental research over the past few decades often focuses on vertical relationships based in federal funding and
mandates to state and local governments (see, Caruson & MacManus, 2006; Caruson & MacManus, 2008; Hall & Handley, 2011; Handley, 2008; Gosling, 2009); however, relatively little research has studied intergovernmental mechanisms that are not simply financial support or legal mandates. Sometimes, state or local governments can adopt federal policy or program so as to create intergovernmentally aligned programs. In this case, state governments are relatively free to choose whether or not to align with the federal government. Further, state and local governments may exercise greater roles as service providers in public policy and program implementation in the absence of intergovernmental requirements to receive federal funding or follow federal mandates. However, this intergovernmental mechanism does not disregard the role of federal government, which still plays an important role as a policy maker and a program initiator.

The concept of intergovernmental alignment used in this chapter can be viewed as an alternative policy mechanism to expect effective federal program outcomes at the local level, based on strategic choices of state or local governments to align with federal government. This intergovernmental mechanism can be understood as a “downward” trend of the American system that highlights the important roles of state and local governments, as well as state-local or interlocal relationships (Cho, Kelleher, Wright, & Yackee, 2005). Further, Agranoff comments that, “[T]he recent tradition in intergovernmental research must move away from an obsession with action in Washington and how much or how little power has accrued where” (2001, p. 54).

U.S. state and local governments sometimes cannot provide effective outcomes without the support of federal governments. For example, Hall and Handley (2011) found that federal assistance programs, such as training and monitoring systems, leads to better
understanding of federal goals and priorities at the local governments. Further, Handley (2008) pointed out that the lack of accountability and adaptability at the local level are due to the lack of technical assistance and intergovernmental assessments of goals and objectives from the federal government to local governments. Their findings point us to recognize that the important role of vertical intergovernmental relations is not based simply in financial and legal incentives, but also many types of cooperative and strategic behaviors in order to achieve effective public outcomes.

In an interdependent intergovernmental system, state governments are at the center of relationships between federal and local governments (Cline, 2000). Agranoff and McGuire (1998c) argue, “state government agencies are by far the most important components of the intergovernmental context” (p.162). Additionally, state governments become active partners in the intergovernmental context when they perceive that such partnerships benefit their own policies and programs (Agranoff & McGuire, 1998c; Krane, 2007). State governments can strategically align their objectives and strategies with federal government, which champions the concept of intergovernmental alignment. Thus, the intergovernmental alignment explains interdependent relationships among different levels of governments in order to achieve goals and objectives that are aligned strategically across governmental and administrative boundaries, and state governments can become a key player to choose whether or not to participate in intergovernmental alignment between federal and local governments. At the same time, the federal government still plays a major role in setting the objectives and strategies to implement their policies and programs, and local governments are able to receive the benefits of intergovernmental alignment as front-line service providers when they implement
national level public policies and programs. Intergovernmental alignment can be an effective policy implementing tool for federal government to achieve its policy goal, especially when their policy is deeply related to local governmental areas, and their impact affects across different levels of governments. Homelessness policy is one clear case of such federal policy that expects intergovernmental mechanism (i.e., alignment) across different levels of governments.

**Understanding Intergovernmental Bodies: The U.S. Interagency Council on Homelessness**

In order to understand the important roles of intergovernmental alignment as an effective tool to plan and implement federal programs at the local (county) level, I introduce the U.S. Interagency Council on Homelessness (USICH), which is a federal-level independent agency that collaborates with 19 federal departments and agencies\(^1\) to reduce and prevent homelessness, and a national level homelessness program, called Opening Doors, which is the comprehensive strategic plan to end homelessness that began in 2010.

The USICH was first developed in 1987 and has become the major federal entity to lead federal homelessness and to initiate federal level homelessness programs and activities, and coordinate and improve active partnerships across different levels of

governments and types of organizations. Under the Homeless Assistance and Rapid Transition to Housing (HEARTH) Act in 2009, the USICH highlighted that its main mission was to:

coordinate the Federal response to homelessness and to create a national partnership at every level of government and with the private sector to reduce and end homelessness in the nation while maximizing the effectiveness of the federal government in contributing to the end of homelessness. (Homeless Assistance and Rapid Transition to Housing Act of 2009, p. 35)

The USICH develops interagency partnerships at the federal level and intergovernmental level. At the federal level, the USICH has regular meetings to advance federal collaboration and coordination. In between Council meetings, USICH convenes interagency working groups focused on key homelessness issues and activities to address them. At the intergovernmental level, the USICH has two systems: 1) regional coordinating groups and 2) state interagency councils on homelessness (SIC). Regional coordinating groups are ten regional coordinators working on homelessness programs; however, they are located at Washington DC. These coordinating groups mainly focus on regional issues at the federal level. In addition to the activities of regional coordinators, the USICH encourages state governments to create a state interagency council on homelessness (SIC) as a means to effectively create intergovernmental mechanisms in order to coordinate with state and local governments.
The SIC is a statewide intergovernmental planning body that involves federal, state, and local governments, as well as nongovernmental organizations, to develop stable and performance-based partnerships to end homelessness at the state level. The development of SICs is based on state governmental decisions, which means that the federal entity does not have any authority to require SICs. State governments decide to develop SICs in order to respond to USICH recommendations to align states’ homelessness plans and programs with USICH’s recommendations. Once state governments develop SICs, they are directly connected with USICH so that local governments within those state that have SICs are automatically receiving the benefits of intergovernmental partnerships. As state governments have discretion to develop SICs, they create them based on executive orders of governors, as recommended by USICH. The USICH asks state governments to specify participatory organizations, meeting schedules, and functions in the executive orders. In addition, the structures and functions of SICs listed in the executive orders follow the USICH’s structures and functions. Throughout SICs, the USICH is able to create intergovernmental cooperation with county and city governments.

The USICH focuses on both planning and implementing homelessness programs across jurisdictional boundaries. As the development of SICs is not related to funding and program regulations, state governments have a discretion to decide strategically whether to develop the SIC that responds to USICH. In the case of USICH and its implementation mechanisms, state governments have more discretion to implement federal programs. However, USICH has a critical role to design intergovernmental partnerships and to initiate federal programs in order to achieve national level objectives to end
homelessness, while collaborating with state and local governments. Thus, it is possible to understand intergovernmental alignment as a key policy implementation tool to extend federal objectives and strategies to address homelessness to different levels of governments when state governments have responded to federal’s recommendation as strategic choices.

**Understanding Federal Strategic Planning: Opening Doors**

Once state governments build SICs in order to align with the USICH, those state and local governments have direct intergovernmental alignment with the USICH. In this case, any policy implemented by the USICH would have different impacts at the local level that vary by the existence of intergovernmental alignment. In this chapter, I examine the impact of intergovernmental alignment on local level program outcomes by using the first national level comprehensive strategic plan to end homelessness (i.e., Opening Doors) developed and managed by the USICH. In order to develop this strategic plan, USICH initiated various efforts. First, USICH built five federal level workgroups to focus on different types of homelessness, which include chronic, veterans, families, youth, and community homelessness. Each of the five groups have collaborated with practitioners and researchers to emphasize strategies and to set specific goals to address each type of homelessness (United States Interagency Council on Homelessness, 2010). Second, USICH offered a number of meetings with state and local governments as they were developing the plan, as the guiding principle is that homelessness is rooted in and can be solved at the local level. These meetings enabled the USICH to contain both nationwide and communitywide strategies to end homelessness that included stable
economic, housing, health, and educational systems for homeless individuals. The USICH understood the importance of multi-actor efforts to address homelessness so that meetings during the development process were opened to all governmental actors, nongovernmental actors, and homelessness advocates, as well as individuals who had experienced homelessness. Overall, the development of Opening Doors heavily relies on intergovernmental collaboration among different levels of governments and types of organizations.

As a result of these efforts, the USICH published Opening Doors in 2010, which explicitly identifies its goals and timeline, such as ending chronic homelessness within five years; veteran homelessness within five years; homelessness for families, youth, and children within ten years; and setting a path toward ending all types of homelessness. The plan also clearly announces 10 objectives with 66 strategies. Such strategies include increasing collaborative leadership and civic engagement since single organizations cannot solve homelessness; it requires multi-organizational efforts to resolve it. Additionally, the Opening Doors provides several strategies to secure stable housing, economic, and health systems to homeless individuals (United States Interagency Council on Homelessness, 2010). The plan was updated twice, in 2012 and 2013, and amended twice in 2012 and 2015. The last amendment points out additional strategies to end homelessness after learning from five years’ experience of implementing homelessness policy; however, its initial goals and strategies have remained the same in updated and amended versions: ending all types of homelessness within ten years and developing systematic structures including those with a focus on economic, health, and educational issues.
Although the objective of Opening Doors is to implement nationwide homelessness program through its various strategies to end homelessness, its implementation process may vary by local areas as state governments are not uniformly aligned with the USICH. The implementation process may be dependent on the structure of USICH as the USICH uses SICs to facilitate intergovernmental partnerships in order to effectively transfer the goals and strategies of Opening Doors to local areas. Thus, local governments within the state that have a SIC might receive the benefits of the plan as the plan is designed to offer a nationwide approach, while local governments within the state that do not have the SIC might receive different levels of the benefits. The different outcomes between two different local governments could be understood as the existence of an intergovernmental alignment.

Data and Method

Data. I developed a quantitative dataset from multiple sources. First, I used homelessness data provided by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). From this source, I collected data on the homeless population and the amount of federal homeless financial grants to a county government. Second, I identified state interagency councils and collected all strategic plans on homelessness that state and county governments produced from the information that USICH provides. In order to develop a reliable dataset, I visited each state governmental website to check whether the SIC is made by an active executive order that USICH recommends. Further, I investigated each county government website to discern whether homelessness strategic plans are active. Lastly, I used the U.S. Census dataset to collect county-specific
socioeconomic and housing characteristics that previous studies have identified as key determinants of homelessness (Early, 2004; Kuhn & Culhane, 1998; Orwin, Scott, & Arieira, 2003). From the U.S. Census dataset, I collected county level data, including population size, median household income, minority rate, unemployment rate, poverty rate, and vacancy rate. Overall, the dataset consists of 208 county governments located across 33 states over six years from 2008 to 2013. The total number of observations is 1,248 county governments. Table 4-1 shows the distribution of county governments.

Table 4-1. Distribution of Counties by States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>County Numbers</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>County Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>South</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>Midwest</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Nevada</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>New Hampshire</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>South</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>South</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>South</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idaho</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>Midwest</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>Midwest</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Oklahoma</td>
<td>South</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>Midwest</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>Midwest</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansas</td>
<td>Midwest</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>South</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>South</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>South</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>South</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Vermont</td>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>Northwest</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>South</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>Midwest</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>Midwest</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>Midwest</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dataset and county governments are distributed equally across the U.S. regions – Northeast Region (54 counties); South Region (57 counties); Midwest Region (51 counties); West Region (46 counties). Regional characteristics can be important determinants of the homeless population, as some geographical pockets of the U.S. population experience higher incidences of homelessness. In addition, the distribution of state and county governments is an important foundation for conducting the empirical
model in this study, as I compare the program outcomes between two groups that are divided by the existence of a state interagency council (SIC) on homelessness. Table 4-1 shows that California has the largest county government size (30) and five states have only one county government in the dataset (Alabama, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Vermont). All other states have 2 – 17 county governments in the dataset.

Comparing average changes in chronic homelessness populations between two groups before and after the federal strategic plan (i.e., homelessness program intervention) enables us to examine whether intergovernmental alignment provides greater policy outcomes than do local governments without any clear intergovernmental alignment. I estimate the group averages of outcomes in two years before the Opening Doors and outcomes in four years after the Opening Doors. Considering the nature of intergovernmental partnering between the federal (USICH) and state governments (SICs), an empirical strategy of this study enables us to examine the effects of vertical intergovernmental alignment on federal program outcomes at the local (county) level, as the difference between two groups is based in whether the states and their localities are intergovernmentally aligned with USICH (or not).

To understand the difference between two groups, it is useful to understand which state governments developed a state interagency council. As the development of SICs is not mandatory, not all states have developed a SIC, but some state governments decided to activate a SICs. Thus, I identified which states have active SICs from the state’s websites. According to the information I collected, 22 states have active SICs and five states do not have it, regardless of the time period; however, five states have active SICs after the USICH started the strategic plan in the dataset. The variation of SICs between
2008 and 2013 in state governments is listed in Table 4-2.

Table 4-2. Distribution of State with and without State Interagency Councils on Homelessness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Name</th>
<th>Before Opening Doors</th>
<th>After Opening Doors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2008-2009</td>
<td>2010-2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State without SIC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>2008 – 2009</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>2010 – 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State with SIC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>2010 – 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2010 – 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>2012 – 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nevada</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>2008 – 2009</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As shown in Tables 4-1 and 4-2, 137 county governments are intergovernmentally
aligned, and the total number of county governments are not aligned is 71. More specifically, 67 county governments within states do not have SICs during the relevant time period (2008-2013). One-hundred and seventeen county governments are located within states with SICs during the time period. Further, 24 county governments are located within states that have started to activate SICs during the time period. Three of 24 counties from Arizona and Indiana are considered as a treatment group since they have activated SICs before 2010. Four counties from Tennessee are counted as a comparison group as they inactivated their SIC in 2010. However, 15 counties from New Jersey joined the treatment group in 2012, and 2 counties in Nevada became part of the treatment group in 2013. As a result, the final dataset contains 207 county governments with 1,191 total observations due to missing data of one county.

**Measurement. Outcome Variables.** The outcome variable is the number of chronic homeless persons in a county, collected from HUD’s annual homeless reports. The HUD publishes annual reports that contain total numbers of homelessness counted in a single night of every January by the Continuum of Care (CoC) programs, which are the local community-wide homelessness programs under HUD. The CoCs provide homeless-related social services and collect homeless-related reports. Each CoC covers a designated geographic area that can be either a single county or not. HUD designs a systematic data collection process of the homelessness population. Based on this guidance, CoCs annually collect the number of homeless and track their information every year. Among the CoCs, I selected chronic homelessness information of CoCs that only cover the single county areas so that I can control for county level socioeconomic
and housing characteristics, which affect the incidence of homelessness.

This study uses the number of chronic homeless persons who have been continuously experiencing homelessness for more than one year. There are two reasons for this. First, the federal homelessness program (Opening Doors) has set ending chronic homelessness as a priority goal. Second, chronically homeless individuals are the most urgent group of homeless because this group contributes to additional social issues in a community. I standardized the outcome variable by county population.

**Key Independent Variables.** The key independent variable is an interaction term (federal homelessness program * state interagency council). The federal homelessness program variable is a time variable coded as a one when the federal agency started the homelessness program and zero before it was created. The state interagency council is a place variable that is coded as a one when a county government is located in a state that has a state interagency council and zero when a county government is located in a state that does not have a state interagency council. Thus, the interaction term is equal to one when a county government is vertically aligned between federal and state governments, which signifies that counties are located in states where the SIC existed and when the federal homelessness program of interest began. However, the value of the variable is zero when counties are not affected by vertical intergovernmental alignment. Under this condition, I can argue that the difference between the two groups is due to vertical intergovernmental alignment, which is the combination of the existence of the federal homelessness program strategic plan and the existence of a state interagency council.
**Covariate Variables.** I employed a list of covariate variables to control for an endogeneity bias that may affect the association between outcome and key independent variables. First, I included figures representing intergovernmental homelessness grants available from the federal government in order to control for possible intergovernmental explanations other than alignment. Second, I included both states’ and counties’ strategic plans, as my intention is to examine the effect of intergovernmental alignment rather than local governmental efforts on county level homelessness outcomes. Third, I included a series of county-specific characteristics that capture both time-varying socioeconomic and housing characteristics in a county. As previous research on homelessness argues, the incidence of homelessness is closely related to individuals’ socioeconomic characteristics and local housing characteristics. I thus used population size, median household income, minority rate, unemployment rate, poverty rate, and vacant house rate as control variables. Lastly, I used state and year dummies to control time-invariant unobserved characteristics at the state level, as well as the trend of homelessness across time to control for economic and housing crisis that occurred between 2008 and 2013. I describe all variables in Table 4-3.
Table 4-3. Data Description

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome Variable</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chronic Homelessness per 100,000 population</td>
<td>Homelessness individuals who continuously experienced homelessness for more than one year.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key Independent Variable</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction (Intergovernmental Alignment = FPxSIC)</td>
<td>County governments located within a state that have a state interagency council on homelessness after the federal homelessness plan started (1 if yes and 0 if otherwise)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Plan (FP)</td>
<td>Time variable of county governments after federal homelessness plan was created (1 if year and 0 if otherwise)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Interagency Council (SIC)</td>
<td>Location variable of county governments located within a state that has a state interagency council (1 if year and 0 if otherwise)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Covariate Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Intergovernmental Homelessness Grant per 100,000 (Grant) ($)</td>
<td>Total amount of federal homelessness grants in a year for a county</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Plan (SP)</td>
<td>County governments located within a state that have a state plan on homelessness (1 if yes and 0 if otherwise)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County Plan (CP)</td>
<td>County governments that have their own plan on homelessness (1 if yes and 0 if otherwise)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>Total county population in a year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Income ($)</td>
<td>Median household income in a year and a county</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment (%)</td>
<td>Percentage of the unemployed population in a year and a county</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty (%)</td>
<td>Percentage of the population in a year and a county who live at or below the poverty level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority (%)</td>
<td>Percentage of the non-white population in a year and a county</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Rent</td>
<td>Median gross rent in a year and a county</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Method.** This chapter uses a panel data analysis with state and year fixed effects for determining the effect of intergovernmental alignment on program outcomes. As
county governments can be separated by two groups based on the decision of state
governments to create SICs, the empirical strategy of this chapter is to assess the impact
of intergovernmental alignment on the program outcomes at the local (county) level by
comparing outcome changes between counties influenced by the intergovernmental
alignment and counties that are not strategically aligned.

Since my empirical model compares outcome changes between two groups, I
need to assess the common trend between two groups in order to improve the accuracy of
program impacts. The common trend assumption implies that two groups would follow
the same time trend in the absence of program intervention (i.e., Opening Doors), which
can be tested by joint equivalence of 2008 and 2009 (H0: common trend assumption). I
used a Stata command, “DQD,” and the test result (p-value: 0.18) indicates that I cannot
reject the null hypothesis, which means that the two groups follow the same trend in the
absence of the Opening Doors. The finding of this test bolsters the argument that different
outcomes between two groups after Opening Doors can be explained by
intergovernmental alignment. I additionally examined any socioeconomic and housing
characteristics between the two groups that dramatically changed between pre-Opening
Doors and post-Opening Doors. If so, this would suggest that changes in outcomes might
be due to these characteristics, not intergovernmental alignment. In order to prevent other
possible explanations of findings in this empirical model, the differences in covariates
between two groups must be constant over time. Table 4-4 shows that changes in the
covariate variables between treatment and comparison groups are constant over the pre-
and post-periods. This result strengthens the findings of this chapter.
Table 4-4. County Socioeconomic and Housing Characteristics Summary Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Treatment</td>
<td>Comparison</td>
<td>Differences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (number)</td>
<td>549,205.8</td>
<td>589,093.4</td>
<td>44,080.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(431,898.9)</td>
<td>(532,051.2)</td>
<td>(108,410.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Income ($)</td>
<td>52,952.13</td>
<td>53,627.33</td>
<td>16,915.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(13,114.95)</td>
<td>(13,793.38)</td>
<td>(1,368.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority (%)</td>
<td>21.93</td>
<td>23.06</td>
<td>-1.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(13.75)</td>
<td>(13.54)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment (%)</td>
<td>7.67</td>
<td>8.31</td>
<td>-0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.65)</td>
<td>(1.97)</td>
<td>(0.68)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty (%)</td>
<td>13.40</td>
<td>15.01</td>
<td>-1.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5.21)</td>
<td>(5.41)</td>
<td>(0.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vacancy (%)</td>
<td>2.73</td>
<td>2.31</td>
<td>-0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.43)</td>
<td>(1.23)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to checking the conditions of two groups to explain the impacts of intergovernmental alignment, I additionally attempt to approach a more conservative way to eliminate other possible explanations in the model. For example, the change in outcomes of the two groups may be due to the scope and amount of intergovernmental grant dollars instead of intergovernmental alignment. Further, there could be state and county governments that have developed their own strategic plans on homelessness, but which are not directly aligned with the federal plan or the SICs. Their own strategic plans could prohibit the association between independent and outcome variables. So I added these variables that capture intergovernmental grants and both state and county governments’ strategic plans on homelessness into this model. Lastly, I included state and year dummies in order to control state specific unobserved characteristics as well as net of time trend. The final regression model is as follows:
\[ \text{Outcome} = B_0 + B_1 \text{FP} + B_2 \text{SIC} + B_3 \text{Interaction (FPxSIC)} + B_4 \text{SP} + B_5 \text{CP} + B_6 \text{Grant} + X\beta + \rho + \tau + \varepsilon \]

‘Outcome’ is the average number of chronic homeless individuals per 100,000 at the county level. ‘FP’ is a dummy variable in which 1 indicates the post-period and 0 indicates the pre-period. ‘SIC’ is a dummy variable in which 1 indicates that a state interagency council was present and 0 indicates that state interagency council was not present. ‘FPxSIC’ is an interaction effect, in which 1 indicates the impact of intergovernmental alignment in the post-treatment period and 0 indicates otherwise. ‘SP’ is a dummy variable in which 1 indicates that a state has its own strategic plan on homelessness and 0 indicates otherwise. ‘CP’ is a dummy variable in which 1 indicates that a county has own strategic plan on homelessness and 0 indicates otherwise. ‘X’ indicates a vector of the county socioeconomic and housing characteristics, such as population, median household income, minority rate, unemployment rate, poverty rate, and vacancy rate. ‘\(\rho\)’ indicates a state dummy. ‘\(\tau\)’ indicates a year dummy. ‘\(\varepsilon\)’ indicates the error terms. From this equation, an empirical strategy of this model is to calculate and assess the significance level of \(B_3\), as well as its direction and size.

Findings

The empirical result indicates the average number of chronic homelessness in each group. The basic result is listed in Table 4-5.
Table 4-5. Differences between Two Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-State Interagency Council</td>
<td>42.16</td>
<td>53.43</td>
<td>-11.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Interagency Council</td>
<td>35.19</td>
<td>30.53</td>
<td>4.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>6.96</td>
<td>22.90</td>
<td>-15.94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The county governments under the intergovernmentally aligned system follow a downward trend in the incidence of homelessness between before (35.19) and after (30.53) Opening Doors. On the other hand, the other group (i.e., county governments without intergovernmental alignment) shows an upward trend in the number of homeless. These numbers are average chronic homelessness per 100,000 county population. The average changes in chronic homelessness in treatment group is 4.66. This number indicates that county governments within a state with a state interagency council have on average 4.66 fewer chronic homeless individuals after the Opening Doors. The average changes in chronic homelessness in county governments that do not have SICs have on average 11.26 more chronic homelessness after the Opening Doors. This change indicates the common trend of chronic homelessness between 2008 and 2013 in the absence of the Opening Doors. After controlling for this secular trend, the county governments aligned strategically and intergovernmentally have nearly 16 fewer chronic homeless individuals per 100,000 population than county governments without intergovernmental alignment. This indicates that county governments that are intergovernmentally aligned received the greater program effects. Table 4-6 shows a list of panel regression models that include a basic model (model 1), a model with covariates (model 2), a model with covariates and...
state/year dummies (model 3), and a model with covariates, state/year dummies, local governmental efforts and intergovernmental grants (model 4).

Table 4-6. Regression results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chronic Homelessness Per Capita 100,000</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interaction (FPxSIC)</td>
<td>-15.94***</td>
<td>-13.76***</td>
<td>-8.16**</td>
<td>-6.77*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.86)</td>
<td>(3.838)</td>
<td>(3.83)</td>
<td>(3.90)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FP (1 = Post-FP, 0 = Pre-FP)</td>
<td>11.26</td>
<td>4.92</td>
<td>4.41</td>
<td>3.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.72)</td>
<td>(4.15)</td>
<td>(4.71)</td>
<td>(4.97)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIC (1 = SIC, 0 = No SIC)</td>
<td>-6.96</td>
<td>-8.64</td>
<td>13.35</td>
<td>13.96**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(7.23)</td>
<td>(4.89)</td>
<td>(5.50)</td>
<td>(5.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP (1 = SP, 0 = No SP)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-2.39*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(3.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP (1 = CP, 0 = No CP)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(11.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grant</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.13***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County Covariates</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County Numbers</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Observations</td>
<td>1,191</td>
<td>1,191</td>
<td>1,191</td>
<td>1,186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Robust standardized errors are in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. Two-tailed test.

Model 1 shows that vertical intergovernmental alignment provides a meaningful association with chronic homelessness (p-value: 0.001). Model 2 shows that this impact is still highly significant (p-value: 0.005) when I controlled county-specific socioeconomic and housing characteristics. Both model 3 and 4 support the positive impact of intergovernmental alignment on the federal program outcome at the local
(county) level as I controlled state-specific time invariant characteristics and the net of the time trend, as well as non-intergovernmental efforts (state and county governments’ own plans for homelessness) or intergovernmental grants come from federal government with state and year fixed effects.

Adding a series of covariate variables bolsters the robustness of the empirical findings, as empirical strategies used in this chapter were intended to reduce other possible explanations that may affect the association between the key independent variable and outcome variable of this model; the findings must be interpreted with caution as I was unable to control county level, time invariant, unobserved differences between the two groups due to data limitations. However, the empirical evidence supports the argument that the federal homelessness program provides greater program effects on county level chronic homelessness when both federal and state governments are aligned intergovernmentally. As a result, I answered the research question that a federal homelessness program leads to effective program outcomes at the local (county) level when vertical intergovernmental alignment is present.

**Discussion**

In this chapter, I examined a federal homelessness program that highlights intergovernmental efforts to align programs objectives and strategies across governmental boundaries. In order to empirically test its effectiveness, I used chronic homelessness individuals in a county as the outcome variable. I employed a series of panel regression analyses to estimate the average difference in chronic homelessness numbers in order to examine the impact of vertical intergovernmental alignment. Based
on these findings, I conclude that intergovernmental alignment leads to greater program
effects in the federal homelessness program at the local (county) level.

In the American governmental system, centralized policy coordination at the
federal level is an important factor for achieving meaningful national level results
(Bakvis & Brown, 2010). Financial incentives or legal regulations are used traditionally
as intergovernmental instruments to exert the federal government’s will to state and local
governments (Caruson & MacManus, 2006). However, unlike other federal social
programs, this homelessness program does not have either financial incentives or legal
regulations to promote intergovernmental cooperation across different levels of
governments. Thus, state and local governments may have less desire to follow federal
programs that do not have any financial incentives or mandates. However, I found that
program outcomes (i.e., the number of chronically homeless individuals) are greater in
the existence of intergovernmental alignment than those outcomes without
intergovernmental alignment. This finding supports the argument that state governments
have made strategic decisions to align with the federal government in terms of adopting
objectives and strategies of the federal program in order to solve wicked problems that
cannot be solved by single governments.

I argue that two contributions have been made by this study. First, I was able to
expand the concept of intergovernmental alignment as one effective intergovernmental
mechanism to implement national level policy at the local (county) level. In an era of
multi-governmental arrangements and devolution federalism wherein local governments
have become major interests of research, intergovernmental strategic alignment can be
useful to study. Vertical arrangements in the intergovernmental system are present in the
real world and play important roles in the management of inter-local activities. The findings complement past research on the vertical intergovernmental system and the implications of intergovernmental relations on local governments. Second, I attempted to bolster my findings by adding a series of covariates, including socioeconomic characteristics, housing characteristics, other governmental efforts, grant dollars, and even state and year characteristics, in order to clearly understand the positive association between intergovernmental alignment and federal program effectiveness. Thus, the empirical strategy was to account for as many possible alternative explanations of my findings as possible, given the complexity of the homelessness issue. Following this strategy, I was able to provide relatively accurate associations between independent and outcome variables, although findings must be interpreted with caution due to the limitation of the dataset and the nature of correlational study.

Beside these two contributions of findings, I hope that this research extends the research conversation to include strategic activities inside the U.S. intergovernmental system. In this study, research interests of this study were focused particularly on intergovernmental relations and its impact on federal program effectiveness. However, I was unable to view the roles of managerial activities, such as collaborative leadership or individual behavioral activities inside intergovernmental alignment. It will be more robust to understand the big picture of the effect of multi-governmental arrangements on public policy or program outcomes when future research combines both structural and managerial impacts.

Conclusion
Homelessness is a serious problem that is difficult to end in the U.S. There have been several federal policy efforts to deal with homelessness, such as by providing housing properties. This strategic planning program is the first-ever comprehensive homelessness program developed by the federal government to provide not just housing properties, but also economic, social, and health services to homelessness persons. Additionally, this program is an outcome-driven program that highlights intergovernmental, collaborative partnerships across boundaries. The empirical evidence of this study supports that this federal program is effective to reduce chronic homelessness at the local (county) level when the county governments are located within a state that is strategically aligned with the federal partnership—USICH—that leads this program.

The American intergovernmental system can be leveraged as an effective tool for achieving program outcomes that cannot be achieved by single governments. In public administration research, I typically accept that the vertical intergovernmental system is based primarily in either financial incentives or legal mandates from federal to state and/or local governments. However, I found that in the absence of grants and mandates, the vertical intergovernmental system still provides effective outcomes when the levels of government are strategically aligned. Making such a strategic decision to coordinate program implementation collaboratively across boundaries to achieve intergovernmental goals appears to be beneficial for program outcomes.
Chapter 5: Is Need Enough?

Allocating Intergovernmental Resources to Local Homelessness Agencies

In the American government system, many policies are now implemented by multiple actors because the complicated nature of social wicked problems are not easy to solve by single organizations (O’Toole, 1997). These multi-organizational arrangements often play an important role in implementing programs in order to strategically deal with such wicked problems (Agranoff & McGuire, 1998a; O’Toole, 1988; O’Toole, 2000; O’Toole & Meier, 1999; Provan & Milward, 1995). Within these multi-organizational arrangements, local governments and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have become the major actors and the key service deliverers/program implementers, which has allowed them to successfully implement public policies and programs aimed at completing national objectives at the local level. Thus, service delivery mechanisms and program implementation processes are mostly focused on the roles of local organizations.

In order to understand local program effectiveness, previous research has focused on how to establish effective service delivery mechanisms with a particular focus on local organizations (Hjern & Hull, 1982; deLeon & deLeon, 2002). That is, the majority of the past empirical research on this subject has studied the management practices necessary to facilitate multi-organizational arrangements at the local level (for example, Agranoff & McGuire, 1998a; Feiock, Steinacker, & Park, 2009; Feiock, Lee, & Park, 2012; McGuire & Silvia, 2009).

Although past research has made significant and meaningful contributions with regard to understanding effective management practices, relatively little is known about
how to set effective and stable structures in order to manage local public program implementation. More specifically, studies of intergovernmental financial support for specific, local public program processes is relatively scant, although some researchers have developed empirical evidence to understand the funding distribution between the federal government and local (state) governments based on the characteristics of state or local governments, not the characteristics of local programs (for example, Collins & Gerber, 2006; Collins, Andrew, & Khunwishit, 2016; Hall, 2008a; Hall, 2008b; Nicholson-Crotty, 2004; Nicholson-Crotty & Nicholson-Crotty, 2015).

Local organizations within the American intergovernmental system have become increasingly important as these organizations may have greater knowledge and information about the target programs and populations than other levels of the government. Further, local programs managed by multi-organizational arrangements of local actors are more capable of solving wicked problems when issues are heavily embedded in the local level (Agranoff & McGuire, 2004). Thus, local actors and programs are increasingly important, not only for achieving local policy but also for achieving the objectives of national policy (Cho et al., 2005). Based on the perspectives of performance-oriented and outcome-driven government policy, my research interests are somewhat changed from the areas of the policy making process to the areas of policy implementation process in order to effectively achieve policy goals. However, it is difficult to fully understand the implementation processes of local programs without understanding vertical multi-organizational arrangements where they are present. The financial allocation between the federal government and a local program is an important
part of understanding a vertical multi-organizational arrangement in the local program implementation process.

This chapter focuses on the distribution of federal grants on local homelessness program implementation process. This intergovernmental mechanism is important when federal governments are key decision makers with regard to allowing administrative and financial authorities to develop local public programs targeted to a population(s) at the local level. Given this intergovernmental relationship between federal governments and local actors, research must explore how to secure financial resources from the federal government in order to effectively implement social services and public policies at the local level. Some researchers have studied the states’ political and administrative influences in terms of the determinants of financial awards on federal grant decisions (see, Bickers & Stein, 1996; Goerdel, 2013; Nicholson, 2012; Nicholson-Crotty & Nicholson-Crotty, 2015; Stein & Bickers 1994). However, these empirical studies have focused on the intergovernmental relationships between the federal and state levels. Further, the existing literatures focusing on local governmental capacity and the need to understand the determinants of federal grants in American intergovernmental system, provide imprecise ways of measuring local capacity and need that may not be suited to use this chapter (see, Collins & Gerber, 2006; Collins, Andrew, & Khunwishit, 2016; Hall, 2008a; Terman & Feiock, 2015a; Terman & Feiock, 2015b).

The major contribution of this chapter is to expand current research on the determinants of federal grants to understand federal and local relationships based on more precise ways of measuring local need, ability, and capacity. More specifically, this chapter examines federal grants, which, hypothetically at least, are distributed according
to a local program’s characteristics, such as problem severity (i.e., local need) or program capacity and ability.

These curiosities are based on the fact that the availability of financial resources can be a central reason to form and maintain multi-organizational arrangements, as well as a key explanation for understanding the intergovernmental aspect inside the arrangements. Stable and plentiful financial resources can also be a central factor in order to effectively achieve program outcomes at the local level. However, when studying local program implementation of intergovernmental programs, one must ask why one recipient is flush with resources, while another is not. Is it based on need, capacity, or ability? Or is it based on something else? What are the effects for local programs that receive stable financial resources from the federal government? To answer these questions, this chapter will answer two major research questions to investigate the determinants of federal grants in an intergovernmental program area (i.e., homelessness). Two research questions are as follow:

- **What are the determinants of federal grants in regard to local, homelessness programs?**

- **Do financial awards go to local, homelessness programs based on problem severity, past performance, program composition, or something else?**

In order to answer these questions, I study a local homelessness program, called Continuum of Care (CoC), which is a comprehensive, homelessness-related local
program designated by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). As briefly explained in the previous chapter, a CoC is composed of a multi-organizational that includes state and local governments, nonprofit organizations, homelessness advocates, faith-based organizations, health and academic organizations, businesses, housing developers, and actual or previous homeless individuals. Its major role is to manage various types of homeless-related programs at the local level.

The CoC is a valid program through which to study the determinants of federal grant allocations to local programs. First, the CoC designed the application process for submitting proposals through federal grant competitions. Second, the CoC receives financial support from HUD in order to implement various homelessness-related local programs and to achieve both the national and local level policy objectives of ending homelessness. Third, the CoC is built as a multi-organizational arrangement that include governments and NGOs to alleviate homelessness and solve this wicked problem. Overall, the CoC is a core, local planning body that is being used to initiate homelessness program implementation in the U.S. Using the CoC local homelessness programs as a case study, this chapter aims to explore what types of program are more likely to receive federal grants.

In following sections, I discuss the mechanisms used by federal grants for local programs and introduce research hypotheses that draw from previous literature on intergovernmental grants. Then, I introduce the local homelessness programs used in this study and their funding mechanisms as they are related to the federal agency (i.e., HUD) and local programs (i.e., CoCs). After that, I introduce the dataset and method as well as
the empirical findings. Finally, the discussion and conclusion includes practical implications and the limitations of the research.

**Federal Grants and Local Homelessness Programs**

**Federal Grants.** Some older research into the federal grant distribution system focused on both the supply- and demand-side features between the flows of federal grants (see Stein, 1981). The supply-side focused on the roles of legislators and their political interests in order to explain the flow of federal grants into their district. In this type of research, federal grants were viewed by some as pork barrel projects, and a basic assumption of these studies was that local actors who receive the grants are stable and inactive; however, legislators who authorize the grants have the power and authority to manipulate the distribution of federal grants based on their political preference, either before or after an election period. However, previous research that adopted this approach lacked consistent findings. Stein and Bickers (1994 and 1996) pointed out that legislators are more likely to assert their political influence in order to create financial benefits for their election districts, especially prior to a political election when they are vulnerable to losing. However, the impacts of legislators’ wills on the distribution of federal grants are limited to single, specific, financial programs, called small business loans. In a recent study, the political influence of legislators (i.e., the supply-side) has a meaningful impact only on federal grants when the programs have universal benefits over district, non-specific benefits (Goerdel, 2013).

On the other hand, the distribution of federal grants can also be explained by the demand-side of federal grants. This approach employs a bottom-up explanation to
consider local actors and their activities with regard to securing stable financial resources coming from federal or state governments. In particular, various local characteristics, such as local needs and capacities, have been considered, in past research, as key indicators for receiving federal financial support in order to achieve both local and national goals. Local governments are thus major components of American federalism (Cho et al., 2005; Cho & Wright, 2007).

Further, Rich (1989) supported the argument that local governments meaningfully influence the determinants of federal grants. Thus, local demands and needs are key indicators of the allocation of federal grants (Rich, 1989). As such, assessing the demand-side of federal grants means considering whether local capacity is sufficient to employ the needed financial resources and whether local needs can be resolved with financial support from the federal government. As the federal governments expect local governments to resolve social issues when allocating flow of federal grants, the capacity of local actors to provide effective services using federal grants can be another indicator used to predict the determinants of federal grants. In previous research, local capacity is measured by the total number of government employees at the local level (Collins & Gerber, 2006; Collins, Andrew, & Khunwishit, 2016; Hall, 2008a; Terman & Feiock, 2015a; Terman & Feiock, 2015b). In terms of federal-local relationships, Hall (2008a) found that more often than not, local governments with greater capacity are more likely to receive federal grants than those local governments with less capacity. However, Collins, Andrew, and Khunwishit (2016) found that local capacity is not a significant indicator of receiving community development block grants. In regard to state and local
governmental relationships, Collins and Gerber (2006) found that a positive relationship exists between local governmental capacity and the distribution of federal grants.

In addition to using the number of governmental officials to predict the distribution of federal grants, the local governmental structure is also considered to be a possible capacity measurement in federal grant research. Bickers and Stein (2004) pointed out that “inter-local cooperation and governmental structures (i.e., fragmentation) within metropolitan areas matter in the distribution of federal assistance” (p. 817). Their finding supports the argument that federal government agencies, which can decide the actual local actors or programs to receive federal financial support, consider the type and character of a multi-organizational arrangement to deliver programs and services at the local level. So, federal governments often must consider the multi-organizational arrangements, including their structures and composition, to understand the flow of federal grants.

Besides local capacity, local need has been considered an important factor in previous research on federal grant distributions. To assess the local need, previous research frequently used the economic vulnerability of the local area as an explanation for allocating federal financial resources to local government (Collins & Gerber, 2006; Collins, Andrew, & Khunwishit, 2016; Rich, 1989). Rich (1989) found that the flow of federal grants was dependent upon local governmental need, as measured by median family income and unemployment rate. However, Collins and his colleagues (2016) found that the distribution of federal grants is negatively affected to local need, measured as the size of the low income population, which is inconsistent with their hypothesis (Collins, Andrew, & Khunwishit, 2016). Thus, local need, measured by the economic
characteristics of the local population, may not significantly affect the determinants of federal grant allocations. Although previous research hypothesized a positive relationship between these two, it is possible to understand this unexpected finding. Local governments are willing to receive stable federal financial resources when they implement policies and programs. At the same time, the federal government may consider the levels of success of local policies and programs that previously were supported by financial resources. However, local governments with the neediest area in terms of economic conditions are likely to have the least governmental capacity to capture grants (Collins & Gerber, 2006). As a result, there is inconsistent empirical evidence to understand the relationship between local governmental need and the distribution of federal grants when researchers examined the economic conditions of the local population as the indicator of local need.

Overall, previous research on the determinants of federal grants has focused on the supply-side (i.e., political preference of legislators) and demand-side (i.e., local governmental capacity and need) of grant distributions. In the American federal system, research should determine definitely how intergovernmental grant allocation operates between the federal government and local governments and non-governmental organizations. Thus, understanding both capacity and need is essential to better understand the distribution of federal grants, particularly in regard to assessing why some local programs have flourished in regard to receiving federal grants, while others have not.

The extent and scope of local capacity may affect the federal government’s decision-making processes as it determines which locality may have a better chance of
achieving policy goals and producing effective program outcomes using their financial resources. Local need is also an important indicator of the areas that need assistance from the federal government. In addition to the two indicators, local ability, which has not been considered empirically by previous research, may be another important factor considered by the federal government with regard to deciding which local programs or governments should receive financial support. If the federal government considers performance-oriented, outcome-driven intergovernmental mechanisms, local ability can be one of the most important factors for a federal agency to decide whether or not to provide federal funds. In this chapter, I consider local capacity and ability to be different constructs. Whereas local capacity captures the size and scope of local programs or governments so that federal agency is able to look at the structures of local entity, local ability captures past performance using federal grants so that the federal agency considers effective outcomes when they decide to distribute money to certain local areas.

In this chapter, I attempt to provide more detailed measurements of three major, local program characteristics (i.e., need, capacity, and ability) in order to understand the determinants of federal grant allocation in homelessness programs as previous research has measured both capacity and need in a way that may not directly capture what we intend to measure. First, local capacity was measured by total number of governmental officials within a local region (for example, Collins & Gerber, 2006; Collins, Andrew, & Khunwishit, 2016; Hall, 2008a; Terman & Feiock, 2015a; Terman & Feiock, 2015b). However, not all governmental employees will work in certain local program areas that receive federal grants. Additionally, the federal government that provides financial support may consider local capacity to measure the ability to get work done. Thus, it may
be better to use factors that directly capture the local capacity for specific programs that received federal grants, rather than the crude measure of total governmental employees. Second, local need also needs to be re-operationalized. For example, local need was measured using socioeconomic characteristics of geographic regions, including population size, unemployment rate, poverty rate, and median household income (Collins & Gerber, 2006; Collins, Andrew, & Khunshit, 2016; Rich, 1989). It is unclear whether those socioeconomic, regional characteristics actually capture all local need to receive federal grants.

As such, one may need to find a more direct and appropriate approach to capturing both local capacity and need, as well as local ability to specifically link intergovernmental grant programs with local governments. As this chapter specifically examines local homelessness programs to understand the determinants of federal grant allocations, I examine local capacity, need, and ability based on the local homelessness programs’ characteristics, which provide more direct measurements than can be found in previous research. The intent of the research reported in this chapter is to gauge the effects of local capacity, need, and ability on the distribution of federal grants in local homelessness programs, using precise, direct measurements to capture these factors. That is, I use problem severity, which captures local need, using the homelessness population per capita at the local level. I also use past performance, which captures local ability, using the number of total beds provided by local programs supported by federal grants. Finally, I use program composition, which captures local capacity, using both the scope and size of the projects and the participants involved in programs at the local level.
Although this chapter focuses on the allocations of federal grants based on local programs’ characteristics, political characteristics should be considered in the empirical model for the reason that the mechanisms of intergovernmental grant systems cannot be fully explained without political characteristics (see, Carley, Nicholson-Crotty, & Fisher, 2015; Nicholson-Crotty, 2012; Nicholson-Crotty & Nicholson-Crotty, 2015). According to Nicholson-Crotty’s recent work with his colleagues, the mechanisms of the intergovernmental grant system is related to political partisans of state governments and electoral periods, even the perspectives of recipient governments. Thus, political characteristics could affect the allocation of intergovernmental grant competition process between federal and local relationships. Democratic alignment between federal and state governments is used to control any variation. Further, I also include various indicators that control for political and socioeconomic characteristics that previous research used as determinants of federal grant allocation. Thus, the hypotheses tested in this chapter are as follows:

- **H1. The distribution of federal homelessness grants is positively associated with local problem severity (i.e., need: homelessness population in the previous year).**

- **H2. The distribution of federal homelessness grants is positively associated with local past performance (i.e., ability: total beds in the previous year).**
• H3. The distribution of federal homelessness grants is positively associated with local program components (i.e., capacity: program numbers, types, and total participants).

Local Homelessness Programs. Continuum of Care Programs. In this chapter, the local program examined to understand the distribution of federal grants is called Continuum of Care (CoC). The CoC is a community-wide governance structure that aims to develop and manage various types of homeless related service programs within a designated geographic area. The CoC is composed of the multi-organizational arrangements that include various types of organizations and governments. To understand its characteristics and roles to deal with homelessness issue, the CoC was first aimed at coordinating federal homelessness assistance grants provided by HUD at the local level. After that, the CoC became a major local, coordinating community-wide planning body when HUD consolidated three other major homelessness grant programs into the CoC under the HEARTH Act in 2009. Based on its various roles to deal with homelessness issue at the local level, HUD states that the roles of a CoC are to “promote a community-wide commitment to the goal of ending homelessness, provide funding for efforts for rapidly re-housing homeless individuals and families, and promote access to and effective use of mainstream programs” (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2012, p. 3). Overall, the roles of the CoC are not limited to the development of housing properties for homelessness but also extend to the development of homelessness management information systems for other levels of governments to access homeless related information.
The composition of the CoC governance structure includes a leading agency and board members from the fields of the government, nonprofit organizations, faith-based organizations, housing providing organizations, homelessness advocates, hospitals, universities, and homeless or formerly homeless individuals. COCs have regular meetings and frequent interaction in order to end homelessness at the local level. The two major responsibilities of CoC are: “1) to develop a long-term strategic planning process to end homelessness at the local-level and 2) to prepare for funding applications of federal competitive homeless grants” (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2009, p. 4). As the CoC consists of a local governance structure, the strategic planning process includes those governance structures that maintain effective coordinated systems in order to provide appropriate and prompt social services to target homelessness. In addition, the CoC also establishes monitoring systems to effectively evaluate outcomes of service providers who received federal grants through the application process. Overall, the CoC is the local homelessness governance structure that aims to end the homeless population in its designated geographic region using federal grant dollars to implement and manage local interorganizational structures.

In 2015, 406 CoCs were located across the U.S. They provide various homelessness services funded by the HUD at a designated geographic region that can be either an urban or rural region. More specifically, two types of CoC regions exist. In one type, a municipality and its county are designated a CoC region. In this case, the CoC specifically covers either the city or county area, which is typically in an urban area where a relatively large homeless population resides. The boundaries of this region match the geographic boundaries of either the city or county. The second type of region consists
of either a large area or an entire state. This type is generally found in rural areas as the homeless population is smaller and more diffuse than in the first type. This region may cover more than one county within a state, several countries in multiple states, or an entire state. Thus, a regional or statewide type of CoC is more likely to determine a consensus within the governing board of the CoC to effectively reduce administrative costs due to less homelessness needs (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2009).

In addition, CoCs are not permanent and may merge or disappear when no longer needed. They may be merged with other adjacent CoCs when HUD or multiple CoCs determine it is better to merge with each other to save administrative costs. Further, some CoCs may not be “players” in the intergovernmental system as they do not receive financial grants by HUD. For example, a number of rural CoCs in Arkansas merged into a single CoC because of administrative efficiency reasons in 2011.

**Funding Mechanisms.** Among the various roles undertaken by CoCs, one of the most important may be the application process completed in order to receive financial support from the federal government. Federal competitive grants (i.e., CoC awards) from intergovernmental funding mechanisms are one of the most crucial factors to successfully implementing various homelessness projects. According to HUD, “a major function of the CoC is to prepare and oversee the development and submission of an annual application for CoC program funds” (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2012, p. 8). These grants are annually provided by HUD under the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act. In order to develop a competitive
application, the CoC must “coordinate a diverse group of stakeholders and manage a number of complicated processes, including assessing need for housing services, assessing the size and scope of the problem, and assessing performance in meeting community and national goals” (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2009, p. 66). This statement implies that the application for these grants requires collaborative efforts between the service providers (i.e., recipients), including nonprofit organizations, states, local governmental units, and instrumentalities of the state or local governments, in order to align their programs and participants.

Due to the nature of federal grants decided by the HUD, the role of the CoCs as a leading body to develop and manage the application process becomes more important than ever since homelessness is a serious local social issue. Thus, the application must be based in the number of homeless reached or if the CoC exceeds the cut-off point that HUD has set in order to receive federal grants. HUD’s review standards include program components, problem severity, and past performance (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2009), although these three indicators are not the only factors they consider. HUD reviews all of the competitive applications provided by the CoCs by the end of the fiscal year and announces the recipients early the following fiscal year. In order to test the research hypotheses, the analytical framework of this chapter focuses on whether federal grants are truly based on program composition, problem severity, and past performance as noted in the application package.

Data and Method

Data. In order to understand the determinants used to award federal grants, I developed a panel dataset containing 208 counties within the United States. The data for
the analyses was acquired between 2005 and 2014. The characteristics of dataset are based on the CoCs that manage homelessness projects at the local level under the HUD. This means that the data I collected explain the determinants of federal grant allocations to local programs. All data sources regarding the CoC characteristics are derived from HUD’s Census dataset. In order to take into consideration the socioeconomic characteristics related to homelessness, the unit of analysis in this chapter is the county level, which allow me to control for such characteristics derived from the U.S. Census dataset. As a result, the total observations from 208 counties over the 10 year period were 1,846 (this number takes into consideration the observations that had to be removed due to missing variables).

The counties used in this study were spread across 32 states. Of these states, California contained the most countries (n = 30) and five states only had one county in the study (i.e., Alabama, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, and Vermont). The county with the largest population was Los Angeles County in California with an average population of nearly 10 million persons. The county with the smallest population was Garrett County in Maryland, with an average population of approximately 30,000. Although our sample size was smaller than the total number of counties in the U.S., the distribution was across four regional areas. For example, 46 counties were located in the West Region that includes Arizona, Idaho, Nevada, California, Oregon, and Washington. 51 counties were located in the Midwest Region, which includes Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, and Missouri. 57 counties were located in the South Region that includes Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, Virginia, Alabama, Kentucky, Tennessee, Oklahoma, and Texas. Lastly, 54 counties were located
in the Northeast Region, which includes Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Vermont. Overall, I argue that the distribution and characteristics of the sample counties in this study are valid and appropriate with regard to providing meaningful results. A brief explanation of the county distribution is shown in Table 5-1.

Table 5-1. Distribution of Counties by States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>County Numbers</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>County Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Nevada</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>New Hampshire</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idaho</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Oklahoma</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansas</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Vermont</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Measurement. Outcome Variables.** The main outcome variable for this study is the total dollars received from HUD for each CoC. Further, I also separate the federal grants into total dollars received for new projects and total dollars received for renewal projects in order to examine if there is any variation of federal grant allocations between different purposes of homelessness-related projects. As explained earlier, the HUD review standard is based on the point system. And HUD decides to allow the federal grants for new projects only for those CoCs that receive relatively higher points than other CoCs that may be seeking federal grants for renewal projects. All of the outcome
variables were standardized by county population in order to directly compare their coefficients, regardless of county size.

**Independent Variables.** The independent variables used in this study attempt to measure three determinants of the CoC awards. First, I hypothesize that past performance is positively related to the size of federal grants received in the current year. Second, I assume that counties that possess well-structured and diverse programs are more likely to receive larger federal grants than other counties. Finally, I hypothesize that counties with serious problems with regard to the homelessness population are more likely to receive higher federal grants than other counties. Thus, the five key independent variables are intended to capture the three key indicators discussed in previous research: 1) problem severity, 2) program capacity, and 3) program ability. The five variables are 1) total beds provided by the CoC (i.e., program ability); 2) total projects operated by the CoC (i.e., program capacity); 3) project diversity (i.e., program capacity); 4) total service providers participating in the CoC (i.e., program capacity), and 5) total homelessness counted in the CoC (i.e., problem severity). In addition, I standardized all of the independent variables in order to directly compare their impacts.

**Control Variables.** In order to control for possible associations that may cause biased estimators of the results of the model, I include several control variables. First, I use a dummy variable to measure the existence of the county government’s efforts to deal with homelessness issue at the county level on homelessness in order to control for the logic that the distribution of federal grants is based on governmental will, instead of the
three primary indicators. Second, the distribution of the federal grants may be affected by political preferences. As the nature of the CoC awards is rooted in the intergovernmental relationships between the federal government (i.e., HUD) and local programs (i.e., CoC), HUD may prefer CoCs located in the county areas based on political, rather than administrative, alignment. This assumption is plausible as the Obama Administration attempted to re-structure the homelessness-related federal agency (i.e., USICH), and HUD also re-structured its homelessness programs in 2009 when Congress passed the HEARTH Act. Thus, I created a dummy variable to measure the interaction between the President and governors when both are from the Democratic Party. Third, a lagged dependent variable is used to capture any historical relationships under the grant distribution mechanisms that cannot be captured in the model. Fourth, I use various types of socioeconomic characteristics at the county level, such as unemployment rate, poverty rate, minority rate, and median household income, in order to control for county-specific characteristics that may affect homelessness. Finally, county and year dummies were used to control for time-invariant observed and unobserved county-specific characteristics that cannot be captured in the model, as well as for the net of time trends of homelessness-related characteristics of federal grants. Variables other than the dummy or ratio variables were standardized by county population or standard score (i.e., z-score) in order to control for county or program size. The data description and summary statistics are reported in Table 5-2 and Table 5-3.
Table 5-2. Data Description

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome Variable</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Federal Grants per capita</td>
<td>Total federal grants that local CoC program received from HUD’s annual homeless grant competitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem Severity:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Homelessness per capita</td>
<td>Total homeless people who observed on the street or the designated area when HUD counts homelessness annually</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program Ability:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Beds per capita</td>
<td>Total beds, including permanent and transitional types, for homeless people developed by CoC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program Capacities:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program Number</td>
<td>Total number of homeless-related service programs operated by CoC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program Diversity</td>
<td>Total number of program types operated by CoC (Total 6 program types: Permanent Supportive Housing; Transitional Housing; Supportive Services; Homelessness Information Management System; Safe Haven; Planning Project)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Providers</td>
<td>Total number of service providing organization in a CoC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Plan</td>
<td>Existence of local strategic plan on homelessness (1 if yes and 0 if otherwise)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Alignment between President and Governors</td>
<td>President and governors from Democratic party (1 if yes and 0 if otherwise)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment (%)</td>
<td>Percentage of the population in a year and county who are unemployed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty (%)</td>
<td>Percentage of the population in a year and a county who live at or below the poverty level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Income ($)</td>
<td>Median county level household income in a year and a county</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority (%)</td>
<td>Percentage of the population in a year and a county who are non-white.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5-3. Summary Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Observation</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Federal Grants per capita</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>2071</td>
<td>5.781</td>
<td>5.166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Homelessness per capita</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>1858</td>
<td>5.687</td>
<td>5.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Beds per capita</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>2027</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program Numbers (standardization)</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>2071</td>
<td>2.04e-09</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program Diversity (ratio)</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>2071</td>
<td>0.680</td>
<td>0.223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Providers (standardization)</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>2071</td>
<td>1.21e-09</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Plan (dummy)</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>2071</td>
<td>0.079</td>
<td>0.270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratically Aligned Fed-State (dummy)</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>2071</td>
<td>0.330</td>
<td>0.470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment (%)</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>2071</td>
<td>7.170</td>
<td>3.197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty (%)</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>2069</td>
<td>13.519</td>
<td>5.222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Income ($)</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>2069</td>
<td>55,932.22</td>
<td>15,106.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority (%)</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>2069</td>
<td>24.028</td>
<td>13.481</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Method.** This chapter employs a panel fixed effect model using Prais-Winsten regression with heteroscedasticity-corrected standard errors for the following reasons. As the unit of analysis is counties that repeatedly appeared in the dataset over the length of the study period, I expect the error terms to be significantly correlated across different time periods (i.e., serial correlation). In addition, I also suspect that county-specific characteristics that cannot be captured by independent and control variables remain in the error term and, as such, increase the risk of having biased estimators. Thus, I correct the county fixed effect model to control for the time-invariant county-specific characteristics that cannot be controlled by the list of control variables used in the model.

This study used several diagnostic tests to test the appropriateness of the empirical model. First, a Hausman test showed that a fixed effect model was preferred over a random effect model (Wooldridge, 2015). This test result enabled us to use a fixed effect model, not only for theoretical reasons (i.e., county-specific characteristics), but also for statistical reasons (i.e., the test result). Second, a Wald test for heteroscedasticity showed that heteroscedasticity was present in the dataset. Thus, the error terms must be robust in
order to prevent heteroscedasticity. Third, I use a joint significance of temporal difference test and the results indicated that the model should include time dummies as the coefficients for all of the years are not equal to zero (Wooldridge, 2010). Finally, the last diagnostic test was used to look for serial correlation that may lead to less efficient estimators as error terms are serially related to one another (Drukker, 2003). The test results indicated that the model should control for such serial correlation. In turn, all of the diagnostic results showed that the error terms had serial correlations and heteroscedasticity, and that both the county and year dummies were used in order to control for time-invariant characteristics as well as for the net of time trends in the final empirical model.

After all diagnostic tests, I used a panel fixed effect analysis using the Prais-Winsten regression with a heteroscedasticity-corrected standard error. A similar approach was used in previous intergovernmental research studies that focused on environmental regulations (Kim, 2008; Kim, 2011), municipal debt financing (Clinger, Feiock, McCabe, & Park, 2008), local capacity for federal grants (Hall, 2008a), and the allocation of federal grants (Goerdel, 2013). However, based on the limited knowledge of previous research, this study is the first study to employ heteroscedasticity-corrected standard errors and the Prais-Winsten regression, which is an appropriate method to control for serial correlation. Overall, I believe that the finalized model is able to control for both heteroscedasticity and serial correlation so as to reduce endogeneity bias.

Findings

Table 5-4 shows the empirical results.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>D V: Total Grant</th>
<th>D V: New Project Grant</th>
<th>D V: Renew Project Grant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prais-Winsten Coefficient</td>
<td>19.90</td>
<td>-21.48**</td>
<td>22.14**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hetero-corrected Standard Error</td>
<td>9.60</td>
<td>6.93</td>
<td>8.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Homelessness Population per capita</td>
<td>107.68***</td>
<td>-52.69*</td>
<td>124.02**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Bed per capita</td>
<td>26.58</td>
<td>20.65</td>
<td>45.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program (Standardization)</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program Diversity (Ratio)</td>
<td>-0.41*</td>
<td>0.62*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Provider (Standardization)</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.58*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Plan (Dummy)</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal-State Democratic Alignment (Dummy)</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment (%)</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty (%)</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Income ($)</td>
<td>207.86</td>
<td>8.38e-06</td>
<td>9.52e-06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority (%)</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County Dummies</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year Dummies</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald chi-square</td>
<td>51,139.76</td>
<td>1,745.20</td>
<td>61,146.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance of chi-square</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1,846</td>
<td>1,846</td>
<td>1,846</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*<0.05, **<0.01, ***<0.001 two-tailed test.
Overall, the empirical evidence partially supports the main argument. First, problem severity (i.e., the homeless population per capita) was not significantly associated with receiving total federal grants (i.e., total CoC awards) (coefficients: 15.90, \( p < 0.098 \)). Although the direction of coefficient is positive, it failed to reject the hypothesis. Thus, this finding does not support hypothesis 1. This means that the federal grants are likely to distribute to local programs regardless of problem severity. Second, program ability is significantly and positively associated with total federal grants (coefficients: 107.68, \( p < 0.000 \)). This result indicates that one more bed per capita in a county (i.e., past performance) has on average $107.68 more in federal grant dollars. Thus, larger federal grants are distributed to local programs that produce better performance on housing properties than other local programs. This finding supports hypothesis 2 that program ability is positively related to the allocation of federal homelessness grants.

Third, the size and scope of programs have positive impacts on receiving federal grants, as described in hypothesis 3. Thus, for one more standard deviation homelessness program in a county, the county is likely to receive $2.08 in additional federal grant money (\( p < 0.000 \)), while diverse projects within a local homelessness program are positively associated with receiving federal grant money (coefficient: 0.66, \( p < 0.000 \)), controlling for other constants. However, it should be noted that program size variable is standardized by z-score and program diversity is a ratio variable so it is unrealistic to compare the magnitudes of these coefficients with other variables. Although these findings are consistent with the hypothesis that program capacity has a positive impact on
federal grants, the size of the group of participants (i.e., service deliverers) within a local homelessness program does not conform to the third hypothesis (coefficient: -0.19, $p < 0.064$). Thus, hypothesis 3 is only partially supported.

In addition to three hypotheses for problem severity, program ability, and program capacity, I found that local homelessness programs of counties that have strategic plans on homelessness are likely to receive more federal grants than those programs that do not have county governments’ strategic plans (coefficient: 0.44, $p < 0.014$). The democratic alignment between President and Governors also had a positive impact on federal grants (coefficient: 0.22, $p < 0.000$).

In order to provide more detailed findings of the allocations of federal grants, the outcome variable (i.e., total federal grants) has been separated by two types of purposes – 1) renewed projects and 2) new projects. Overall, renewal grants had results that were consistent with the results for total federal grants, although problem severity is positively associated with outcome variable (coefficients: 22.14, $p < 0.009$). Program ability (i.e., past performance) is also positively associated with the renewal of project grants (coefficients: 124.02, $p < 0.006$). Thus, the higher the relative homeless population per capita and/or the better a program previously performed, the higher the likelihood that the program would have its grant renewed. Program capacity (i.e., size and scope of a program) has similar results with total federal grant dollars. The size and scope of a program had a positive impact on its likelihood to have its funds renewed (program size – coefficients: 2.66, $p < 0.000$; program diversity – coefficients: 0.62, $p < 0.001$); however, the size of the participating organizations had a negative impact (coefficients: -0.29, $p < 0.010$). Two indicators of other governmental efforts showed positive associations.
New project grant allocations had unexpected findings. First, problem severity was significantly and negatively associated with new project grants (coefficient: -21.48, \( p < 0.002 \)). This result indicates that local programs that have relatively serious problem severity are less likely to receive federal grants for new projects, which is inconsistent with the objective of the CoC grant process. Further, program ability is also negatively associated with federal grants for new projects (coefficients: -52.69, \( p < 0.011 \)). Program capacity (i.e., the size and scope of a program) is also negatively related to federal grants for new projects. In addition, the size of a program participants is not related to federal grants for new projects nor county governments’ strategic plans and the democratic alignment between federal and state governments.

Overall, these findings indicated that local homelessness programs (i.e., CoCs) that had performed well in the past were more likely to receive federal grants than those programs that had not performed well. However, the allocation of federal homelessness grants is not affected by local homelessness characteristics (i.e., counties where relatively larger homelessness population). These results point out that the flow of federal grants increases when program ability is high; however, problem severity does not provide significant association. In addition, local homelessness programs that provided relatively more projects and more diverse projects received more federal grant money than those programs with less projects and less diverse projects. However, the findings indicate that the size of service providers does not provide meaningful impacts on federal grant
decision process, although these findings should be interpreted with caution as different types of federal grants had different results.

**Discussion and Conclusion**

The objective of this chapter was to examine the importance of local program characteristics, such as problem severity (i.e., need), program composition (i.e., capacity), and past performance (i.e., ability), as the determinants of receiving federal grants for local homelessness programs. This study employed panel data analyses in order to examine the characteristics of local homelessness programs as these characteristics are related to receiving competitive federal grants between the needs of suppliers and demanders. In addition, the analytical framework tried to reduce several sources of endogenous bias that could occur at the county level over time and to separate the outcome variables by new projects and renewal projects in order to have robust findings. Based on the nature of the panel dataset, this chapter overcomes the limited implications of cross-sectional data analysis and employs the most appropriate regression models with corrected standard errors in order to reduce any possible endogeneity issues. Controlling for the county and year dummies as well as for county-specific socioeconomic characteristics allowed me to reduce both the county-specific time-invariant unobserved (from county-dummies) and some time-varying observed (from socioeconomic control variables) characteristics and net of time trends (from year-dummies).

Practically, this chapter provides several meaningful implications. First, I attempt to provide precise measurements to understand the ways to capture local need, capacity, and ability in studies of intergovernmental grant distribution process. Although previous
research has contributed to the understanding intergovernmental grant mechanisms, its imprecise measurements of local capacity (i.e., government employee size) and needs (i.e., local economic condition) might not be the appropriate way to capture local capacity and need that intend to measure local program characteristics. As this chapter used direct measurements of those program capacity and ability, as well as problem severity, future research can extend the measurement issues to capture these variables in studies of specific local programs and their intergovernmental grant mechanisms. Second, program ability (i.e., past performance) is an important indicator with regard to predicting the distribution of federal grants. Thus, I note that federal grants are awarded to local homelessness programs based on the abilities of the local programs, which follows the assumptions of a performance-oriented, outcome-driven public management phenomenon. As noted earlier in this chapter, the federal government (i.e., funding supplier) in the intergovernmental relationship considers the ability of the local recipient to achieve federal policy goal at the local level so as to use their financial resources effectively. However, unlike the hypothesis, it appears that the federal government does not consider which local areas have encountered this wicked social problem. As mentioned earlier, one can assume that counties with relatively worse problem severity would expect greater financial support; however, empirical results provide no association between them. Thus, I find that funding mechanisms from the federal government to local programs should be based on performance-oriented perspectives.

This study finds mixed results with regard to local program capacity. Capacity has been treated as important factor to understand intergovernmental grant mechanisms. Carley, Nicholson-Crotty, and Fisher (2015) used actual staff size in state agencies that
receive funds as the measurement of capacity, which is similar with my approach. As far as the important roles of program capacity, I intended to measure program capacity in various ways, such as the size and scope of programs as well as the size of participating organizations in local programs. Although program size and scope were positively related to the size of federal grants, the participants’ sizes had insignificant impacts on the funding mechanisms. I hypothesized that intensive program capacity had a positive impact on the distribution of federal grants; however, it seems that the more organizations (i.e., service deliverers) that participate in a program is not related to the funding mechanisms. One could argue that the number of participants do not matter; however, the important point is to consider the existence of strong “hub” participants that the federal government may perceive can produce effective program outcomes when they receive federal grants. Thus, future research should examine whether powerful single organizations have positive impacts on funding decisions in intergovernmental systems.

In the results, I also found that political factors (i.e., democratic alignment) had positive impacts on the distribution of federal grants. Since the Obama administration has taken a leading role in attempting to end homelessness, more federal grants have been distributed to local areas when politically-aligned with state governments. However, this finding may have limited implication as I was only able to use the political alignment between the federal and state governments, while county governments may have different political structures compared to those of federal and state governments. Like political factors, the existence of local governments’ strategic plans on homelessness had significant impacts on the funding decisions from federal agency. This finding bolsters the argument that the distribution of federal grants is affected by the perspectives of
performance-driven approach so that local governments showed their efforts to address homelessness have relatively better chance to receive financial supports. As this chapter only used a dummy variable to capture governmental efforts, future research will need to further explain the relationship and impacts between local governmental efforts and funding mechanisms in the intergovernmental system.

Interestingly, empirical findings have somewhat unexpected results in regard to federal grants for new projects. Unlike federal grants for renewal projects, the determinants of all expected indicators have directions not consistent with the hypothesis. Problem severity (i.e., total homelessness per capita), program ability (i.e., total beds per capita) and capacity (i.e., program numbers and types) are negatively associated with the amounts of federal grants for new projects in the CoC. These findings are interesting to further investigate. According to the decision standard for HUD in terms of the federal homelessness grant competition, local homelessness programs (i.e., CoC) are more likely to receive federal grants for new projects when they have higher problem severity, and better program capacity and ability than other local homelessness programs (i.e., CoC). However, the findings showed that the federal grants for new projects are more likely to distribute to local areas where there is less program capacity and ability, as well as less problem severity than other local area. One could assume that a federal agency may have strategic decisions with regard to awarding new project funds to local homelessness programs that have relatively less effective programs than other CoCs so as to assist them to become more effective than before. Otherwise, another possible explanation is that a federal agency (HUD) makes a strategic decision to allocate its homelessness grants to local programs with less capable and less effective than other local programs in order for
them to develop new projects to develop their capacity and ability. In this case, the negative association between problem severity and grant distribution of new projects can be explained by the fact that HUD chooses local areas where strong performance is relatively easy to achieve. However, these assumptions are not consistent with what HUD’s decision standard describes. Again, my expectation is that future researchers will examine this unexpected result.

Although this chapter provides meaningful empirical evidence to understand federal grant distribution mechanisms to local homelessness programs, this study has some limitations that need further examination. First, the findings may be limited to the homelessness programs; research in other policy areas may have different findings. Thus, future research should seek to verify whether the same indicators used in this study have significant impacts on the funding distributions to different policies and programs, in order to generalize these findings. Second, the sample data used in this chapter is limited as 208 county governments within 32 states are used in the analyses. Thus, the findings may be changed when we include more counties in future research. Last, these findings are limited to the structural perspectives of funding distributions between federal and local relationships; I was not able to understand the behavioral and managerial perspectives that determine the flow of federal funds. For example, Terman and her colleagues have surveyed local governments receiving federal grants to study management techniques and processes to receive the federal grants (Terman, Kassekert, Feiock, & Yang, 2016). Another possible way to bolster the findings is to use in-person interviews to understand what matters in intergovernmental grant mechanisms in order to complement the quantitative data analyses with the qualitative approach (see, Carley,
Nicholson-Crotty, & Fisher, 2015). Thus, the findings would be stronger when future research can survey program managers to assess the managerial practices and collaborative leadership needed during the application process to prepare for federal grants.

Overall, this chapter was intended to understand the intergovernmental mechanisms between federal government and local programs that determine the allocation of federal grant dollars. Based on the empirical findings, the intergovernmental grant system does not always follow a top-down model (see, Handley, 2008). As such, local governments and programs become vital players as service providers. Receiving stable financial resources can be one of the most important factors to successfully implementing programs as well as improve the program effectiveness.
Chapter 6: Collaboration, Strategic Planning, and Program Outcomes

The strategic planning process can be and often is highly collaborative. Interest in the importance of understanding collaborative mechanisms to develop strategic planning has existed for many decades, as noted by Bryson, Freeman, and Roering (1986). Nearly 25 years after this observation, Bryson, Berry, and Yang (2010) pointed out that there is still a dearth of research in the public sector strategic planning field that focuses specifically on collaboration. In spite of this gap in research, many public management scholars have argued for the important role of strategic planning as collaborative strategic management has become a major policy implementation tool for practitioners. For example, McGuire (2006) argued that “strategic planning by participants in the collaboration is one important way to develop an overall purpose and framework for the collaborative effort” (p. 37). However, practice has outpaced the empirical knowledge of the role and effectiveness of collaborative strategic plans and planning. It is this lack of awareness and understanding of the phenomenon that motivates the research presented in this chapter.

This study provides two contributions to the public sector strategic planning field. First, I examine 124 local government strategic plans on homelessness using content analysis. From this information, I identify key elements of collaborative strategic planning, which allows me to provide an in-depth look at how these local governments plan and what the planning process produces in the form of written plans. Second, I collected local homelessness population data provided by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to construct a rich dataset with multiple years
of information on local homelessness populations. These data, when linked to the analysis of the written plans, enable me to deploy a quantitative model that controls for oft-used socioeconomic factors but focuses primarily on strategic planning characteristics that may affect the success of efforts to reduce homelessness.

The primary contribution of the paper is to demonstrate how collaborative strategic planning and the resulting plans affect program outcome, which is local level homelessness population in this chapter. I believe the findings derived from this mixed-method analysis will clarify the missing linkage(s) between strategic planning and collaboration as well as provide meaningful guidance to practitioners for a better understanding of collaborative strategic planning.

Thus, research questions are the following:

- Does collaborative strategic planning make a difference in local homelessness programs?

- What are the determinants of successful strategic planning efforts to reduce homelessness?

This paper begins by clarifying important concepts and deriving empirical hypotheses from the vast literature on strategic planning and collaboration. Next, I explain a multi-methods approach, concentrating specifically on how I identified, collected, and analyzed a wealth of data. After I report the findings, the penultimate section discusses the overall impact of a collaboratively designed strategic plan and its
various components on program outcomes. I conclude by arguing that collaborative strategic planning is perhaps a necessary, but not sufficient, factor in alleviating homelessness.

**Explanation of Concepts and Hypotheses**

A strategic planning approach to public policy making and implementation is based in the idea that problems to be solved are dynamic and cannot be addressed through a static or one-time decision. Strategic planning, defined as “a deliberative, disciplined effort to produce fundamental decisions and actions that shape and guide what an organization (or other entity) is, what it does, and why it does it” (Bryson, 2011, pp. 7-8), has long been considered an innovative way to improve public organizational performance and thus promote program effectiveness (Berry, 1994; Bryson & Roering, 1987; Poister, Pasha, & Edwards, 2010). Multiple stakeholders and many different types and degrees of input from these stakeholders participate in strategic planning. Indeed, in order to achieve effective outcomes, strategic planning is often performed and implemented through a multi-person effort to reach and sustain strategic goals and objectives.

Previous research has also examined the affirming effects of strategic planning in the public sector. Since strategic planning is intended to improve organizational performance, much research has focused on these impacts. Streib and Poister (1990) found that public managers hold the perception that strategic planning is positively associated with a successful management system in city governments. Additionally, later work by Poister and Streib (2005) supports the argument that governments with strategic
planning are more likely to have performance management and performance measurement systems, as well as a performance budgeting system. Poister, Pasha, and Edwards (2010) found that formal strategic planning is positively associated with organizational performance in U.S. local transit agencies, which suggests the importance of clear guidance for local agencies to achieve outcomes. Related, Walker, Andrews, Boyne, Meier, and O’Toole (2010) pointed out that rational planning and active strategy content are positively associated with organizational performance. Conversely but consistently, the absence of strategy is associated with a negative impact on performance in local governments (Andrews, Boyne, Law, & Walker, 2009). One way to understand the existence of strategic planning is to see whether formal strategic plans are present or not. Using formal strategic plans can help to understand the results of strategic planning that identifies their goals, objectives, strategies, and workgroups. Further, ones could expect detailed understanding of strategic planning from strategic plans if there exists a large sample size of the strategic plans in a single public policy area. Thus, this previous research suggests the following hypothesis:

\[ H1: \text{The existence of a strategic plan will be associated with greater program outcomes (i.e., local homelessness population), all other factors being equal.} \]

It should be noted that other types of entities that do not have a strategic plan may have some managerial activities that can lead to positive program outcomes, but the absence of a strategic plan implies that it does not (or may not) have formal strategies and collaborative activities. In this chapter, my research interests focus on the effect of a
strategic plan, which means the effect of formal strategies and collaborative activities on alleviating a social problem. Thus, although other entities that do not have a strategic plan may still have a strategic vision and even collaborative activities, I define these entities as a comparison unit to examine the effect of active, formal strategic plan since a treatment in the empirical model is the existence of a strategic plan, not the presence of undistinguishable managerial activities.

The conventional approach to strategic planning views the process as being sequential. For example, Clarke and Fuller (2010, p. 86) define strategic planning performed collaboratively as, “The joint determination of the vision, and long-term collaborative goals for addressing a given social problem, along with the adoption of both organizational and collective courses of action and allocation of resources to carry out these courses of action.” This implies that the planning process, thus the plan itself, can be considered in terms of formulating goals and implementing strategies to achieve the goals. Throughout the planning process, multiple stakeholders are able to collaborate with other workgroups in order to achieve goals that cannot be achieved by single organizations. However, collaboration, which has been considered an effective way to solve wicked problems, is not easy to implement without a deliberative planning process. It is even more difficult when more stakeholders and voluntary groups participate in collaborative settings (Bryson, Crosby, & Ackermann, 2004). These participants need to have clearly identified implementation strategies in order to prevent unexpected, undefined work roles. Further, they could participate in the development of implementation strategies as well as set goals in the development of the formal strategic plan. Indeed, the Bryson approach allows for many iterations and feedback throughout
the process, but the sequence of plan components remains implicit and most time explicit. This distinction between formulation and implementation is not trivial, as strategic plans that have clear implementation steps are more apt to be managed effectively (Elbanna, Andrews, & Pollanen, 2016). Stakeholders and participants will elucidate their visions, interests, goals, and objectives, but I assume that the more important components of a high quality plan are the implementation strategies that involve collaborative participants identifying specific resource needs, a timeline, and the partners through which implementation will occur. I thus hypothesize:

*H2: The explicit use of implementation steps in a strategic plan will be associated with greater program outcomes (i.e., local homelessness population), all other factors being equal.*

The strategic planning process typically is based in a number of interactions among the various actors taking part in the process. Understanding each other is important to develop a harmonious, positive work environment in collaborative settings. The actors share their concerns and challenges in order to develop common sense strategies produced by the interactive processes. Thus, strategic planning is a flexible process where participants share many positive values that can lead to collaborative advantage (or, alternatively, result in a lack of progress) (Huxham & Vangen, 2005). The benefits of collaborative strategic planning are derived from the fact that such planning is the result of a negotiation among the stakeholders and participants (Nathan & Mitroff, 1991). This negotiated order is based in an interactive process among the stakeholders
and participants to build a deliberative and comprehensive strategic plan for solving the most difficult public problems. The outcome of such negotiation is a strategic plan that should offer a clear understanding of the problems, action plans, and outcomes.

A negotiated order implies the presence of multiple actors in the planning process. It makes sense, theoretically as well as empirically, that I can analyze the strategic planning process within the context of collaboration. As the objective of collaboration is to solve wicked social problems that cannot be solved by single organizations, collaborative strategic planning is the process whereby participants (i.e., workgroups or stakeholders) collaborate with others in order to develop collaborative goals, objectives, strategies, and action plans, as well as to implement them to achieve program outcomes. These formal strategic plans can be understood as documents created from collaborative processes. The importance of collaborative strategic planning has been demonstrated by several authors (Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006; McGuire, 2006) and identified in previous research (see Bryson, 2010; Bryson, Berry, & Yang, 2010). For example, it has been shown empirically that the level of collaboration within city-level economic development was positively associated with the existence of a local strategic development plan (McGuire, 2000). Indeed, the likelihood of achieving an effective strategic planning process is enhanced when representatives of diverse organizations are included collaboratively in the process so as to include diverse perspectives from diverse stakeholders and participants. Strategic planning is thus a useful collaborative strategy. These arguments with respect to collaborative strategic planning lead to the following hypothesis:
H3: The greater diversity of the persons involved in strategic planning, the greater the program outcomes (i.e., local homelessness population), all other factors being equal.

So what is meant by collaboration and its role in strategic planning? Collaboration as a practice emerged before any scholarly understanding of collaboration as an empirical phenomenon. Although recent research often describes collaboration in novel terms, there is a rich history that precedes it. Agranoff and McGuire (2003) approach collaboration from a management perspective while arguing that the recent spate of attention to collaborative public management suggests its newness, but that there is ample evidence to suggest that managers have practiced collaborative public management for quite some time (McGuire, 2006). Writing in an era when collaborative management was largely a scholarly afterthought, Grodzins argued, “federal-state-local collaboration is the characteristic mode of action” in American federalism (1960, p. 266). Indeed, American federalism was in the distant past and remains the setting for bargaining and negotiation, designing practical but sometimes complex structures within which administration occurs, and “working out” issues that precludes go-it-alone strategies from any level of government.

On the other hand, the benefits of collaborative strategic planning are often due to local governments being closest to the problem that needs to be addressed. Local collaborative strategic planning can also fall short due to the limited resources available in many cities. Some research suggests that a regional or inter-local system that includes nongovernmental organizations may provide better results than single local governmental
activities. For example, Abels (2014) highlighted the importance of regional strategic planning that incorporates collaborative efforts among various local organizations. Thus, given the emphasis on local and collaborative development of strategic plans, I hypothesize the following:

H4: Collaborative strategic planning motivated by mandated requirements from the federal or state government to local governments will be associated with lower program outcomes (i.e., local homelessness population), all other factors being equal.

Whether one speaks of finding solutions or managing specific processes toward “making things happen” in situations where a single entity cannot take on a challenge alone (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003; Vangen & Huxham, 2003), collaboration can be conceptualized as strategic in practice. The strategic nature of collaboration makes planning for the future a central component of successful collaboration. Although all earlier research on collaborative strategic planning provides significant and meaningful evidence to support the important roles of collaborative strategic planning at the local level, I aim to demonstrate the linkage between collaborative strategic planning and the effects of those plans on program outcomes.

The context for an examination of collaborative strategic planning is homelessness. Homelessness has been and continues to be one of the most urgent social problems in the U.S. Due to the complex nature of such social problems, many issues must be resolved through collaborative frameworks. Homelessness in the United States is
one such problem that cannot adequately be solved by single government organizations or by a single program. Homelessness is related to other social ills, including drug addiction, crime, unemployment, and mental illness (Draine, Salzer, Culhane, & Hadley, 2002; Thompson, Wall, Greenstein, Grant, & Hasin, 2013). Typically and historically, local governments have initiated homelessness policies because the incidence of homelessness is easily influenced by many local characteristics such as economic, housing, and weather conditions (Fitzpatrick, Bramley, & Johsen, 2012). As a result, previous research on homelessness is mainly focused on the individual and social characteristics of homelessness individuals (Early, 2004; Orwin, Scott, & Arieira, 2003). For example, unemployment and poverty rates are strongly associated with homelessness (Mansur, Quigley, Raphael, & Smolensky, 2002; Quigley & Raphael, 2001). In addition, the quality and quantity of local housing conditions are other factors that affect homelessness (Quigley, Raphael, & Smolensky, 2001).

Relatively little is known about the effectiveness of public programs on the incidence of homelessness. While acknowledging the local legislative and administrative efforts to curb homelessness, the federal, state, and local governments in the U.S. have recently been engaged in planning to address the widespread problem of homelessness. The intent of the planning is to establish strategies that, when implemented, will lower the rate of homelessness. The planning processes are intergovernmental, interagency, and cross-jurisdictional.

Much research has focused on the role of various sectors in homelessness policy. Relatively recent research has shown the prominence of nongovernmental organizations in the provision of shelters for the homeless population, given their community service
mission (Fyall & McGuire, 2015). Consistent with this assumption that nonprofit organizations may have a greater community orientation, some research shows that nonprofits can work in more distressed neighborhoods and pay more attention to broader neighborhood benefits (Ellen & Voicu, 2006; O’Regan & Quigley, 2000). In addition, Koebel (1998) argues that nonprofit organizations in particular are much more likely to build and provide housing that will be affordable permanently, not just during the length of a government subsidy. In essence, nongovernmental organizations often successfully lead strategic planning activities in local homelessness programs. This research suggests the following:

\[
H5: \text{Collaborative strategic planning efforts led by representatives of nongovernmental organizations will be associated with greater program outcomes (i.e., local homelessness population), all other factors being equal.}
\]

**Data and Method**

**Data.** The data for this mixed-methods study are derived from multiple sources. First, I collected quantitative information on homelessness, including data on the numbers of homeless, the various types of homelessness, and numerous demographic data. These data were gleaned primarily from U.S. government sources. The data collected enabled me to construct a panel dataset of homeless data in 208 U.S. county governments over 10 years from 2005 to 2014. The unit of analysis is county government.
Second, I conducted a content analysis of all homelessness strategic plans from these counties. Content analysis enables us to understand complicated phenomena in the social sciences that is often unstructured (Bazeley & Jackson, 2013; Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). To conduct the content analysis, I first collected the list of active strategic plans on homelessness that focused on the county level. I started to collect a list of local governmental strategic plans on homelessness provided by the U.S. Interagency Council on Homelessness (USICH). Based on the list provided by USICH, I selected strategic plans that cover county geographic regions in order to match them with other variables in dataset. I initialized the draft of strategic plans, and compared it with the information provided by the National Alliance to End Homelessness (NAEH), which is a national level nonprofit agency, in order to check any missing plans or inactive plans. After that, I visited all county governmental websites that existed in an initial list in order to determine whether the plans are still active or not. In addition, I visited other county governmental websites, which are listed in the dataset, to find if they have strategic plans on homelessness. I took a repetitive process to develop an exhaustive list of strategic plans at the county level. Finally, I developed the list of 146 strategic plans from 124 county governments. The distribution of county governments that have the strategic plans in the U.S. are listed in Table 6-1.
Based on the 146 strategic plans, I conducted a repetitive coding process that originated in thoroughly reading the strategic plans. I used suggested items that affect the quality of the strategic plans provided by Bryson in his seminal book (Bryson, 1995). The suggested items allow me to answer “what, why, when, who, how” questions, which helps to verify the needs and the usage of the strategic plans to improve organizational performance or address social issues. These items include issue identification, mission, vision, purpose, value, goal, objective, strategy, action plan, outcome, responsible organizations, resource, and timeline. In addition, I examined the collaborative strategic planning processes to develop as well as implement the strategic plans. These items include the type of leading agency, a ratio of governing boards, a type of meeting and communication techniques, a ratio of participating organizations during the implementation period, and so on. In order to collect these information, I then highlighted
specific words, sentences, terms, and paragraphs from ten sample plans that were based in my research interests. After that, I employed an auto-coding process with NVivo software. I carefully analyzed each part selected by the auto-coding process to verify its validity and reliability. I then coded each part and converted them into many quantitative variables, which enables me to blend the qualitative information from the strategic plans and the homelessness program data into a single dataset. The data description and summary statistics are reported in Tables 6-2 and 6-3.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome Variable</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsheltered Homelessness</td>
<td>Total homeless people who do not stay in sheltered area but observed on the street when HUD counts homelessness annually.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Treatment Variable</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Plan</td>
<td>Existence of local strategic plan on homelessness (1 if yes and 0 if otherwise)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Planning Context Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vertical Need</td>
<td>Local plan developed in response to federal or state governmental activities (1 if yes and 0 if otherwise)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO Leading</td>
<td>NGO is the lead agency to develop and implement the local plan (1 if yes and 0 if otherwise)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collaborative Group Scope</td>
<td>Number of organizational types in collaborative working group to develop and implement the local plan (Index: 0 – 13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning Quality</td>
<td>Number of planning elements in the local plan (Index: 0 – 5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementing Quality</td>
<td>Number of implementing elements in the local plan (Index: 0 – 4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (Log)</td>
<td>Total county population in a year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Income (Log)</td>
<td>Median county level household income in a year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment (%)</td>
<td>Percentage of the population in a year and county who are unemployed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty (%)</td>
<td>Percentage of the population in a year and a county who live at or below the poverty level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Rent (Log)</td>
<td>Median county level gross rent in a year</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6-3. Summary Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Observation</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome Variable</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsheltered Homelessness per 10,000 population</td>
<td>2,059</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>8.539</td>
<td>18.786</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Treatment Variable</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Plan</td>
<td>2,077</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>0.498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Planning Context Variable</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Local Plan=1)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Vertical Need</td>
<td>947</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>0.481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO Leading</td>
<td>947</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>0.493</td>
</tr>
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<td>Collaborative Group Scope</td>
<td>947</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>6.279</td>
<td>2.776</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning Quality Scope</td>
<td>947</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>3.065</td>
<td>1.052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementing Quality Scope</td>
<td>947</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>1.161</td>
<td>1.155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control Variable</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (Log)</td>
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<td>208</td>
<td>12.932</td>
<td>0.903</td>
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<tr>
<td>Median Income (Log)</td>
<td>2,075</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>10.898</td>
<td>0.250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment (%)</td>
<td>2,077</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>7.178</td>
<td>3.196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty (%)</td>
<td>2,075</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>13.533</td>
<td>5.222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Rent (Log)</td>
<td>2,074</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>6.774</td>
<td>0.256</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Measurement. Outcome Variable.** The dependent/outcome variable is the number of unsheltered homelessness individuals in each county. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) provides annual reports of homelessness at the local level. A community-wide and locally-based homelessness program called the Continuum of Care (CoC) manages the reports. Some CoCs cover one single county; others cover more or less than one single county. In order to be consistent, I used data based only in county level homelessness populations since my primary source of qualitative information is the county strategic plan. Further, I use the count of unsheltered homeless individuals, which is the most difficult population to address, as the dependent variable. Typically, strategies to end homelessness are based in providing both short-term and long-term housing. Homeless individuals who stay in short-term housing are still
included by HUD in the number of total homeless. A test of the effect of strategic planning on unsheltered homelessness thus provides the most stringent test of program outcomes. Additionally, I standardized this variable (i.e., unsheltered homelessness per 10,000 population) so that I can directly compare program outcomes, regardless of county size.

**Treatment Variable.** The primary treatment or explanatory variable for my analyses is the existence of a homelessness strategic plan. This variable is coded 1 if a strategic plan is present and 0 if otherwise. The criteria to create this dummy variable is based on the strategic plans that published the year and the histories of the development of the strategic plans. I found 124 county strategic plans from the 208 counties studied. In order to gather the data for this variable, I first accessed two lists of local strategic plans provided by the U.S. Interagency Council on Homelessness (USICH) and the National Alliance to End Homelessness (NAEH) to find which counties have strategic plans. I searched each county’s website to confirm that the collected plans were still active. In addition to the strategic plans identified from the two agencies, I used search engines to find any additional county strategic plans in order to exhaust the search.

**Planning Context Variable.** I created five planning context variables to understand successful collaborative planning strategies. I used content analysis to convert qualitative codes into quantitative variables in order to develop the five variables. As my main interest is collaborative planning strategies, I classified several codes to include the contents of collaborative planning strategies, such as initiating the process, identifying
the lead agency, identifying the agency types in collaborative activities, and the various qualities or components of the plans.

One such variable (which I call “vertical”) captures whether the plan is developed in response to federal or state governments’ requirements or not. The “vertical” variable thus is coded “1” if it responded to “higher-level” governments and is coded “0” if the plan is developed in response to requests of nongovernmental organizations or local governments. Another one of the planning context variables (“NGO leading”) is coded “1” if the explicit lead agency for developing and implementing the plan is a nongovernmental agency, and is coded “0” if a leading agency is a governmental agency. The variable named “Collaborative Group Index” is an index variable of 13 agency types involved in the planning process (federal representative agency, state representative agency, local representative agency, federal administrative agency, state administrative agency, local administrative agency, general nonprofit agency, health special agency, housing special agency, academic or research agency, faith-based agency, for-profit agency, and current or former homeless groups). This variable is coded “0” if no collaborative group exists, “13” if all agency types are involved in collaborative group, or a number between zero and 13 that represents the actual number of groups involved in the planning process. “Planning Quality” is an index variable that measures the number of essential components included in the strategic plans. This variable includes 5 planning components (vision statement, mission statement, goal identification, strategies, and action plans), and is coded “0” if the plan does not explicitly explain one of these statements, “5” if the plan provides all five statements, or a number between zero and five that represents the actual number of components in each plan. “Implementing
Quality” is also an index variable that explains the existence of various implementation components. This variable includes 4 implementing processes (defining outcomes, identifying partners in implementation, identifying resources needed, and a timeline), and is coded “0” if the plan has none of these statements, “4” if the plan contains all the implementing processes, or a number between zero and four that represents the actual number of implementation processes in each plan.

**Control Variables.** I include a vector of control variables that captures county-specific socioeconomic and housing characteristics that are often linked to the incidence of homelessness. These variables include the logged county population, logged median household income in the county, the percentage of unemployed individuals in the county, the percentage of individuals living in the county below the poverty level in county level, and the logged median gross rent in the county.

**Method.** To test the hypotheses that address the effects of strategic plans and collaborative planning strategies, I analyzed two empirical models. The first model aims to examine the effect of strategic plan on program outcomes (i.e., unsheltered homelessness in a county level). This model adopts a fixed effects model since observations are bounded by the county level. Fixed effects models use within estimators so that I am able to examine the effects of strategic plans within county as a key independent variable. Additionally, fixed effects models help to correct possible endogeneity bias caused by time-invariant, unit-specific characteristics. As my observations are at the county level, I can assume that county-specific characteristics,
especially those that cannot be captured by the empirical models (i.e., unobserved characteristics), may cause endogeneity problems if not accounted for. Using county fixed effects provides an easy way to control for time-invariant, county-specific characteristics that may affect homeless people. Additionally, my empirical strategy attempted to control for time-varying, county-specific characteristics using a list of control variables. However, a fixed effects model does not guarantee causal inference, as there are still unobserved, time-varying characteristics that cannot be controlled by the empirical model. Thus, I must cautiously interpret the association between program outcomes and the independent variables.

The second model adopts a random effects model as key independent variables are merely changed over time (i.e., time-invariant variables) in the sub-sample analysis, which I only selected county variables that implement the strategic plans. Fixed effects models re inappropriate to use as time-invariant characteristics of the unit being fixed disappear in fixed effects models. Additionally, I controlled for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in my final model.

I also employed several statistical tests to verify the models. First, a Hausman test shows that a fixed effects model is preferred to a random effects model (Wooldridge, 2013, p. 496). Second, in the presence of heteroscedasticity, one cannot argue that estimators are unbiased. I used a Wald test for heteroscedasticity and found that heteroscedasticity is suspected in the error terms. Thus, standard errors used in the analysis are robust in order to correct for this problem. Third, I employed an F-test for joint significance of the temporal differences since I used a panel dataset. Moreover, the convention is that when panel data contain large groups with relatively few time
observations (i.e., large N and small T), separate intercepts for each time period is appropriate to use in order to account for effects for all units within the same time (Wooldridge, 2010, p. 170). Adding year fixed effects provides the same logic as including year dummy variables in the models. The test result indicates that year dummies are not jointly significant; thus, I should include a year dummy (i.e., time fixed effects) to control for the temporal difference over the 10-year period. Last, I employed a Wooldridge test for serial correlation. Serial correlation produces less efficient estimators because the standard errors are biased and I cannot assume the independence of observations (Drukker, 2003). The test result shows the presence of serial correlation in the error terms. To correct the serial correlation, I used feasible generalized least squares regression with the corrections of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity.

My final empirical models include various county-specific, time-varying variables as well as county and year fixed effects to reduce possible bias caused by county-specific characteristics, as well as heteroscedasticity and serial correlation in the error terms. Using these models, I first tested the effect of a strategic plan on unsheltered homelessness. Second, I used sub-sample analysis to explore the successful determinants of collaborative planning strategies on homelessness since my main research interest is to understand successful collaborative planning efforts in local homelessness activities.

Findings

The findings are presented in Tables 6-4 and Table 6-5. My test of the first hypothesis examines the impact of a strategic plan on local homelessness. This test analyzes whether the existence of a county level homelessness strategic plan provides
positive program outcomes compared with those counties without strategic plans. The presence of a strategic plan means that counties formulate formal multi-organizational arrangements to plan and implement strategies. It can be argued that counties without strategic plans still have some degree of activity to reduce homelessness. However, my interests in this test are specifically focused on the existence of formal plans and their impact on target outcomes. Second, although not all counties with strategic plans have the same levels of collaborative activities, all strategic plans highlight the role of collaborative activities. They have been created by multi-organizational arrangements (i.e., councils, coalitions, networks, partnerships, and so on) that focused on the formal planning activities. Thus, the effect of a strategic plan does imply the effect of formal collaborative strategies on homelessness.

Table 6-4. Testing the effects of local strategic plans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1 without Controls</th>
<th>Model 2 with Controls</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>Standard Error</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Plan</td>
<td>-2.00*</td>
<td>1.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (Log)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Income (Log)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment (%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty (%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Rent (Log)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County FE</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year FE</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observation</td>
<td>2,062</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-test</td>
<td>5.29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prob &gt; F</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*: Clustered robust standard error
Significance level: * < 0.1, ** < 0.05, *** < 0.01
As shown in Table 6-4, hypothesis one (H1) is not rejected as I find that counties with strategic plans have, on average, two less unsheltered homeless individuals per 10,000 population. Although the impact seems small, this result is consistently statistically significant in an additional model where I include control variables. Moreover, in large counties, say one with 300,000 residents, the effect can be quite large; in such a county, the presence of a collaborative strategic plan would reduce homelessness by approximately 60 persons. This finding supports the prominence of strategic plans on program outcomes and enables us to further explore the various components in the strategic plans.

Next, I conducted a sub-sample analysis where I focus on counties with strategic plans. The motivation of this model is that program effectiveness could vary as plans have different levels of collaborative strategies. For example, some plans were designed with relatively homogeneous agency types in the collaborative planning process; others have diverse agencies. Further, some plans are led by nongovernmental agencies that develop and implement the strategic planning process; others do not.
Table 6-5. Testing the effects of planning contexts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error^</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vertical</td>
<td>1.72**</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonprofit Leading</td>
<td>-0.29</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Scope</td>
<td>-0.58****</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning Quality</td>
<td>1.35***</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implement Quality</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (log)</td>
<td>-1.62****</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Income (log)</td>
<td>-20.77***</td>
<td>2.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment (%)</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty (%)</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Rent (log)</td>
<td>25.76***</td>
<td>2.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

County FE            | N            |
Year FE              | Y            |
County               | 120          |
Observation          | 933          |
Wald chi2            | 387.56       |
Prob > chi2          | 0.00         |

^: Clustered robust standard error
Significance level: * < 0.1, ** < 0.05, *** < 0.01

The results in Table 6-5 provide various readings of the analysis. First, I found that particular components of a strategic plan are related to the number of unsheltered homeless. H2 suggests that while many components of a strategic plan should be associated with program outcomes, implementation components will be positively associated with program outcomes. Both types of plan components (planning and implementing) should be correlated with outcomes. Contrary to the hypothesis, detailed and specific indications of implementation processes in the plans do not provide favorable impacts on the number of unsheltered homelessness individuals. Further, planning components are related positively to outcomes, as are implementation components, but in a statistically significant way. Hypothesis 2 thus is rejected.

The third hypothesis (H3) states that the diversity of the planning team will be negatively related to the number of unsheltered homeless (that is, positive outcomes). So
much of the literature in collaboration suggests that “the more diverse, the merrier” approach will lead to positive program outcomes. I have statistically significant results that show this is true. The results indicate that more diversity in collaborative activities is associated with lower homelessness. Hypothesis 3 is supported.

Hypothesis 4 implies that counties that develop strategic plans in response to “vertical” governmental requirements will experience worse program outcomes than counties that developed strategic plans in response to horizontal and locally based requests from local agencies or homeless advocates. I find support for this hypothesis (H4). This finding indicates that resolving local issues through inter-local means is an important variable. Finally, counties do not have significantly different results in program outcomes when a collaborative strategic planning process is led by a nongovernmental agency. The magnitude is quite small compared with other indicators. One can argue that the important characteristics are characteristics of collaborative group rather than a leading agency of strategic planning process. So, I cannot argue that collaborative planning strategies may be more effective when they are led by nongovernmental local agencies. Hypothesis 5 is rejected.

Discussion

The objective of this paper is to demonstrate the impact of a collaboratively designed strategic plan and its various components on program outcomes. In the context of my research, the program outcomes are the number of hardcore (unsheltered) homeless individuals in a county. I offer a careful, mixed-methods analysis to examine whether collaborative planning is an effective tool for reducing homelessness. The experience of
multiple decades of homeless policies suggests that it is very difficult in practice to make
headway on such a seemingly intractable social problem. However, even though
homelessness is assumed to be caused primarily by socioeconomic conditions, I found
that strategic planning, performed collaboratively, can make a positive difference on
reducing the number of homeless individuals. I also identified particular parts of both the
strategic plan and the planning process that can improve outcomes.

So what is novel about this research? First, I am able to isolate, quantitatively and
over time, the actual effect of the existence of a collaborative strategic plan on
homelessness. We see that the difference between having such a plan in place and not
having a plan can mean hundreds fewer unsheltered homeless in medium- to large-sized
counties. Even in relatively smaller communities, the reduction in unsheltered homeless
individuals is meaningful progress toward alleviating the problem.

Second, I am able to isolate what explains program outcomes in those counties
with a strategic plan. There is great variation in outcomes in those counties with a plan,
but particular components of a strategic plan do make a difference. For example, it
appears that a strategic planning process performed as a “vertical” requirement is
significantly associated with a higher number of unsheltered homeless. A bottom-up,
more “horizontal” approach is not only prescribed by strategic planning theorists, but is
shown to have a statistically significant impact on reducing homelessness.

Third, I found that multiple parties involved in the strategic planning process lead
to effective program outcomes. Programs outcomes are, in fact, greater the greater the
diversity of the planners. The assumption that “more diverse is better” holds up in this
analysis. As the nature of homelessness characteristics are complicated by other social
issues, such as drug, education, health, and so on, it appears that the existence of diverse professional and nongovernmental advocates may allow planning teams to be more effective at dealing with many aspects of homelessness.

Fourth, I find unexpected but significant associations between planning and less effective program outcomes. Although the finding may not diminish the importance of basic planning components such as a mission statement or a vision statement; I expect future research is expected in this finding.

The analysis reported here points to factors that can help alleviate homelessness in counties. I have taken the advice of prominent researchers in strategic planning and collaboration, who argue that, “…longitudinal, multilevel, multimethod comparative case studies that collect rich qualitative and quantitative data” (Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2015, p. 13) are the preferred model for answering questions about collaboration (and seemingly other phenomena). My mixed-methods, longitudinal approach to this analysis enables me to isolate specific characteristics of collaborative strategic planning that contribute to positive program outcomes. However, there are limitations to the research that should be overcome in future work. The dataset I exploited was built variable-by-variable, case-by-case, and year-by-year, but missing variables can bias the estimators. Also, although the number of observations is large due to the panel dataset, the number of counties with collaborative homelessness strategic plans that I studied in final analyses is just 124. Collecting, analyzing, and reporting on 124 actual plans is laborious, but I believe I was able to find everything available. Still, there could be missing plans. I have also taken great care with the statistical analysis to check the accuracy and robustness of the findings.
Conclusion

Homelessness is one of the most intractable social and economic problems in the U.S., but this analysis demonstrates that collaborative strategic planning may be one mechanism to address the problem. Strategic planning is a flexible process where various actors can share many positive values that can lead to collaborative advantage. Well-constructed strategic plans based in collaborative working environments can explicitly identify goals and actors, as well as the resources and action plans needed to improve program outcomes. As a result, the development and implementation of strategic planning can create positive synergy and plentiful benefits in collaborative activities. Although previous literature has clearly identified, conceptually, the meaningful link between collaborative strategic planning and program outcomes, I have tried to fill this research gap in order to establish the linkage empirically. Homelessness will not disappear completely as a result of a collaborative strategic planning process, but much headway can be made toward strategically and collaboratively alleviating this social ill.
Chapter 7. Conclusion

Findings

This dissertation aims to understand the important roles of intergovernmental processes and governmental activities by evaluating three homelessness programs. These programs include different levels of governments and different types of organizations, and highlight the important, but often underappreciated roles, of intergovernmental processes. These processes, or mechanisms as I have called them in this dissertation, include program alignment between the federal and state governments, grant processes between the federal government and local programs, and collaborative strategic planning processes among local governments and organizations. These mechanisms have been evaluated within the context of program outcomes and effectiveness. Previous research on multi-organizational arrangements in public management and policy contexts has mainly focused on studies of collaborative structures and processes as they are related to local governments and NGOs, both of which are major service providers at the local level in the American federal system. However, vertical intergovernmental mechanisms are considered only sparingly in recent research, even though many cases of intergovernmental public policies and programs operate between the federal and state governments. Thus, this dissertation helps to fill the gap with regard to understanding effective multi-organizational arrangements on public program implementation.

In this dissertation, three empirical studies provide meaningful findings to understand the roles of intergovernmental mechanisms and the important roles of governments as related to homelessness program effectiveness and outcomes at the local
In this dissertation, the first empirical study (chapter 4) examined how vertical intergovernmental program alignment between federal and state governments affected local homelessness program outcomes. This study (chapter 4) employs a fixed effects panel analysis to examine the effects of federal homelessness programs on the county level homeless population by comparing the federal program’s differential impacts between county governments with vertical intergovernmental program alignment and county governments without vertical intergovernmental program alignment. In the second empirical study (chapter 5), I examined the factors that influence the allocation of federal grant monies for local homelessness programs. Using a panel data analysis, this study explored the importance of program characteristics as key determinants of receiving federal financial support in intergovernmental relationships. The final empirical study (chapter 6) examined whether governments play significant roles in local homelessness program effectiveness. Using a mixed method approach, this study examined the effects of county governments’ strategic plans on homelessness as well as the effects of collaborative strategic planning in strategic plans aimed at the local homeless population.

Overall, the empirical evidence from these three studies explain the important roles of intergovernmental mechanisms (from the first and second empirical studies) and governmental activities (from the third empirical study) on local homelessness program effectiveness and outcomes. The empirical evidence presented in this dissertation highlights my argument that intergovernmental mechanisms are serious concepts to account for in program implementation. Generally, I find that vertical intergovernmental mechanisms such as program alignment and grant mechanisms provide productive,
positive influences on local homelessness programs. Using a top-down approach to understand multi-organizational arrangements that constitute intergovernmental mechanisms, one can see that intergovernmental program alignment between the federal and state governments provides positive, meaningful influences on the number of homeless individuals at the local level. This finding helps us to consider vertical intergovernmental relationships as beneficial structures rather than as barriers to local program effectiveness. Using a bottom-up approach to understand multi-organizational arrangements that incorporate intergovernmental mechanisms, one can see that federal financial support, which is necessary for local actors who implement public policies and programs effectively, is not affected by political reasons, but determined by local program characteristics, such as capacity and ability. This finding demonstrates that the federal government does consider local program characteristics, but not local homelessness conditions, when allocating financial support. Finally, I found that county governments can take a leading role in developing and implementing collaboratively designed strategic plans in order to provide effective program outcomes.

More specifically, each empirical chapter offers meaningful empirical evidence to support the necessity of understanding the important roles of intergovernmental mechanisms as related to public program effectiveness and outcomes. Chapter 4 shows that intergovernmental program alignment provides positive impacts on local homelessness outcomes. As Opening Doors is aimed at ending homelessness in the U.S., it is reasonable to surmise that program impacts may affect entire county regions, regardless of the intergovernmental alignment between the federal and state governments. However, Opening Doors actually turns out to have different impacts on local homeless
populations as county governments within vertically aligned programs (between federal (USICH) and state (SIC) governments) have greater program impacts (Opening Doors) than county governments without vertically aligned programs.

The findings demonstrate that Opening Doors alone cannot provide a significant impact on county level homelessness outcomes; it is highly probable that there are significant impacts on county level homeless populations when the county governments have vertically aligned programs between the federal and state governments. Intergovernmental alignment thus leads to positive, significant outcomes. Further, the effects of Opening Doors on local homeless populations are consistently significant after adding a series of control variables aimed at reducing a possible endogeneity bias caused by socioeconomic and housing characteristics at the county level or by other governmental efforts, such as county governments’ own strategic plans on homelessness or federal agency’s financial supports. Thus, the empirical evidence of the first study sought to provide a clear understanding of the effects of an intervention (Opening Doors) on program outcomes. As such, the findings from this study (chapter 4) show that program effectiveness occurs significantly at the right place (i.e., where SIC exists) in the right time (i.e., after Opening Doors).

The second empirical study (chapter 5) attempted to explain the factors that influence the allocation of federal homelessness grants to local homelessness programs, based on program characteristics and problem severity rather than on political and administrative perspectives of local governments, the latter of which have been frequently examined in previous research. This study analyzed a local homelessness program (i.e., CoC), operated by HUD. The findings show that local homelessness
programs that have proven their abilities through previous performance and have greater
program composition (i.e., size and scope of projects) were more likely to receive federal
grants than other local programs in the competitive intergovernmental grant system.
These findings support the argument that federal agencies consider local program
characteristics when allocating financial resources based on the outcome-driven,
performance-oriented management system. The flow of federal grants increases when
local programs have the ability to perform well as well as have high levels of scope and
size of program components.

Unlike the above two factors, program capacity had somewhat unexpected results.
I employed three indicators to measure program capacity: program numbers (size),
program types (scope), and service provider numbers (participants). Both program
numbers and program types were positively related to the amount of federal grants in that
federal homelessness grants were more likely to be awarded to local programs with
greater program numbers and program types. Further, unlike the federal grant system’s
assumptions, program ability (previous performance) and capacity (program size and
scope) have negative impacts on federal homelessness grants for new local homelessness
projects. Further, problem severity (homeless population ratio) and service providers’
size are insignificantly related with federal homelessness grants for new local
homelessness programs. Additionally, the findings indicate that problem severity is not
significant factor to allocate the federal grants to local programs. In order to provide a
better understanding of federal grant allocating mechanisms on local program
characteristics, further research is needed.
The third empirical study (chapter 6) provides an examination of the effects of collaborative strategic planning on local homelessness outcomes. The results of this study show that county governments with strategic homelessness plans have greater program outcomes (unsheltered homeless population) than county governments that did not have such strategic plans. This finding supports the view that governments are central to the local public program implementation process. Although NGOs are still major service providers at the local level, local governments are able to play important roles as policy initiators since they provide supportive environments for NGOs to effectively provide public services.

In addition, this study evaluated the types of collaborative strategic planning processes, using a content analysis focused on county strategic plans. There are four meaningful empirical findings. First, county governments that developed their strategic plans in response to state governmental requests had less effective outcomes than county governments that developed their strategic plans in response to locally based third sector requests, such as civil society, nonprofit organizations, and homelessness advocates. Second, county governments that have diverse groups of board members in the development and implementation stages of their strategic plans have more effective outcomes than county governments that had homogenous groups in these stages. Third, contrary to my expectation, county governments that have a nonprofit agency as the program lead do not provide effective program outcomes. This finding requires further research to understand why local strategic planning process led by a nonprofit agency does not provide effective program outcomes in the collaborative strategic planning process at the local level. Finally, the quality of implementation as provided for in the
strategic plans is not an important factor for reaching effective program outcomes, while
the quality of the plan development process as provided in the strategic plans does lead to
significant, negative impacts on program outcomes. This finding may be due to the
limitation of data structure. Further investigation is needed to fully understand the effects
of the qualities of implementation and development processes listed in the formal
strategic plans.

Overall, this dissertation shows the underappreciated areas in multi-organizational
arrangements in public management and policy contexts. Based on the empirical
evidence of the three studies in this dissertation, intergovernmental “mechanisms” such
as program alignment, the federal grant process, and the importance of “governments”
should be considered as they aim to provide effective public services in order to achieve
policy goals that cannot be achieved by single organizations. This dissertation also
identified some unexpected results. For example, the size of the service provider was
negatively related to the flow of the federal grants to the local programs (chapter 5). This
finding may be due to the fact that local programs should have the right organizations to
serve high quality of local public service rather than many organizations for achieving
policy goals. However, this finding is somewhat inconsistent with what we have learned
from previous research. Thus, further research is necessary in order to understand why
such results have occurred while researching homelessness programs.

**Limitations**

Although this dissertation provides meaningful evidence to support the theoretical
frameworks and practical implications necessary to understand the important roles of
intergovernmental mechanisms in program effectiveness and outcomes, limitations still exist. The first limitation of this dissertation is data restriction. This dissertation uses a panel dataset of 208 county governments and three homelessness programs in the U.S. The unit of analysis is the county government and the outcome variables are the homeless population and federal homelessness grants at the county level. However, the 208 county governments selected for this research are not based on a random sampling, but instead are chosen by CoC programs and their homelessness information in their annual HUD reports. As explained earlier, one of the major roles of CoC programs is to collect homelessness population data and services in their geographic regions. Although 405 CoC programs cover entire geographic regions in the U.S., this dissertation only selected homelessness data from the 208 CoC programs that specifically covered a single county. This gave me the opportunity to merge the other dataset with county level census data and strategic plan information. It is possible to argue that 208 county governments were chosen by HUD to develop CoC programs as these county areas may have relatively higher homelessness population than other county areas that do not have a single CoC program within their regions. Thus, the findings of this dissertation should be interpreted with caution.

Second, 208 county governments is but a small sample of the total county governments in the U.S. As such, the empirical findings from the three studies can be criticized for lacking generalizability, due to a small sample size. The 208 county governments were fairly distributed across the four Census Bureau-designated regions in the U.S.: 1) Northeast, 2) Midwest, 3) South, and 4) West. Each region consists of about 50 county governments in the sample size of this dissertation. Moreover, the panel
dataset contained data from ten years, the period from 2005 to 2014, so that each county
government had almost 10 years of information with regard to their homeless-related data
and socioeconomic characteristics. Thus, the sample size used in this dissertation reflects
the entire regional characteristics of the homeless population in the U.S. between 2005
and 2014. Furthermore, the panel dataset gives us the ability to examine the causal
impacts of three homelessness programs on local homelessness outcomes and grants
distributions.

Third, another limitation focuses more on the empirical models than on the
dataset structure. The objectives of this dissertation were to test whether
intergovernmental mechanisms improved homelessness program effectiveness and
outcomes. Thus, major contributions also focused on the understanding of the structures
of multi-organizational arrangements that include intergovernmental mechanisms in order
to improve homelessness program effectiveness. For example, the first empirical study
provided the effect of the federal strategic plan on local homelessness outcomes, using
the intergovernmental program alignment. Additionally, the second empirical study
informed us of the importance of local program characteristics with regard to
understanding the distribution of federal grants in an intergovernmental system. Finally,
the third empirical study explored the effects of county government strategic plans and
collaborative strategic planning on local homelessness outcomes. Thus, three empirical
studies broadly examined the research framework of this dissertation (see, Figure 2-2)
that includes vertical intergovernmental mechanisms and horizontal intergovernmental
mechanisms, as well as the roles of governments inside multi-organizational
arrangements.
The three empirical studies provide meaningful, important contributions to help the next generation understand the important roles of intergovernmental mechanisms on homelessness programs’ effectiveness and outcomes. However, the studies are still incomplete in that I have not accounted for the roles of managerial behaviors and collaborative processes through various intergovernmental mechanisms. Further, one could argue that the primary factor affecting program effectiveness is managerial practice. McGuire (2006) argued the important roles of managerial behaviors in order to motivate other participants from different organizations in multi-organizational arrangements. Given that, it is possible that the variation among county governments that had a SIC may be due to managerial practices that could vary by different types of government officials and public managers and which cannot be captured by the empirical models in this dissertation. Additionally, different types of organizations within the multi-organizational arrangements in the last empirical study may lead to different results when attempting to understand the county governments’ strategic plans. Again, it is difficult to capture such variations, although the mixed methods approach used in this dissertation enables me to cover new empirical ground.

Overall, given the limitations of this dissertation, we should interpret the empirical evidence with caution. However, the objectives of this dissertation were to highlight the important roles of intergovernmental mechanisms in public program effectiveness and highlight the outcomes of these intergovernmental processes. I believe these studies do just that. Given that, although I have not measured managerial practices and behaviors inside the structures, this dissertation offers a meaningful contribution to studies of multi-organizational arrangements in public management and policy contexts.
And although there are some limitations in the panel dataset that may not be completely generalizable, the methodologies used for the three empirical studies attempted to reduce possible endogenous bias with the purpose of improving the causal inference that enables us to understand the linkage between program effectiveness and outcomes based on intergovernmental mechanisms.

**Implications**

Based on the empirical evidence and findings from the three studies, this dissertation provided meaningful implications that were linked to theoretical frameworks related to understanding collaborations (i.e., multi-organizational arrangements) in public management and policy researchers.

**Research Implication.** In terms of a theoretical understanding of multi-organizational arrangements in public management and policy research, the empirical evidence in this dissertation broadly expands our understanding of collaboration in the American federal system. Particularly, this dissertation provides a better understanding of collaboration by verifying the collaborative effectiveness and actual program outcomes that had been proposed in previous research (see, Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006; Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2015). In addition, this dissertation helped link frameworks of collaboration with strategic planning and intergovernmental relations in order to broaden the theoretical and empirical foundation of the concept of collaboration. As explained earlier, collaboration is likely to be emergent in the presence of wicked social problems that cannot be solved easily by single organizations (Agranoff & McGuire, 2004).
Additionally, collaboration is most likely to occur when public managers recognize the importance of multi-organizational arrangements and efforts in turbulent environments (see, Agranoff & McGuire, 2001; Agranoff & McGuire, 2004; Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006; Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2015).

Thus, intergovernmental collaboration, which is the structure of and process among multiple agencies and other organizational arrangements, is understood as a strategic decision of public managers (or decision makers, government officials, or someone who has a leading role to deal with wicked social problems) in order to solve wicked social problems, achieve policy goals, and produce effective program outcomes. I argue that collaboration does not guarantee successful outcomes due to the difficulties that come from having too many participants with diverse cultures, goals, and objectives. As such, collaboration can lead to negative results (Huxham & Vangen, 2005; McGuire & Agranoff, 2011). This dissertation helped test some propositions that explain the important roles of the deliberative planning process among the participants or stakeholders, before and during the collaborative process.

As Bryson and his colleagues argued, collaboration is more likely to succeed when the deliberative planning process exists at the beginning of the collaborative structures so that all of the participants have shared goals and visions, as well as clearly identified action strategies (Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006). I have the empirical evidence in this dissertation that demonstrates the important roles of such deliberative processes based on the strategic plans of federal and county governments. Further, the findings from these empirical studies support the importance of governments as leading
agencies of multi-organizational arrangements as they are able to provide stable policy engines to other participants in order to achieve effective program outcomes.

In the presence of Opening Doors and local government strategic plans, the collaborative participants had better information related to their shared goals, visions, and action strategies during the collaborative process than those collaborative participants without strategic plans. As such, they were able to reduce the time and efforts needed to deal with unexpected events during the collaborative process (Innes & Booher, 1999a; Innes & Booher, 1999b). Further, it is possible to argue that the roles of governments become much more important in this case, as governments can provide legal authority and legitimacy that other types of organizations cannot provide. Overall, this dissertation supported the important roles of initial conditions, drivers, and linking mechanisms as related to understanding the important factor of strategic planning process in successful cross-sector collaboration frameworks found in Bryson, Crosby, and Stone’s conceptual research (2006; 2015).

This dissertation also helps expand the theoretical frameworks related to understanding multi-organizational arrangements by examining the theories of the strategic planning process. Bryson, Berry, and Yang (2010) discussed the important linkage between collaboration and strategic planning in studies of public organizations. As a means of solving wicked social problems, collaboration is used as a strategic decision of governments. As explained by Bryson, Crosby, and Stone (2006), collaborative advantage (Huxham & Vangen, 2005) can be accomplished through a deliberative strategic planning processes because negotiation and bargaining processes among collaborative participants are able to discern shared goals and reduce conflicts.
when the actual collaborative process starts. In this dissertation, the empirical evidence found that county governments that had collaborative strategic planning processes produced greater program outcomes than county governments without collaborative strategic planning processes. Considering collaboration (i.e., multi-organizational arrangements) as a strategic decision by which to solve wicked social problems, one can argue the important linkage between strategic planning and collaboration to create effective program outcomes.

In addition to strategic planning, this dissertation reemphasizes the important roles of intergovernmental mechanisms (i.e., program alignment and grant processes) on multi-organizational arrangements in public management and policy contexts. This dissertation examines the important, but underappreciated roles of intergovernmental mechanisms on program effectiveness and outcomes at the local level. In American federalism, intergovernmental relations must be treated seriously and explicitly in policy implementation at the local level. In particular, financial aspects of intergovernmental relations become even more important when local governments begin focusing on solving wicked social problems. As Kincaid (2011) suggested, the federal government still expects its financial and legal authorities to implement its policy goals through different levels of the government. For example, one my dissertation provides evidence that local governments that align vertically with a federal homelessness program are better off than local governments without such vertical alignment.

This dissertation also points out the important aspects of local program characteristics on fiscal relations between federal and local governments. As Zeemering and Romero (2011) found, the administrative capacity of local governments can be a
central reason to guarantee stable financial support in the American federal system. Consistent with this argument, this dissertation specifically points out that the federal government considers local capacity (i.e., size and scope of program components) and ability (i.e., ability to perform well) when allocating federal grant monies. Thus, this finding shows that intergovernmental grant allocation in a homelessness program is based on the perspective of program effectiveness that follows the outcome-driven, performance-oriented mechanisms based on the supply-side (i.e., program ability and capacity).

In addition to examining vertical intergovernmental relations, this dissertation also provides meaningful implications with regard to the horizontal aspects of intergovernmental relations. One empirical study raises an important aspect of horizontal intergovernmental relations among governments and NGOs for developing and implementing homelessness strategic planning processes. In this case, diverse parties involved in horizontal strategic planning process can play major strategic roles by addressing homelessness issues at the local level.

**Practical Implications.** This dissertation also provides several implications for practitioners and homelessness programs. First, I evaluated the effects of homelessness programs on actual homeless populations at the local (county) level and have provided the empirical evidence to demonstrate these programs’ effectiveness. From these empirical findings, one can argue that local governments should spend more time and effort developing their own strategic plans on homelessness in order to end homelessness. Further, these findings showed that managers of local homelessness programs should be
aware that different types of collaborative strategic planning processes could lead to
different results in the local homelessness population. For example, it is better to develop
a strategic plan based on locally based needs rather than on the requirements to receive
financial support from the state government.

Further, strategic plans developed by horizontal needs (i.e., bottom-up approach)
can perform better than strategic plans developed by vertical requirements (i.e., top-down
approach) in local homelessness programs. In addition, the collaborative strategic
planning process provided effective, positive outcomes when relatively large diverse
groups of organizations were involved in the planning process. In addition, an
implementation index, which includes other participants, the timeline, and the budget,
does not lead to effective program outcomes; explicitly identified planning components,
such as visions, goals, strategies, and action plans, were negatively related to program
outcomes. This finding requires further research.

In addition to local collaborative strategic planning, local government officials
and program managers of homelessness programs should be aware of their programs’
characteristics, such as previous performance and program capacity; types and numbers
of programs being operated; and diversities of their programs, as they are all important
indicators of predicting stable financial support from the federal government. It is
possible to argue that local program managers may consider strong, effective service
providers instead of several small service providers for those organizations that work for
their local homelessness programs. The federal government (HUD) may trust these local
programs. However, further study is required to explore this concept.
Finally, local homelessness problems are more likely to resolve when local (county) governments are located within state governments that have intergovernmentally aligned their homelessness programs with USICH. Thus, state government officials should consider developing SIC on homelessness in order to effectively deal with their local homelessness issue. Thus, homelessness programs in the U.S. should be governed by both vertical and horizontal intergovernmental mechanisms, as they include collaborative strategic planning processes.

**Future Research**

This dissertation looks at the important aspects of intergovernmental mechanisms and governmental activities on a research framework of multi-organizational arrangements in public management and policy contexts. In order to understand fully the effects of multi-organizational arrangements on public program effectiveness and outcomes, further research is needed to include managerial practices and collaborative processes that link both vertical and horizontal multi-organizational arrangements with their structures and actual program outcomes in empirical models. Although I employed a mixed methods approach to provide detailed information of collaborative strategic planning process, I also expect in-person interviews or actual program participations or observations to understand what actually happens in collaborative processes inside the black box of multi-organizational arrangements. Lastly, I expect further study to adopt a similar research framework in different policy and program areas in order to enhance the generalizability of the empirical findings of this dissertation.
References


Homeless Emergency Assistance and Rapid Transition to Housing: Continuum of Care Program; Interim Final Rule. 11 CFR 108 (2012).


## Appendix

### Appendix 2-1. List of Intergovernmental Research

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Authors</th>
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<td>Greenaway et al.</td>
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<td>May &amp; Winter</td>
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<td>Managing the Hollow State: Collaboration &amp; contracting</td>
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</table>
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Indiana University  
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Education  
Ph.D. in Public Affairs, Indiana University, July 2016  
(On leave for compulsory national service, January 2011-July 2013)  
 Majors: Public Management and Policy Analysis  
 Minor: Entrepreneurship from Kelley School of Business  
 Dissertatation: *Understanding Intergovernmental Mechanisms in U.S. Homelessness Policy Implementation*  
 Committees: Michael McGuire (Chair), Sergio Fernandez, Sean Nicholson-Crotty, Thomas Rabovsky

Master of Public Administration, University of Southern California, 2008

B.A. in Public Administration, Konkuk University, Korea, 2006

Academic Positions  
Visiting Lecturer, School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University,  
August 2016-

Conference Presentations  
“A Further Examination of Telework: Causal Inference of Telework Eligibility, Participation, and Non-Participation Reasons on Employee Attitudes” poster presented at the Association of Public Policy Analysis and Management Conference, Miami FL, November 2015 (with Sun Young Kim)

“Opening Doors to Collaboration: A Natural Experiment of Federal Collaborative Strategic Plans on Local Homelessness” presented at the American Political Science Association Conference, San Francisco CA, September 2015 (with Michael McGuire)

“Opening Doors to Collaboration: An Examination of Federal Collaborative Strategic Plans on Local Homelessness” presented at the Public Management Research Association Conference, Minneapolis MN, June 2015 (with Michael McGuire)

“A Quasi-Experimental Examination of Telework Arrangements in the U.S. Federal Government: Eligibility, Participation, and Frequency” presented at the Midwest Political Science Association Conference, Chicago IL, April 2015 (with Sun Young Kim)

“The Unexplainable Absence of Intergovernmental Management Research in an Intergovernmental World” presented at the Public Management Research Association Conference, Madison WI, June 2013 (with Michael McGuire and Rachel Fyall)
“Board Structural Independence and CEO’s Social Embeddedness among the Top: The Case of QUANGOs in South Korea” presented at the American Society for Public Administration Conference, Las Vegas NV, March 2012 (with Hyang-Won Kwon)

“The Contingent Value of Accountability in Public Management: The Effects of Political Elite Networks on Governance Composition of the Public Enterprises in South Korea” presented at the Korea Association of Public Administration International Conference, Seoul Korea, June 2011 (with Hyang-Won Kwon)

“The Minnowbrook Process: What Have We Learned?” panelist with H. George Frederickson, Sergio Fernandez, Beth Gazley, David Lee, and Rachel Fyall (one of two doctoral students asked to offer “Next Generation” comments), Workshop Colloquium Series, Indiana University, Bloomington IN, November 2010.

“Empirical Analysis of Causality between Social Expenditure and Income Inequality” presented at the Southeastern Conference of Public Administration Conference, Louisville KY, September 2009 (with Kwangbin Bae)

**Research Interests**
Public Administration and Management, Collaborative Public Management, Intergovernmental Management, Strategic Planning and Management, Human Resource Management

**Teaching Interests**
Public Administration and Management, Collaboration and Network Management, Organizational Theory and Behavior, Strategic Planning, Entrepreneurship, Program Evaluation, Research Methods

**Research Experience**
Research Assistant for Professor Michael McGuire, Indiana University, 2015-2016

Research Assistant for Professor Beth Gazley, Indiana University, spring 2009

**Teaching Experience**
Visiting Lecturer, Indiana University, August 2016-
V236: Management Concepts and Applications I in Public and Private Organizations (undergraduate level), fall 2016
K300: Statistical Techniques (undergraduate level), fall 2016

Associate Instructor (Instructor on Record), Indiana University, 2010-2015
K300: Statistical Techniques (undergraduate level) (6 sections)

Guest Lecturer, Indiana University
V672: Public Management and Organizations II (doctoral level), spring 2014
K300: Statistical Techniques (undergraduate level), spring 2014, spring 2015
Awards, Honors, & Grants
Pi Alpha Alpha, National Honor Society for Public Affairs and Administration, 2016
Conference Travel Grant, American Political Science Association Conference, 2015
Conference Travel Grants (4 awards), School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University, 2013-2015
Honorable Mention, Junior Asian Scholarship Award, American Society for Public Administration Conference, 2012
Ph.D. Fellowship (on leave, Jan 2011-July 2013), School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University, 2009-2016
Dean’s Merit Scholarship, School of Policy, Planning, and Development, University of Southern California, 2006-2008

Professional Activities
Member
Public Management Research Association
American Society for Public Administration
Association of Policy Analysis and Management
American Political Science Association
Reviewer
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management